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PREFACE
The seed of this project was planted in December of 2005. One month earlier, I
was presenting a paper on Reinhold Niebuhr’s normative contribution to international
relations at the annual meeting of the Illinois Political Science Association. My plan was
to follow up on my initial observations and write a work of some length on the subject.
Between November and December, I had amassed a considerable bibliography of works
by and about Niebuhr, as I hoped to propose a dissertation about him after submitting
final grades for the fall term. In my preparations, I came across an intellectual biography
of Niebuhr entitled The Constant Dialogue by Richard Halliwell. Niebuhr had often been
criticized for being an inconsistent thinker who held various and even contradictory
opinions throughout his career. Yet this was not seen by Halliwell as a defect of Niebuhr,
but Niebuhr’s strength as a theologian and as a critic. Niebuhr’s willingness to consider
perspectives other than his own helped him to respond to changing circumstances. Given
that Niebuhr’s career spanned two world wars, a cold war, a civil rights movement, and
the general instability that occurred in American life in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s,
Niebuhr witnessed more change than most philosophers. This made me consider what a
good philosopher should do. Should a good philosopher doggedly defend his position,
however untenable? Or should a good philosopher pursue the truth in light of new
evidence, even when it contradicts his philosophy?
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I happened to reexamine my copy of Hobbes’s Behemoth to prepare my students’
final exam. Although I had read Hobbes’s Epistle Dedicatory letter to Lord Arlington
several times, I read it differently this time. I realized that the statements Hobbes made in
that Epistle Dedicatory were to be taken seriously, for they contained claims that seemed
to propose a different sort of philosophy than the one I had previously attributed to
Hobbes. It occurred to me that what I was reading was not the Hobbes I was taught, but a
different Hobbes, and one that I would have never considered had I been operating under
the assumption that a good philosopher should never write anything that even remotely
challenges his previous statements. Hobbes, like Niebuhr, had experienced change
throughout his career. Specifically, within Hobbes’s own lifetime, England went from a
relatively stable commonwealth under James I, to a tumultuous commonwealth plagued
by civil war, to another relatively stable monarchy under Charles II.
At that point, I knew that I had to explore this Hobbes from Behemoth’s Epistle
Dedicatory. In a sense, the subject chose me more that I chose the subject, simply
because it was too important not to consider. This lends credibility to Max Weber’s
notion that ideas have a volition all their own, and they pursue their authors more than
their authors pursue them.
A. Yoksas
March 1, 2010
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ABSTRACT
This study explores the possibility that Thomas Hobbes’s post-Restoration
writings have a teaching that is somewhat different than the teaching contained in his
scientific treatises. Specifically, Hobbes seems to express doubt in his dialogues that his
science as outlined in Leviathan and elsewhere is a realistic solution to the problems of
the commonwealth. His knowledge of the English Civil War and the peace that followed
may have been instrumental in reorienting Hobbes towards a more pragmatic and realistic
philosophy that recognized the limits of science to create stability in the political arena.
The Hobbes of the dialogues seems to focus his attention on leadership as the means by
which a commonwealth can be well governed, which is a departure from the more formal
program of institutional reform that he proposed in his science.
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CHAPTER I
HOBBES’S DIALOGUES AS A RE-EVALUATION
On the surface, Thomas Hobbes’s philosophy seems inapplicable to our present
political circumstances. Unlike Hobbes, we live in an era where hardly anyone believes
in the divine right of kings or the legitimacy of absolute rule. Instead, we see our
common good juxtaposed to the power of rulers rather than flowing from strong
sovereign power. As James Madison observed, we tend to regard strong monarchy “as
the source of danger,” watching “with all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty ought to
inspire.” 1 Therefore, it would seem that a defense of absolute kingship would be
inapplicable to our times except as a relic of a far less enlightened age: an age when
absolute dominion was justified on the basis of title, superstition, and blind tradition.
Given how far we have come from that archaic soil, it would seem pointless to
consider the thoughts that came out of that era, and doubly pointless when the thoughts
we find promote a political system so antithetical to our core political beliefs. In his
history of the English Civil War, or Behemoth, Hobbes seems to defend a political
institution that we have long since abandoned: absolute monarchy. What makes
Hobbes’s work even more unpalatable is Behemoth’s central figure, King Charles I,
whose actions were so inexcusable to his own people that they beheaded him in the
1

Federalist 48. Taken from Bernard Bailyn’s Debate on the Constitution: Federalist Speeches, Articles,
and Letters During the Struggle over Ratification, Vol. II. New York: Library of America, 1993, 137.

1

2
twenty-fifth year of his reign. It is easy for us in our time to understand why, as Charles I
refused to call Parliament for a decade and levied taxes without the consent of the
governed. If anything, the fact that the English people rebelled against Charles I shows
us that our current political sensibilities might be more compatible with them than we
would initially assume. However, it remains to be seen if Behemoth is solely a defense of
Charles I, or if it contains a deeper message that is far more interesting and relevant for
the politics of our time.
Section 1: Hobbes’s Behemoth and the Problem of Good Administration
Hobbes was not the last political thinker to defend an unpopular sovereign.
Lincoln Steffens, a reporter for the New York Evening Post, was one of the leading voices
against machine politics in early twentieth century America. In 1904, a series of articles
he wrote on the corruption of urban politics would be compiled into The Shame of the
Cities, one of the first works of urban political commentary produced in America. Not
one year before, Steffens was working as a columnist at McClure’s magazine when he
took on a new challenge. Already having a reputation for exposing corruption in local
politics in cities such as Philadelphia, Chicago, and New York City, Steffens usually
counseled the people to rise up and overthrow the incumbent politicians at the ballot box.
Yet in 1903, Steffens would act differently and write in support of an incumbent New
York City mayor in a desperate electoral struggle.
Having served for only one term on a reform ticket, Mayor Seth Low was under
attack by the extremely popular and Tammany Hall supported candidate George B.

3
McClellan, Jr. In his article, “New York, Good Government in Danger,” Steffens argued
that the mayoral election of 1903 was a microcosm of “what has become a national
question: good government.” 2 In Steffens’s mind, good government was found in the
approach of a mayor like Seth Low: an approach that was beneficial—yet fragile—and
dangerously susceptible to overthrow at the ballot box.
In many ways, Hobbes’s Behemoth appears to be a defense of Charles I’s regime
in the same sense as Steffens’s article is a defense of Seth Low’s administration. The
difference is that Steffens appealed to the public in the midst of a failing regime while
Hobbes commented on a regime that had already failed. What both can agree upon is
that good government is in a fragile condition susceptible to popular overthrow.
Character A from Behemoth not only remarked that Charles I was “the best king,” but
also characterized Charles I as a tragic victim, “having first been persecuted by war, at
the indictment of the Presbyterian ministers.” 3 What is curious to note is how little A
justifies his assessment of Charles I as “the best king,” and the reason for this may be that
the quality of the sovereign as an administrator has very little to do with a sovereign’s
longevity. Hobbes makes clear that despite possessing a near-absolute constitutional
prerogative, Charles I was just as susceptible to public opinion as a popularly elected
representative of the people. As Behemoth’s character A would say, “the power of the

2

The article used here is a reprint of that original article from McClure’s that constitutes the last chapter of
Steffens’s Shame of the Cities (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992), p. 195.

3

The edition of Behemoth used is from Behemoth, or The Long Parliament, 3rd Edition, edited by
Ferdinand Tönnies (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990), hereafter cited as Behemoth.
Behemoth, p. 95.

4
mighty hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people,” 4 inferring that the
legitimacy of all political leaders, from absolute kings to municipal clerks, is dependent
on popular opinion. Both Steffens and Hobbes seem to point to a universal problem in
politics: good administration alone does not secure sovereignty. The problem that good
administrators face is that the very qualities that provide for good administration may
have very little to do with the qualities that determine success or failure in the political
arena.
What made Steffens admire Low as a model executive was a combination of his
honesty and ability. Seth Low was already a man of means and reputation. Coming from
a wealthy trade family in New York City, Low did not depend on patronage from the
ruling machine for his livelihood. Having served as both the president of Columbia
University and the mayor of Brooklyn, Low had already built up considerable
administrative experience. He was a Republican, but was elected as Mayor on a fusion
ticket that included Democrats left outside of the Tammany Hall system. Steffens
described Low as “what the whole country has been looking for in all municipal crises—
the non-political ruler.” 5 What made Low’s administration refreshing for Steffens was
how little partisan politics influenced it after the election was decided. In Steffens’s
opinion, Low’s reputation as a non-political ruler was a result of his dedication to the
public business as opposed to the party’s business. He writes that Low “began his
mayoralty with a study of the affairs of New York; he has said himself that he devoted

4

Ibid., p. 16.

5

Steffens (1992), p. 202.

5
eight months to its finances: and he mastered this department and is admitted to be the
master in detail of every department which has engaged his attention. In other words,
Mr. Low has learned the business of New York; he is just about competent now to
become the mayor of a great city.” 6 In Steffens’s opinion, Seth Low did what we would
hope all public officials would do: he learned the public business, did the public business,
and did so in service to the common good rather than serving partisan interests.
Similarly, A describes Charles I’s admirable qualities early on in Behemoth. He
portrays the late king as “a man that wanted no virtue, either of body or mind, nor
endeavoured anything more than to discharge his duty towards God, in the well
governing of his subjects.” 7 Furthermore, Hobbes established in Behemoth that if
Charles I had faults, they did not stem from his character and ability as an administrator.
The King’s absolute prerogative certainly gave Charles I the power to assert his will over
the people of England. Nevertheless, A maintains that Charles I used his power justly,
for the common good of all his subjects, and not in favor of one political faction over
another. Setting aside the actions and advice of the king’s advisors, 8 Hobbes seemed to
portray Charles I as a sovereign who governed England as an administrative exercise
detached from the political considerations that turn government as a means to aggrandize
the sovereign’s friends.

6

Ibid., p. 200.

7

Behemoth, p. 2.

8

This is in reference to the advice of the Archbishop of Canterbury to send “a book of Common-prayer into
Scotland,” (ibid., p. 28). In his introduction to Behemoth, Steven Holmes acknowledges that “Regret about
the prayer-book episode is the closest Hobbes comes to admitting that royal misgovernment, rather than
insubordination among miseducated subjects, led to the breakdown of authority,” (ibid., p. xli).
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This is similar to the way Steffens portrayed Seth Low, who was described as
someone who ran the affairs of New York City as “business, not politics.” 9 We must be
careful to understand what business in opposition to politics means in this case. Low saw
the mayor’s business as limited to the chartered duties of the office, fulfilling these duties
efficiently for the good of all New Yorkers, rather than for his political supporters only.
Tammany, however, saw the business of government differently. Its conception of the
official’s business was to secure the vote, and once the vote was secured, to milk the city
dry by means of graft in line with what Steffens called “the commercial spirit” or “the
spirit of profit, not patriotism; of credit, not honor; of individual gain, not national
prosperity; of trade and dickering, not principle. ‘My business is sacred,’ says the
business man in his heart. ‘Whatever prospers my business, is good; it must be.
Whatever hinders it is wrong; it must be.’” 10 Steffens understood that Low faced a
Tammany opposition that was shrewd in a sense that good administrators were not, for
“Tammany’s democratic corruption rests upon the corruption of the people.” 11 Unlike
Low’s reform administration, Steffens observed Tammany‘s shrewdness in moving the
passions of the public, understood Tammany’s ability to “study the people,” 12 and
understood how Tammany moved the people to vote for them on Election Day. Knowing
that factions in the electorate generally placed their private self-interests ahead of the

9

Steffens (1992), p. 126.

10

Ibid., pp. 4-5.

11

Ibid., p. 128.

12

Ibid., p. 127.

7
public interest, Tammany won votes through “kindness and petty privileges.” 13 The
kindness took the form of Tammany’s charismatic leadership, found in candidates who
were “usually the natural leaders of the people in these districts, and they are originally
good-natured, kindly men.” 14 The petty privileges came in the form of gifts, patronage
jobs, and even “violations of the law” in the form of avoiding fines as rewards for
loyalty. 15 According to Steffens, Tammany Hall’s tactics were forms of “corruption with
consent” as the people of New York were at least partially—if not wholly—culpable for
the corruption that preceded Low’s administration.
Hobbes seemed to identify Charles I’s opposition in a similar way to the way
Steffen’s described Tammany Hall. Behemoth portrayed the king’s opponents in the
Long Parliament as shrewd political tacticians who proceeded against Charles I “like
skillful hunters; first to single him out, by men disposed in all parts to drive him into the
open field.” 16 The reasons the Long Parliament was so successful were twofold. First,
the Long Parliament delivered its message by way of speeches in assemblies or
congregations. Using the power of the podium and pulpit, the king’s enemies used mass
spectacle to their advantage, for as B observed, “it is easier to gull the multitude, than any
one man amongst them.” 17 Understanding how to appeal to the people by way of

13

Ibid., p. 129.

14

Ibid., p. 133.

15

Ibid., p. 129.

16

Behemoth, p. 36.

17

Ibid., p. 38.

8
conscience or the love of material gain, 18 the Long Parliament was able to build up a
strong coalition against Charles I.
Behemoth offers a second reason for the Long Parliament’s success: the rebellious
disposition of the people of England. From the insurrection orchestrated by the Long
Parliament, to Oliver Cromwell’s machinations, to the ambitious maneuvering of Thomas
Fairfax, Behemoth is filled with examples of elites who know how to gain political
support. What is useful to observe from a political standpoint is how these ambitious
elites were able to be so persuasive, for as A observed, “ambition can do little without
hands, and few hands it would have, if the common people were as diligently instructed
in the true principles of their duty, as they were terrified and amazed by preachers.” 19
One wonders if either the loyalists or the rebels were even motivated by religion at all,
for if A is correct, “there were very few of the common people that cared much for either
of the causes, but would have taken any side for pay or plunder.” 20 Perhaps A
characterizes the disposition of Charles I’s subjects best when he claims that “the people
were corrupted generally, and disobedient persons esteemed the best patriots.” 21 When
we examine the disposition of the people of England, we discover that the same
disposition that brought about the English Civil War was also the one that made political
machines such as Tammany Hall so successful. Both were manifestations of what
18

B makes the observation that a king’s “subjects will hardly be drawn into the field and fight with courage
against their consciences.” A responds to this observation by asserting that “there are few whose
consciences are so tender as to refuse money when they want it” (ibid., p. 18).
19

Ibid., pp. 70-71.

20

Ibid., p. 2.

21

Behemoth, p. 2.

9
Steffens called “corruption with consent,” or the general proclivity of the public to favor
private advantage over prudent administration.
While Low was not corrupt, he suffered from a different failing: a lack of
charisma. Steffens admits that Low’s “personality … is not very engaging,” and that he
appears “cold and impersonal.” 22 The irony of Low was that his aloof personality traits
were the very traits that, for Steffens, made Low a good administrator. Steffens has no
qualms when describing Low’s want of tact, because “Mr. Low’s very faults . . . make it
impossible for him to be a politician even if he should wish to be. As for his selfishness,
his lack of tact, his coldness—these are of no consequence. He has done his duty all the
better for them. Admit that he is uninteresting; what does that matter? He has served the
city. Will the city not vote for him because it does not like the way he smiles? Absurd as
it sounds, that is what all I have heard against Low amounts to.” 23 Steffens understood
that the duties of the modern executive are outside of the public eye. Few citizens in our
age will ever see a staff meeting, the work that goes into creating a budget, or the effort
that goes into various acts of public policy. For the most part, the duties of the executive
are outside public scrutiny and require the temperament of a manager more than the
charisma of an orator. The tragic fact of the executive is that he or she cannot help but be
an object of public scrutiny and will often be judged by the public on whatever public
persona the executive presents. For all of his diligence at learning how to govern a great
city, Low’s success at administration made him a failure at politics, or at least a failure in

22

Ibid., pp. 200-201.

23

Ibid., p. 202.

10
the eyes of citizens who could not see the administrative competence Seth Low
exemplified.
Like Seth Low, Charles I suffered from a lack of skill in public relations.
Behemoth describes a series of early scandals, missteps, and concessions that ultimately
undermined the late king’s credibility as a strong and capable monarch. The mishaps
start with Dr. William Laud, the Archbishop of Canterbury under Charles I, who “sent
down a book of Common-prayer into Scotland, not differing in substance from ours, nor
much in words besides the putting to the word Presbyter for that of Minister,
commanding it to be used . . . by the ministers there, for an ordinary form of Divine
service.” 24 This “caused such a tumult” in Edinburgh that the Scottish nobility made a
covenant “to put down episcopacy, without consulting with the King.” This forced the
king to call a Parliament for the first time in ten years to raise money to field an army.
Additionlly, “the King, willing to avoid the destruction of his own subjects,
condescended” to a peaceful resolution brokered by Parliament. Though the legitimacy
of Charles I would suffer somewhat, “the issue was peace; and the King thereupon went
to Edinburgh, and passed an Act of Parliament there to [the Scots and Parliament’s]
satisfaction.”
If the goal of a Hobbesian sovereign is to keep the peace, one could say that
Charles I acted as a good sovereign in the case of the Scottish uprising, as his motives
were in accord with salus populi, or the safety and well-being of the people. Yet the
solution to the Scottish uprising had consequences that would later undermine Charles I’s
24

This and the following passages refer to Behemoth, pp. 28-30.

11
ability to act as sovereign. As A said, “to the end the King might buy the Parliament’s
help at no less a price than sovereignty itself,” and while the threat of a violent uprising in
Scotland was temporarily thwarted, the incident did nothing to quell the general feeling
of discontent within Presbyterian congregations in both England and Scotland. Those
who were aggrieved sent “a certain paper” which A claimed was “false and scandalous
. . . which was by the King’s command burnt.” Though Charles I imprisoned “three
persons that had been condemned for publishing” the “seditious doctrine . . . the
Parliament . . . caused them to be released and to return to London.” 25 Rather than
charge the three conspirators who published the scandalous paper, Parliament accused Sir
Thomas Wentworth, “the Earl of Strafford and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, of hightreason.” The reason the trial of the Earl of Strafford was worthy of note is that
Wentworth was far more loyal to Charles I than his accusers were. Though “before the
year 1640,” the “Lord of Strafford did appear in opposition to the King’s demands as
much as any man,” Wentworth is described as rather critical of Parliament’s
encroachment on the king’s prerogative to enforce the laws. Even though by A’s
recollection, treason “was never proved against him,” 26 Thomas Wentworth was
nevertheless sentenced to death. As sovereign monarch, Charles I could have used his
office to pardon the Earl of Strafford, but did not exercise this power for fear that the
pardon might cause an insurrection. As A recalls, Charles I “had heard all that passed at
[Wentworth’s] trial, and declared himself unsatisfied concerning the justice of their [the

25

Ibid., p. 64.

26

Ibid., p. 67.

12
members of Parliament] sentence.” The king, “notwithstanding the danger of his own
person from the fury of the people” was “counseled to give way to his [Wentworth’s]
execution, not only by such as he [Charles I] most relied on, but by the Earl of Strafford
himself.” 27 A recalls that the king “would have pardoned” Wentworth “if that could have
preserved him [Charles I] against the tumult raised and countenanced by the Parliament
itself, for terrifying of those they thought might favor him. And yet the King himself did
not stick to confess afterwards, that he had done amiss, in that he did not rescue him.” 28
As much as Charles I endeavored to act against his better judgment for the sake of
the peace, his actions had the opposite effect. In his attempt to show his subjects that he
would not use his prerogative to favor one citizen over another, Charles I actually
weakened his own legitimacy as sovereign. In his attempt to demonstrate his lack of
favoritism, Charles I favored Parliament, but not because of the merits of Parliament’s
claim. Charles I capitulated to Parliament to appease it, but Parliament would not be
appeased for long. The Wentworth trial showed Parliament that demands backed by the
threat of insurrection proved to be an effective means of manipulating the king, and the
demands on Charles I increased, each one more unreasonable and threatening than the
last. In a statement more reminiscent of Machiavelli than Thomas Hobbes, A explains to
B “that those princes that with preferment are forced to buy the obedience of their
subjects, are already, or must be soon after, in a very weak condition.” 29 Charles I was a

27

Ibid., p. 71.

28

Ibid.

29

Ibid., p. 72.

13
capable administrator, and was for the most part resistant to corruption. Yet like Seth
Low, Charles I was unaware of the political ramifications of his actions. Charles I
desired the support of the people, but he did not understand how to obtain it. His
attempts to gain the support of the people, such as the decision he made in the Wentworth
trial, made him out an object of contempt rather than a strong sovereign. In spite of the
late king’s beneficence, or perhaps because of it, Charles I was deposed by those who had
the ambition, tenacity, and political skill that the late king lacked. If a monarch with the
sort of power and prerogative Charles I possessed was so vulnerable, what can we say
about the vulnerability of the modern elected executive?
In a representative democracy, we would hope that politicians place the public
business ahead of the desire to be well liked. In the early twentieth century, many social
scientists used the then-novel structure of the corporation as a model for how civil
government could function. Max Weber saw the developments in professional civil
service as “quite similar” to the developments he observed in private enterprise. 30 Like
Steffens, Weber saw the prominence of the “expert official” as the defining characteristic
that separated modern politics from earlier forms. The official’s expertise and
bureaucratic demeanor insulated the modern administrator from most political
considerations, as he was judged on his ability to govern “without regard to persons” or
“the leveling of status ‘honor’” rather than his skill in favoring one faction over
30
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another. 31 However, Weber also observed that America tended to govern itself using
“amateur administration through booty politicians,” and was only beginning to value the
sort of professional demeanor described by Steffens. 32 The bulk of large municipal
governments in the early decades of the twentieth century America tended to be governed
by patronage organizations such as Tammany, which Steffens called “the embodiment of
corruption.” 33 Unlike the mayoral administration of Seth Low, Steffens claimed that
patronage organizations such as Tammany Hall were “out for themselves and their own;
not for the public, but for ‘me and my friends’; not for New York, but for Tammany.” 34
By contrast, Low’s administration represented something different: a foray into
what Steffens believed was a new paradigm in how politicians ought to be judged by the
voters. Yet Steffens realized the system cannot be changed overnight, since “it will take
time to evolve the masters of the . . . unstudied art of municipal government – time and
demand. So far there has been no market for municipal experts in this country. All we
are clamoring for today in our meek, weak-hearted way, is the mean, rudimentary virtue

31

Translation of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft part III as found in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, p.
215. See also p. 199: “Entrance into an office, including one in the private economy, is considered an
acceptance of a specific obligation of faithful management in return for a secure existence.”

32

Translation of “Politik als Beruf (Politics as a Vocation)” as found in From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology, p. 88. The full passage reads as follows: “In the United States, amateur administration through
booty politicians in accordance with the outcome of presidential elections resulted in the exchange of
hundreds of thousands of officials, even down to the mail carrier. The administration knew nothing of the
professional civil-servant-for-life, but this amateur administration has long since been punctured by the
Civil Service Reform. Purely technical, irrefragable needs of the administration have determined this
development.” It should be noted that Weber wrote this in 1918, fourteen years after The Shame of the
Cities.

33

Steffens (1992), p. 203.

34

Ibid.

15
miscalled ‘common honesty.’” 35 In a political system that trusts voters to decide who
governs, fair administration will only occur if the voters value it. This implies that the
voters are able to identify good administration as separate from good political
showmanship. As knowledge of good administration does not come naturally, both the
public officials and the voters need to be educated to understand and appreciate good
administration. Impressed with the level of expertise found in the European municipal
courts, Steffens believed that New York’s problems could only be solved when the voters
chose candidates who promoted the public good rather than private advantage or base
sentimentality. Steffens seemed to imply that this might not have been possible at the
time he wrote his article. To their detriment, the voters of New York City tended to be
too influenced by appearance and too quick to turn a blind eye to corruption for the sake
of private advantage. This is the so-called “common honesty” which Steffens described:
a notion of justice that in the words of one Tammany official could be summarized as,
“every good man looks after his friends, and any man who doesn’t, isn’t likely to be
popular.” 36 Democracy at its worst resembled little more than a popularity contest, and
the challenge Steffens proposed to New York City was to make prudent administration
popular.
One would suspect that an undemocratic political system would be far less
vulnerable to developing into a popularity contest amongst friends. Surprisingly,
Hobbes’s Behemoth shows us that even absolute monarchs are not immune to the
35
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problems caused by the sort of “common honesty” described by Steffens. At one point in
Behemoth, character A wonders “why may not men be taught their duty, that is, the
science of Just and Unjust, as diverse other sciences have been taught, from the principles
and evident demonstration; and much more easily taught than any of those preachers and
democratical gentlemen could teach rebellion and treason?” 37 Like Steffens, A believed
that the quality of administration depended upon the ability of the people to recognize
and support good administration when it presented itself.
It is theoretically possible that this could be accomplished through education. If
the people could understand that rulers should be strictly limited to the responsibility they
have been given, to serve the interests of the whole, the people would be less inclined to
see rulers as a vehicle to serve their interests at the expense of the whole. However,
there are limits to education as a solution, limits that A admits in Behemoth. Although
“the rules of just and unjust . . . from principles evident to the meanest capacity, have not
been wanting” and “have shined . . . to men of good education,” these men “are few, in
respect of the rest of men, whereof many cannot read: many, though they can, have no
leisure; and of them that have leisure, the greatest part have their minds wholly employed
and taken up by their private business or pleasures.” 38 This passage would seem to run
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contrary to the notion that Hobbes saw education as a practical solution to the problems
of the commonwealth. Although there are several passages throughout Behemoth that
condemn the universities for causing sedition and creating bad doctrine, one wonders
how effective university reform might have been in solving the problems of civil war and
bad administration. At best, reforming the universities would be a long-term solution,
and at worst, no practical solution at all. Even if scholars, ministers, and elected officials
could have been moved to adopt a more enlightened perspective on politics, it would
have taken a generation or perhaps several generations for the basic habits and attitudes
of the body politic to reflect that change. In addition, there would be many more citizens
who would not learn, or be in a position to be taught. Moreover, there was no guarantee
that those in a position of authority actually wanted a politically astute population,
especially if a highly educated public demanded accountability from those in a position
of authority over them. Behemoth’s B states the problem quite clearly, for “if any man
have been so singular, as to have studied the science of Justice and equity; how can he
teach it safely, when it is against the interest of those that are in possession of the power
to hurt him?” 39 This question is never satisfactorily answered in Behemoth, which may
indicate that the problems in politics cannot be solved satisfactorily through formal
education alone. Like Steffens, Hobbes seemed to have stumbled upon a problem that all
political reformers face: good administration cannot sustain itself solely on its goodness.
It requires public support, but the public is not naturally disposed to recognize and
seditious doctrine, the question of whether this solution was practical or not is the subject that is answered
in chapter III.
39
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support good administration when it presents itself. The most obvious solution is to
educate the public to recognize and value good administration, but there is no guarantee
that the public is willing or even able to be persuaded to see the value of good
administration. While this may be the most obvious solution to the problem, it is neither
the only solution nor perhaps even the best solution.
The other solution is to make the good administrator a better politician. In other
words, good public administrators should study ambitious and skillful political rulers who
were able to sustain political power through political skill, which is somewhat different
from administrative competence. This is Machiavelli’s solution, and when Hobbes
alludes to the dialogue between the characters in Behemoth, it reflects a different
approach from that of the Hobbes we traditionally encounter in his political treatises.
This comparison between Hobbes’s history of the English Civil War and Lincoln
Steffens’s plea to the citizens of New York reveals a common problem in politics, a
problem that is not limited to regimes of any particular stripe or historical time period. If
they are to survive, political leaders have to be more than competent administrators.
They must also be shrewd politicians who cannot ever take for granted that their
constituents will truly see and appreciate administrative competence when practiced.
Therefore, rulers of all types need to have the means to protect themselves through a
shrewd political sense, and good administrators must develop a shrewd political sense
most of all as their skills are vital to the success of the regime.
Could Behemoth be a book of practical wisdom, designed to instruct good
sovereigns how to survive in a contested political arena? Just as Lincoln Steffens
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admired Seth Low for his willingness to put good administration above political
considerations, Behemoth’s A admired Charles I for his basic goodness. However, the
very qualities that made both Seth Low and Charles I good men made them extremely
vulnerable to overthrow, particularly from shrewd and charismatic politicians that placed
more stock in political advantage than unbiased administration strictly limited to the good
of all.
Of course, Leviathan proposes a system of government that rewards and protects
good rulers and proposes that the citizens of the commonwealth have the power to create
such a system for the sake of eliminating the state of war. Unlike Leviathan, however,
Behemoth portrays an actual sovereign exercising his sovereign powers. When
sovereignty is analyzed in this way, it no longer seems like a simple list of administrative
tasks. Instead, sovereignty takes on a human dimension that includes the interpersonal
and charismatic qualities of the sovereign, qualities that do not come from the office as
much as from the official. This is not a theme that resonates strongly in Leviathan, but as
we will see, it is a theme that resonates rather strongly in Hobbes’s post-Leviathan
dialogues.
Section 2: Research Question
A recent Hobbes scholar once claimed that “no one can read Hobbes’s political
treatises without coming away with the sense that Hobbes wanted something to
change.” 40 The English Civil War and the political uncertainty associated with it
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provided the impetus for Hobbes’s Leviathan. Hobbes mentions this explicitly in
Leviathan’s “Review and Conclusion” by stating that his discourse was “occasioned by
the disorders of the present time,” 41 which for Hobbes were the events of the English
Civil War. It seems only natural that, in such a desperate time, Hobbes would seek a new
solution—a modern solution—to create the peace that traditional political philosophy
seemed unable to create, and Hobbes would deliver his modern solution in its final form
in 1651. Widely considered to be Hobbes’s definitive work, Leviathan is modern in
terms of its method and its message. The resolutive-compositive method Hobbes used in
constructing Leviathan was borrowed from the natural sciences, and its application to
human phenomena constituted a radical break with the previous tradition of
understanding politics through historical analysis and disputation. 42 Leviathan’s message
was also modern, testifying to the presence of natural rights, the primacy of individual
self-interest in political decision-making, and the contractual nature of political
relationships. 43 Whether or not the modern message of Leviathan was a result of its
modern method, Leviathan was an important—if not the most important—book of
modern social science.
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Given the long shadow that Leviathan casts upon the history of political thought,
we as readers of Hobbes tend to read his other works in the shadow of Leviathan.
However, great authors tend to refine their ideas over the course of their lives. There are
reasons why authors re-evaluate their ideas. The author may want to consider new
knowledge that was not available for earlier works. Moreover, the author may become
aware of possible points of criticism that the earlier works may not have addressed.
Perhaps the most important reason why an author would want to re-evaluate his ideas is
when an author writes a text in response to a particular set of historical circumstances.
When these circumstances change, the changing circumstances may cause an author to
gain a new and previously unavailable perspective that the author wishes to incorporate
into another work, one that is more complete than the author’s previous works.
If there was any author who bore witness to changing circumstances, it was
Thomas Hobbes. From the period of time when he wrote The Elements of Law in 1640 to
his death in 1679, England went from a failing monarchy under Charles I, through a
period of civil war, to a period of re-established order under Charles II. While it is a
matter of common knowledge that the English Civil War provided the impetus for much
of Hobbes’s political thought, he wrote his actual history of the war in 1668, almost two
decades after Leviathan was first published and eight years after the restoration of the
monarchy under Charles II. Given that Hobbes wrote his dialogues after the English
Civil War, is Behemoth simply a restatement of the same philosophy Hobbes previously
produced, or does Behemoth approach political questions in a different way?
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This study is an attempt to show that Hobbes’s conclusions in Behemoth and other
dialogues are somewhat different from his conclusions in Leviathan. Specifically,
Hobbes seems to take a realistic approach and starts to question whether his political
science is a practical solution to the problems of the commonwealth. Hobbes turns to a
new solution to the problems of the commonwealth: political skill as opposed to political
science. By closely examining the dialogues Hobbes wrote, we are able to see why he
came to this conclusion. In order for Hobbes’s science to serve as a solution to civil war,
it requires ideal political and social conditions that did not exist in the time of the
rebellion against Charles I. Yet despite these conditions, the English Civil War ended,
the Restoration held, and Hobbes’s science as outlined in his political science treatises
cannot explain why.
Political skill, however, can explain how the civil war ended. Conversely, a lack
of political skill also explains why the civil war started in the first place. This study will
show how Hobbes went about this re-evaluation of his project, and will conclude with his
revised teaching about sovereignty that is more reminiscent of Machiavelli than of the
scientific Hobbes we understand from the treatises. This post-Restoration Hobbes of the
dialogues is not altogether different from the pre-Restoration Hobbes of the treatises, and
the difference between these two phases of Hobbes’s career is a difference of degree
rather than kind. However, the degrees that separate the two phases of Hobbes’s career
are meaningful enough to warrant a re-evaluation of Hobbes in much the same way as he
re-evaluated himself through his dialogues.
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Section 3: Literature Survey
It is useful to see how the scholarly community has considered Behemoth and
other late writings to better understand this alternative conception of Hobbes. Behemoth
was Hobbes’s last published work on political matters and one of the last works that
Hobbes scholars seriously considered. 1889 saw the introduction of what is widely
considered to be the authoritative text that was rescued and transcribed by Ferdinand
Tönnies from the St. John’s College manuscript.44 Though several editions of Behemoth
were published before the Tönnies edition, 45 it was never considered an important part of
Hobbes’s philosophical canon like Leviathan or De Cive. The lack of interest in
Hobbes’s Behemoth prompted Royce MacGillivary to conclude in 1970 that “Behemoth
seems to have had surprisingly little influence at any time.” 46 When examining the
twentieth century literature, one will notice three rough phases in Behemoth scholarship.
In the first phase, scholars viewed Behemoth as a supplement to Hobbes’s
scientific project, not a part of Hobbes’s scientific project. Read as little more than an
appendix to Leviathan, Behemoth provided interesting case studies that were intended to
clarify Hobbes’s more formal teachings. Therefore, Hobbes scholars of the first phase
assumed that Behemoth did not add anything new to our understanding of Hobbes’s
political philosophy or political epistemology. Until the late 1970’s, Behemoth was
traditionally read as a study intended to add credibility to Hobbes’s theoretical works:
44
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specifically Leviathan, but also De Corpore, De Cive, Elements of Law, and the like.
Most of the prominent scholars of Hobbes at the time—M.M. Goldsmith, Leo Strauss,
and C.B. Macpherson—read Behemoth in this way.
For Goldsmith, Behemoth adds no claims Hobbes did not already make in his
previous treatises. Rather, Hobbes uses the historical facts of the Civil War in Behemoth
as evidence for the validity of his more sophisticated political treatises, showing that “the
rights pretended by the King’s opponents turn out to be based on the doctrines that are
contradicted by Hobbes’s political doctrines.” 47 Goldsmith believed that Hobbes used
history as a way “to exhibit the consequences of not following the correct, Hobbesian,
science of politics.” 48 Read in this way, Behemoth is simply an historical investigation
by Hobbes, not a scientific one. If we are to classify Hobbes’s works into discrete
categories not intended to overlap, then Behemoth does not itself contain the Hobbesian
science of politics, though it may lead an inquiring mind to approach it.
Strauss’s interpretation of Behemoth in his early work on Hobbes is, for the most
part, very traditional. His consideration of Behemoth was sparse, but powerful, as Strauss
believed the “significance of Hobbes’s morals comes out most clearly in one of his latest
works, in Behemoth.” 49 In Strauss’s view, Behemoth taught that the emerging middle
class “supported by the Presbyterian clergy was the natural vehicle for the Revolution.”
In Strauss’s view, Hobbes’s Behemoth showed how the middle class was “acting against
47
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its own real interest” 50 by undermining the very security that allowed the middle class to
acquire wealth without impediment. Strauss believed that Behemoth was Hobbes’s
argument to place the responsibility for the English Civil War wholly upon the yeomanry
and the burgesses of the growing middle class. Furthermore, Strauss shows how Hobbes
used Behemoth to demonstrate that the English Civil War was motivated by perverse
motives out of step with those that would be considered typical of the middle class
interests that pursued the war. Strauss suggests that Hobbes may have wanted to inform
the middle class of the grave implications of its decision to rebel against the absolute
authority of the sovereign. Instead, Hobbes offered an alternative that was more in step
with the character of the middle class: to pursue “the security of body and soul, which the
bourgeoisie cannot of itself guarantee.” 51
Strauss was not the last figure to use Behemoth as evidence for Hobbes’s interest
in middle class values. In The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, C.B.
Macpherson shows how modern liberalism had its origin in the early English
enlightenment period. Richard Ashcraft described Macpherson’s interpretation of
Behemoth as Marxist, 52 showing how the theme of Behemoth was similar to the work of
James Harrington. Macpherson argued that the theme of Behemoth was the same as that
of Harrington’s Oceana as both works seemed to imply that the struggle for economic
independence was the prime cause of the rebellion against Charles I. The old feudal
50
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notions of property rights, which depended in large part on hereditary title and peerage,
had been slowly giving way to new, more market oriented notions of property rights.
Macpherson argued that the Civil War was important for Hobbes because it was perhaps
the clearest expression of the conflict between the aristocracy and the middle class. 53
The difference between Strauss’s and Macpherson’s interpretations of Hobbes is
really a difference about whether the interests of the middle class were ultimately served
by the Civil War. For Macpherson’s Hobbes, the Civil War was a necessary and
inevitable conflict in order to establish the principles of possessive individualism in a
market based economy. For Strauss’s Hobbes, the Civil War was an example of how the
greater worldliness and education of the wealthy middle class did not serve to make the
lot of the commoner any more prosperous or secure. Whatever their differences, both
Macpherson and Strauss believed Behemoth was useful as a case study for understanding
Hobbes’s opinion of changing social norms when applied to contemporary, twentieth
century notions of class interests. Like Goldsmith, neither Strauss nor Macpherson
viewed Behemoth as Hobbes’s mature teaching on politics. 54 Behemoth was read as a
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supplement to and a case study for the relevance of Hobbes’s other political works, as
Behemoth was thought not to deviate from Hobbes’s former teaching in any meaningful
way.
The second phase starts around the late 1970’s and culminates in the 1990
publication of Robert Kraynak’s History and Modernity in the Thought of Thomas
Hobbes. At this time, scholars started to consider Hobbes’s histories as important works
in their own right with a purpose that is somewhat different from that of the philosophical
works. The scholars of this second phase believed that only by understanding this
historical Hobbes can one understand and appreciate the scientific teaching in the
treatises. This new phase of Behemoth scholarship starts with Richard Ashcraft’s 1978
observation that Thomas Hobbes’s Behemoth had gone virtually unconsidered by
scholars and that Hobbes’s histories may be just as important as his treatises when
understanding Hobbes’s complete political project. 55
Perhaps the most important and commonly cited work from this second phase of
Behemoth scholarship is Robert Kraynak’s History and Modernity in the Thought of
Thomas Hobbes. Like Ashcraft, Kraynak argues that Behemoth should be read as a
necessary component of Hobbes’s overall philosophical project. For Kraynak, Behemoth
becomes important in Hobbes’s case as a means to resolve an underlying paradox that
lies at the heart of Hobbes’s project. On the one hand, Hobbes is a critic of what some
have called “doctrinal politics,” or “the institutionalization and popularization of
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disputative philosophy.” 56 On the other hand, Hobbes seems to replace the doctrinal
politics of his time with a doctrine of his own, possibly far more dogmatic and potentially
destructive than any doctrinal teaching gleaned from scholasticism. 57
The previous consensus among those who studied Behemoth was that Hobbes
most clearly delineated his doctrinal teaching in his political treatises such as Elements of
Law, De Cive, and Leviathan. Kraynak and Ashcraft are no exceptions to this rule, but
they do observe that one cannot understand Hobbes’s political project through the
political treatises alone. Ashcraft read Behemoth as a necessary component of Hobbes’s
overall political philosophy as it “described at length” the problems associated with
unenlightened popular government. 58 For Kraynak, “Hobbes’s historical theory, which
defines the fundamental problem of civilization, must be temporally and logically prior to
his political science, which explains the solution.” 59 Though Behemoth is a work of
historical theory and seems to be independent of the formal treatises, such an historical
theory is essential. Understanding the way philosophy abuses history is a prerequisite for
science, because only by understanding how history is abused can one understand the
need for an objective, universally valid science of politics starting from accurate
definitions.
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Kraynak claims that “no other work provides so much insight into the problems of
past and contemporary civil society” as Behemoth. While Behemoth’s method may differ
from Leviathan’s, he concluded that Behemoth solves the problem of doctrinal politics in
the same way as Leviathan. Kraynak interprets Hobbes’s intent in Behemoth as a call for
“reform of the universities and the introduction of his own political teaching, which he
claims is the ‘true science of equity and justice.’” 60 To reform the university curriculum,
Behemoth points the reader back to the treatises, as Hobbes “must go beyond the
discipline of civil history and turn to the discipline of political science in the strict and
proper sense” in order to formulate practical solutions for the problems history reveals.61
For Kraynak, Behemoth stands at the heart of Hobbes’s political project, as Hobbes’s
science only becomes relevant in response to the problem raised in Behemoth.
The first phase scholars and the second phase scholars share a belief that
Hobbes’s basic philosophic conclusions are the same throughout his canon. Though
Behemoth described a new method of teaching political principles, the political principles
Hobbes taught in Behemoth are the same principles taught in Leviathan without
alteration. 62 Because history is necessary to justify why politics needs a science like
Hobbes’s own, Kraynak contends that “regardless of its place in the chronology of
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Hobbes’s writings, Behemoth is a work of primary importance.” 63 However, the reason
why Behemoth was important was not that Behemoth’s conclusion was different from the
conclusions reached in the political treatises. Behemoth was important because Hobbes
defined the political problem far more clearly there than anywhere else in his writings.
The main contribution of this second wave of scholarship was to show the
importance of understanding the historical Hobbes in order to understand the
philosophical Hobbes more clearly. Through the historical works, we discover why
Hobbes’s philosophy is necessary, but the historical works exist merely as a prelude to
Hobbes’s political thought, and do not constitute Hobbes’s political science solely. It
would take other authors to make the case that Behemoth is a work that needs to be read
on its own terms as a dialogue. Read with respect to the form, the teaching contained in
Behemoth is only apparent when considering the manner in which Hobbes presents it.
The third phase starts with Noam Flinker’s 1989 article “View from the ‘Devil’s
Mountain’” and includes one of the more recent contributions to Behemoth scholarship:
Geoffrey Vaughan’s 2002 book Behemoth Teaches Leviathan. Like the second phase
interpreters, these latest contributions place Behemoth at the center of Hobbes’s canon.
Unlike the second phase interpreters, both Flinker and Vaughan read Behemoth as one
would read drama: paying special attention to the places where the dramatic tension
between the characters is most apparent.
Flinker’s study was the first attempt to explain why it is important not to confuse
what we believe Behemoth should contain with what Behemoth actually contains.
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Scholars tended to overlook the fact that Behemoth is composed of four dialogues
between A and B and, as a result, “most discussions of Behemoth ignore the personality
distinctions between the characters.” 64 Flinker uses the interplay of Behemoth’s two
characters to put forth a new understanding of Hobbes’s intent behind his history, one
that stresses “Hobbes’s pessimism about rhetorical communication or persuasive
teaching.” 65 For Flinker, Behemoth’s dialogues portray A as a teacher who is teaching an
eager B a “model for illustrating all human evil” in the form of the Civil War. 66 The fact
that B never does understand the model shows the reader the problem in political
pedagogy. Flinker does not view the historical narrative or the content of the opinions as
containing the true message of Behemoth. Rather, Behemoth is a dialogue between two
characters: the teacher and the student, and the problem associated with conveying
political wisdom from one to the other. What makes Hobbes’s view tragic is that the
student B never quite learns how to think on his own without the teacher’s constant
supervision. Seen in this way, Behemoth is not about political pedagogy as much as it is
about the failure of political pedagogy.
Geoffrey Vaughan duplicated Flinker’s method and came to the opposite
conclusion. As the title of his Behemoth Teaches Leviathan suggests, Vaughan shows
how “the lesson ‘B’ learns is distrust.” 67 This distrust leads B and people like B to reject
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dogma at face value, and consent to the solid principles of sovereignty made in
Leviathan. 68 Like Flinker, Vaughan reads Behemoth as a story about political education.
Unlike Flinker, Vaughan concludes that Behemoth is a successful lesson in loyalty and
justice with the teacher (A) successfully teaching the student (B). In Vaughan’s analysis,
Hobbes intended Behemoth to be a demonstration of how political education should
function. It uses history to teach scientific and political principles, which makes
Behemoth an addition that Hobbes felt was necessary to complete his political project.
Behemoth’s role in Hobbes studies has changed, but what has not changed is how
Hobbes scholars view Behemoth’s relationship to the rest of the Hobbes canon. In all
cases, Behemoth is viewed as a work that supports Hobbes’s political science from his
earlier treatises. What has not yet been considered is that Behemoth may be an
expression of Hobbes’s doubts about his previous science or contains evidence that
Hobbes may have seen fit to question his previous conclusions.
This argument is even more compelling when we consider the relationship
between Behemoth and one of Hobbes’s other post-Restoration works, A Dialogue
between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England. As he did in
Behemoth, Hobbes wrote A Dialogue as an exchange between two characters after the
publication of Leviathan. 69 Additionally, some evidence suggests that Hobbes submitted
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A Dialogue to his publisher as an unfinished appendix to Behemoth known as De
Legibus. 70 Though scholarship on A Dialogue is sparse, both Joseph Cropsey and Susan
Okin noticed that A Dialogue deviates from Hobbes’s earlier thinking on the subject of
mixed government. 71 Compared to Hobbes’s earlier treatises, A Dialogue seems to
portray Parliament in a much more favorable light, indicating that Hobbes may have
reconsidered his earlier conclusions concerning the advisability of mixed governance.
This raises the question of whether Hobbes may have reconsidered other aspects of his
previous philosophy in the treatises, or perhaps reconsidered his philosophical project
altogether.
This study will show that Behemoth and other writings approach political
questions in a way that is different from that of Hobbes’s pre-Restoration writings. As
the discussion that follows shows, it is by no means clear that the writings from Hobbes’s
later career are simple restatements of his earlier philosophy. The style Hobbes used was
different, the issues Hobbes faced were different, and the later works emphasized themes
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that are different from the themes of the earlier works. But if these later writings have a
purpose that is different from Hobbes’s earlier works, what purpose might they serve?
Section 4: Scope and Relevance
This study addresses several questions about Hobbes’s post-Restoration career.
Was there sufficient cause for him to be skeptical about his previous conception of
political science? What aspects of politics and justice does Hobbes emphasize in his later
career in contrast to his early career? Is Hobbes still convinced that good politics
depends on the application of universal laws of politics derived from science? Or does
Hobbes become convinced that good politics depends on the political skill of the
sovereign, making politics more art than science? Perhaps the first and most important
question a study of this type should ask is what can Hobbes’s dialogues teach us about
political science today?
Perhaps the most fundamental question we should ask when we consider Hobbes
is his applicability to our present political condition. Many scholars consider Hobbes to
be the first example of a modern social scientist, providing the blueprint for how we
conduct social science to this day. 72 Accordingly, Hobbes is also susceptible to many of
the same criticisms. Three criticisms are generally made against social science that were
also applied to Hobbes’s science.
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The first is that contemporary social science overemphasizes a particularly narrow
version of self-interest as the cause of all human political behavior. Jane Mansbridge
argues that this tendency is directly attributable to Hobbes’s influence, claiming that
Hobbes was the first thinker to conceive of politics as “a state of universal, irreconcilable
conflict.” 73 Whether or not this narrow view of self-interest is indeed what Hobbes held,
the result of this conception of self-interest is that politics tends to be viewed by social
science as an adversarial affair between groups with divergent interests, even in times of
relative peace. 74 This adversarial conception of self-interest tends to dominate our
understanding of politics, particularly in those fields that lend themselves to empirical
investigation. 75 However, Mansbridge wonders if perhaps the adversarial conception of
self-interest is too narrow to be an effective explanation for all political motivation.
Consensus, deliberation, and altruistic behavior are problematic for the adversarial model
to incorporate, and a more useful conception of political motivation should

73

See Jane Mansbridge’s "Rise and Fall of Self-Interest in the Explanation of Political Life," Chap. 1 in
Beyond Self Interest (ed. Jane Mansbridge, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 4.
74

Consider James Madison’s concept of faction from Federalist 10: “By faction I understand a number of
citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community.” Taken from Bailyn (1993), p. 405.
75

Perhaps the clearest examples of how the adversarial model has influenced political science can be found
in the field of voting behavior. Consider Joseph Schlesinger’s view of the adversarial relationship between
officeholders and their constituents. “The acknowledgement is inherent in the common observation that
most, if not all, officeholders are ‘opportunists’ whose preoccupation with office and its powers overrides
all other concerns, including public policy.” Taken from Joseph Schlesinger’s Political Parties and the
Winning of Office (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991), p. 138.

36
“accommodate issues on which citizens have, or can come to have, a common interest, as
well as issues on which citizens’ interests conflict.” 76
This criticism of adversarial self-interest is one that Hobbes would have known,
as it is a criticism that Clarendon made against Hobbes 314 years before Mansbridge’s
article. In his “Survey of Mr. Hobbes,” Clarendon questions whether human beings are
“so full of jealousie and malignity” that they cannot govern themselves unless “they all
become yoaked by a Covenant and Contract that Mr. Hobbes hath provided for them.” 77
Like Mansbridge, Clarendon observes that human beings often act in ways that
undermine the narrow, self-interested behavior described in Leviathan. Rather than
explain man’s political nature, Hobbes “deprives man of the greatest happiness and glory
that can be attributed to him, who devests him of that gentleness and benevolence
towards other men.” 78 Clarendon’s assessment of human beings incorporates a broader
view of human potential than does Hobbes’s science. In addition, Clarendon’s positive
assessment of glory seeking alludes to the second criticism of the type of social science
Hobbes created.
While the first criticism points out the limitations of social science to describe
how human beings do behave, the second criticism points out the inadequacy of social
science in describing how human beings should behave. Specifically, modern social
science fails to capture what Albert Hirschman called “the heroic ideal,” or the capacity
76

Mansbridge (1990), p. 22.

77

See Clarendon’s “A Survey of Mr. Hobbes: His Leviathan” taken from G.A.J. Rogers’s Leviathan:
Contemporary Responses to the Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes (Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Press, 1995),
p. 196.
78

Ibid.

37
of individuals to pursue “honor and glory” as “the touchstone of a man’s virtue and
greatness.” 79
Hannah Arendt viewed Hobbes’s conception of human nature as essentially a
behavioralist one, quite similar to the behavioralist conceptions of human nature found in
our contemporary social science. According to Arendt, Hobbes views a human beings as
“without reason, without the capacity for truth, and without free will—that is, without the
capacity for responsibility.” 80 This is also, in Arendt’s view, the way in which our social
science views human nature, reducing “man as a whole, in all his activities, to the level of
a conditioned and behaving animal.” 81 In this view, there is no room for human beings to
express virtues that fall outside the norm of what is expected of them, and at the same
time, act in accordance with what is good or lawful. While Hobbes’s science admits that
human beings at times act in ways that are contrary to self-interest while pursuing high
ideals, these actions are generally seen as madness.
Actions that are pursued for the sake of high or heroic ideals are manifestations of
what Hobbes’s science called “vain-glory.” 82 Consequently, they are seen as having little
redeeming political or social value. As Gabriella Slomp, a recent Hobbes scholar,
indicates, “the desire for glory and superiority is a fundamental cause of discord in the
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state of nature and the primary source of dissolution of political states.” 83 Since this
desire for glory was destructive to the commonwealth, Hobbes’s science characterized
the pursuit of glory as a kind of political disease. However, by denigrating the pursuit of
glory, Hobbes also denigrates the pursuit of any virtue that supersedes or conflicts with
the fear of violent death, the passion that should, in Hobbes’s estimation, trump all
others. 84
The third criticism against Hobbes’s social science is that he creates what Robert
Kraynak would call “scientific absolutism,” or an aura of infallibility surrounding the
conclusions of social science. 85 This issue will be considered in detail in the final chapter,
but suffice it to say for now that like many political scientists, Hobbes was optimistic
about the ability of political theory to solve the perennial problems of politics. He did not
view his science as merely a framework to study human questions for the sake of
curiosity, as he believed that “knowledge is power,” and theory should be used for “the
performing of some action, or thing to be done.” 86 For Hobbes, science was not only a
window to perceive the underlying truth behind politics, it was a tool of statecraft useful
for correcting the political system where necessary. Ignorance of science can lead to
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disorder and disharmony as “the utility of moral and civil philosophy is to be estimated,
not so much by the commodities we have by knowing these sciences, as by the calamities
we receive from not knowing them.” 87 In Hobbes’s view, the difference between
political harmony and political calamity rests upon, as Hans Morgenthau would say, “the
opportunity to found the dominion of reason over human affairs.” 88 In Hobbes’s own
words, when citizens “have learned those duties which unite and keep men in peace” they
will “convert this truth of speculation, into the utility of practice.” 89
The Hobbes who wrote the treatises was confident that politics was a science and
not an art. In other words, the best solution to the problems of the commonwealth was
not to be found in the political skill of the statesman, but rather in applying the results of
scientific investigation to the commonwealth. He believed “the skill in making, and
maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain rules, as doth Arithmetique and
Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practise onely.” 90 In other words, science had the
capability of discovering a robust formula to solve the problems of the commonwealth
that was generally applicable to most cases in most circumstances. No longer would
commonwealths have to hope that their leaders had enough political skill, virtue and
prudence to ensure peace and tranquility. Instead, Hobbes made it clear that peace and
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tranquility could be guaranteed better by the application of scientifically derived
solutions more than by the statesman’s art.
Still, to say that the statesman’s art is inconsequential to peace and stability is to
deny the facts of the English Civil War. Charles I might have had the full constitutional
authority vested in the office he occupied; and he might have been a capable and just
ruler by the standards of Hobbes’s science. Yet, like Seth Low’s regime fully 250 years
later, Charles I’s regime would fall victim to political opportunists who were more
skillful in the art of politics than he. One of Hobbes’s greatest critics, Bishop John
Bramhall, stated the importance of the statesman’s art to the commonwealth in the 17th
century. Using Hobbes’s reference to tennis-play in his praise of science, Bramhall
responds by stating that:
State-policy, which is wholly involved in matter, and circumstances of
time, and place, and persons, is not at all like Arithmetik and Geometry,
which are altogether abstracted from matter, but much more like Tennisplay. There is no place for liberty in Arithmetik and Geometry, but in
policy there is, and so there is in Tennis-play. A game at Tennis hath its
vicissitudes, and so have States. A Tennis plaier must change his play at
every stroke, according to the occasion and accidents: so must a Statesman move his rudder differently, according to the various faces of heaven.
He who manageth a Common-wealth by general rules, will quickly ruine
both himself, and those who are committed to his government. One mans
meat is another mans poison; and those which are healthful Rules for one
Society at one time, may be pernicious to another Society, or to the same
society at another time. Some nations are like Horses, more patient of
their riders than others; And the same Nations more patient at one time
than at another. In summe, general rules are easie, and signifie not much
in policy. The quintessence of policy doth consist in the dexterous and
skilful application of those rules to the subject matter. 91
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To be fair, Hobbes’s science depends on strong, autonomous leadership in order to
maintain the peace. Leviathan outlines the mandate of the sovereign as salus populi and
describes the powers the sovereign needs to fulfill this mandate, but it is silent on the
question of how to distinguish a more effective sovereign from a less effective one. 92 In
other words, Hobbes’s science is silent on questions of effective leadership, primarily
because effective leadership implies that politics is an art that resembles a game of tennis
more than it resembles a solution to a mathematical problem. Bramhall observes that
politics is a dynamic enterprise that requires dynamic leadership to master its
vicissitudes. It is not, as Leviathan suggests, a static enterprise that responds to a static
formula.
These three criticisms of social science can be traced back to criticisms made
against Hobbes’s science in Hobbes’s own time. The question of whether Hobbes could
appreciate these criticisms and modify his philosophy to ameliorate them has yet to be
considered, but Hobbes’s turn to dialectic in his post-Restoration works makes sense
when we consider that Hobbes may have been aware of certain shortcomings in his preRestoration works. While Hobbes believed that true civil philosophy was no older than
his De Cive, the fact that he would write treatises of civil philosophy after De Cive show
that Hobbes continued to refine his thinking. Recognizing that “the first grounds of all
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science are not only not beautiful, but poor, arid, and, in appearance, deformed,” 93
Hobbes understood that science, especially a young science such as civil philosophy, has
a problem demonstrating its first assumptions. The type of theoretical approach Hobbes
utilizes in his science is rather precise, but relies upon the “strength of conviction
regarding the truth of the first principles from which the procedure begins.” 94 Hobbes
handles this problem within his own science by stressing the importance of having
unambiguous definitions of the central concepts we use in political discourse. 95 Once the
definitions are settled, the science is a simple matter of propositional logic, which is why
Hobbes calls science “the knowledge of consequences.” 96 While science is able to
demonstrate the relationship between cause and consequence with relative ease, it can
only do so because the antecedent is already assumed to be true. 97 Yet what makes
Hobbes’s definitions the true definitions of the terms and on what basis is this truth
affirmed? As we have seen from his admission in De Corpore, the first principles of any
science are often rough, and rely upon the reader to accept them in that rough state. The
study will attempt to show that Hobbes used dialectic to provide a more comprehensive
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understanding of politics than his science can allow. The use of dialectic in this fashion
was not unknown to Hobbes’s predecessors, since Aristotle saw dialectic as “being the
source for the first principles of all sciences.” 98 This may help explain why Hobbes saw
fit to write additional works on political matters in the dialogue form. While dialectic
lacks precision, it makes up for this deficiency by offering a much more comprehensive
account of generally held opinions about the nature of politics and history. 99 Whether
this is what Hobbes intended to do with his post-Restoration writings is something that
must be explored further, but the answer may be rather instructive as to whether Hobbes
became more skeptical of his conception of political science as delineated in the treatises.
A study of Hobbes’s dialogues will not only constitute a new contribution to our
understanding of him, but it will also speak to our discipline generally. As one of the
first modern political scientists, Hobbes was also the first to propose that social science
under a scientific method might provide a cure for the perennial problems of politics.
The dialogues seem to present a different teaching from that found in Hobbes’s more
familiar works. All of Hobbes’s previous works were written in response to a time when
the very foundations of civil order in England were crumbling, but both Behemoth and A
Dialogue were written after the English Civil War resolved itself. Chapter III explores,
through a close study of Hobbes’s Behemoth, the possibility that Hobbes might have
developed a more realistic sense of science’s capability and its limitations. Chapter IV
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explores the question of how Hobbes explained the Restoration and how his conception
of politics changed because of it. Chapter V explores Hobbes’s insight into successful
and unsuccessful techniques of sovereign leadership through his use of historical
sovereigns throughout the dialogues. Chapter VI continues to explore Hobbes’s concept
of leadership before and after his scientific treatises by comparing Hobbes’s solutions
with those of Machiavelli. Finally, chapter VII explores the idealism that is inherent in
Hobbes’s science by contrasting it with his more realistic approach to political problems
found in his dialogues. Taken together, the various components of this study attempt to
show how Hobbes’s dialogues give us a new perspective on Hobbes’s place in the history
of political thought with a different message to consider than the message found when
reading Hobbes’s treatises alone. By engaging in a study of this type, we not only gain
insight into one of the most important thinkers in the history of ideas, but we gain insight
into the promise and limitations of the way we think about politics today.
To begin this exploration, it is necessary in the next chapter to explain how the
Hobbes of the dialogues communicates his message. Reading a philosophical dialogue
requires a different set of assumptions than reading a philosophical treatise. Not only is it
necessary to understand how a philosophical dialogue needs to be read differently than a
treatise, but it is also necessary to understand Hobbes’s dialectical style. While it is
important to consider the form Hobbes had chosen, it is also important to understand why
Hobbes may have chosen the form that he did. The very fact that Hobbes chose to write
in dialectic is itself an important fact to consider, and ascertaining why he preferred
dialectic in his later career helps us to understand the message he wanted to communicate
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to us. Only by understanding both how and why Hobbes wrote dialogues can we best
ascertain what Hobbes’s mature teaching on politics may be.

CHAPTER II
INTERPRETING HOBBES’S DIALOGUES
Section 1: Hobbes’s Turn to Dialectic
When examining the history of political thought as a whole, one cannot help but
notice the change in how political thinkers write about their subjects. The way we choose
to write about politics is far different from the way Plato chose to do so. Our standards
do not allow for much discretion in matters of style. We expect our peers to present their
evidence and conclusions plainly and clearly. It is difficult for us to see how dialectic,
the form employed by Plato, can help us meet the burden of academic rigor expected in
today’s academy. Dialectic appears to our contemporary sensibilities as a dishonest form
of academic writing: a form where the author refuses to take ownership of the words he
writes. It also seems needlessly confusing to read as the arguments are spread out
amongst several characters: fictional entities of convenience that meander into
digressions, incomplete thoughts, absurdities, and errors.
Dialectic seems to be a strange, if not counterintuitive, format for a philosopher
such as Hobbes. He believed the problem with his philosophical predecessors was that
they were too obscure to be useful. 1
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Nevertheless, Hobbes chose to write four dialogues after his treatise Leviathan,
and all of them were written after the English Civil War was concluded. This shift in the
way Hobbes chose to communicate is the natural starting point for understanding the
differences between the Hobbes who wrote Leviathan and the post-Leviathan Hobbes.
Understanding the possible causes of Hobbes’s decision to write dialogues makes the task
of understanding what he is trying to communicate to us much clearer.
This is not to say that Hobbes’s pre-Restoration treatises and post-Restoration
dialogues are incompatible. Hobbes maintained unto his death the belief that there is no
greater illness the commonwealth can suffer than civil war. Furthermore, the illness of
civil war can only be cured by a strong, capable, independent and absolute sovereign that
is fully committed to the principle of salus populi, or the safety and well-being of the
people under the sovereign’s rule. 2 These similarities make the assertion that the Hobbes
of Behemoth supports a different conception of politics from that of the Hobbes of
Leviathan difficult to maintain. However, it is not difficult to see how Hobbes changed
in subtle ways if we read the dialogues under one important assumption: that Thomas
Hobbes was a careful writer.
Hobbes was not a typical author. He was one of the most precise and meticulous
writers in the history of political thought. He believed he had to be in order to avoid the
shortcomings of his philosophical predecessors. Specifically, Hobbes believed that
previous political philosophers lacked precision, and this lack of precision created the
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doctrinal crisis that caused general confusion on matters of justice. 3 In response, Hobbes
deliberately chose his language with the utmost care. This care is most evident in
Leviathan, where Hobbes informs his reader in his introduction that he will “set down my
own reading orderly, and perspicuously,” 4 giving the reader a clear demonstration of the
true science of politics. Hobbes delivered on his promise by creating a substantial
political treatise that is uncannily precise and etymologically consistent from beginning
to end. 5 From the very first sentence in Leviathan’s first chapter, Hobbes informs the
reader that he will approach the subject systematically, starting with man’s thoughts,
“first singly, and afterwards in trayne, or dependence upon one another.” 6 This is
important for Hobbes to convey early in his treatise, because it is important for his
purposes to show how human beings define terms before he may attempt to define terms
of his own. Terminology, or the lack of a consistent terminology, is what causes
3
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diffidence between human beings, and this diffidence causes confusion when considering
moral duties. 7 Therefore, it is no surprise that Hobbes starts all of his treatises with some
explanation of how human beings come to define their words, for the root cause of civil
war can be reduced at some level to differences among human beings in understanding
key concepts due to imprecise or ambiguous terms. 8
When Hobbes defines his own terms, he starts with fundamental concepts,
building definitions that are more complex by compounding concepts defined earlier in
his works. After establishing a definition, Hobbes is consistent in the use of the words.
While subtle differences arise when comparing Hobbes’s definitions among his works,
Hobbes is remarkably consistent when using definitions within each work. Part of what
makes Hobbes so persuasive is the care he takes to explain concepts “in a beautifully
lucid sequence of terms and relations” that “leaves no inference or circumstance of the
argument to his reader’s imagination.” 9 Given Leviathan’s rhetorical style, we cannot
help but conclude that Hobbes was an uncannily thoughtful writer and one who thought
deeply about how his words would be received. In terms of interpretation, we must
assume that the correct interpretation of any given line in Hobbes’s works is the most
literal one, taking into account whatever qualifications Hobbes deemed necessary in the

7

“From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and the same thing, from the
difference of their own passions: As they that approve a private opinion, call it Opinion; but they that
mislike it, Hæresie: and yet hæresie signifies no more than private opinion; but has onely a greater tincture
of choler” (ibid., I.11.165).
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I.5.116-117).
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text preceding the line under consideration. Thus Hobbes’s works provide their own
context as each work contains all of the necessary information to understand Hobbes’s
intent.
It is important to notice, however, that while any particular work of Hobbes is
internally consistent with itself, the works taken as a whole are not always consistent with
each other. That is to say, the terms established by Hobbes in one work do not always
carry over into his other works. As Robert Kraynak shows, subtle variations exist
between Hobbes’s terms in his earliest political treatise, The Elements of Law, and the
terms in his later Leviathan. 10 Kraynak’s analysis shows that it is a mistake to assume
that Hobbes reiterated the same conclusions throughout his career. While the same
general conclusions about human nature and politics seem to pervade the whole of
Hobbes’s canon, he continued to refine his thinking on political matters as his career
progressed.
This study shows how Hobbes refined his political thinking after the Restoration
of the monarchy, and we can observe several initial differences between Hobbes’s preRestoration treatises and his post-Restoration dialogues. Neither Behemoth nor A
Dialogue used constructions such as the state of nature to explain the causes of the civil
war, and Hobbes made no attempt to structure the dialogues according to the resolutivecompositive method. Instead, Hobbes limits his analysis to evidence from the historical
record, and offers specific examples to underpin the arguments of his characters rather
than himself. J.W.N. Watkins maintains that this reliance on historical examples makes
10

Consider Kraynak’s analysis of the differences between Hobbes’s definitions for science, understanding,
and right reason in The Elements of Law as compared with Leviathan in Kraynak (1990), p. 162.
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Behemoth a descriptive work as opposed to Leviathan, a work that is more prescriptive in
its aims. 11 While this is generally the case, it would be a mistake to say that Leviathan is
not descriptive at all, since it includes a description of the political condition as it truly is,
at least according to Hobbes’s standards. 12 For the same reason, it would be a mistake to
say that Behemoth is strictly descriptive. For a history of the English Civil War,
Behemoth is peculiar in its use of historical examples that predate the reign of Charles I in
much the same way as A Dialogue uses historical examples that predate the common
law. 13 Part of the task of understanding Hobbes’s writings is to understand how Hobbes
used history. This will be examined in detail in chapter V, but this is not the only matter
we need to understand. Hobbes wrote his two most important post-Restoration political
works as dialogues. Therefore, understanding how Hobbes used the dialogue form may
shed some light on a matter that Hobbes scholars are debating with increasing
seriousness: the difference of intent between Hobbes’s Leviathan and Behemoth.
In contrast to Leviathan, Behemoth was often considered a work of secondary
importance. Scholars such as M.M. Goldsmith, Leo Strauss, and C.B. Macpherson
viewed Behemoth as a minor work and more of a supplement to Hobbes’s treatises rather
11

Watkins (1965), p. 15.
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Blair Campbell maintains that Hobbes’s philosophy engages in both prescription and description. He
states that “Hobbes was unique among political thinkers in attempting to deny political force to morality;
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than a philosophical work it its own right. This view would change as scholars such as
Richard Ashcraft and Robert Kraynak started to interpret the historical narrative of
Behemoth as having a purpose that is somewhat different from the purpose of Hobbes’s
earlier writings. The most recent trend in the scholarship from Noam Flinker and
Geoffrey Vaughan shifts the focus from the historical narrative to the dramatic interplay
between the characters. What all of these interpretations share is the belief that
Behemoth’s message explains or complements the message in the treatises. What has not
been considered is the possibility that Behemoth’s message constitutes something of a
departure from the message of Hobbes’s earlier writings, or that it may provide evidence
of a subtle shift in Hobbes’s conception of proper political inquiry.
Hobbes wrote both Behemoth and A Dialogue using only two characters. While
literary dialectic was a known form of discourse employed by Plato and Cicero, there was
considerable variation in how the form was employed. 14 Yet all dialogues, regardless of
their origins, possess two fundamental qualities inherent to the form. The term dialogue
comes from the root word logos, defined as both reason and speech. Logos is preceded
by the prefix di or dia, and has a double meaning. The prefix di implies a bifurcation or
division, meaning that a dialogue divides the reason or speech amongst the several
characters. However, the prefix dia implies a movement or motion, which implies that a
dialogue is a movement of reason or speech. 15 Both prefixes seem to explain what
14

See Chapter II of Werner Jaeger’s Aristotle, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 2438.

15

In Philosophical Dialogue in the British Enlightenment, Michael Prince describes the two ways dialogue
can be interpreted. When thinking of dialogue in terms of the prefix di, “it might be more accurate to say
that the logos, conceived as absolute unity, permits itself to be divided for the sake of human
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makes a philosophical dialogue different from a philosophical treatise. A dialogue
divides the reasoning and speech among two or more characters. The reasoning and
speech also moves from one character to another as the dialogue moves from beginning
to end.
This is different from a philosophical treatise where the actual philosophical
process of reaching a conclusion is somewhat concealed. In a treatise, the conclusions
are much more important than the process by which they are reached. By contrast, the
author of a dialogue invites the reader to observe the philosophical process directly
through observing how the characters reach their conclusions. In this way, philosophical
dialectic can provide the reader with a glimpse into the philosophic process far more
accurately than is available when reading a philosophic treatise. Yet if we are to take this
view, we have to ask ourselves why Hobbes did not write political dialogues in his early
career. If philosophical dialectic is truly the best way to depict the philosophic process
with any accuracy, why did Hobbes turn to dialogue only in the latter stages of his career
instead of all along?
We have no account of how Hobbes himself viewed philosophical dialectic, so it
is difficult to understand why he rejected philosophical dialectic in his earlier career.
What we do know is that the Hobbes who wrote the treatises believed philosophy should
duplicate the same systematic approach as geometry. In other words, Hobbes believed

comprehension, with the proviso that division remain all the time a propaedeutic to the recovery of a
coherent whole.” Thinking of dialogue in terms of the prefix dia implies “passage, transition, movement,
with no limitation upon the number of voices sharing in the logos.” Looking back into the origins of
philosophical dialectic, “Plato seems to have understood dialogue in both senses.” See Michael Prince’s
Philosophical Dialogue in the British Enlightenment (Cambridge: University Press, 1996), pp. 2-3.
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that the philosopher should construct his argument as a mathematician constructs a
geometric proof. This philosophical process is by necessity an activity performed in
isolation with the objective already in sight. 16 It is not, as in philosophical dialectic, a
collaborative activity with the objective of reaching a common understanding of what is
unknown. Given this understanding of philosophy, it is no wonder that Hobbes took
great care to construct his treatises with the clarity formerly found only in geometry. 17
This was the only way that Hobbes could guarantee the precision that his science
required. 18 In contrast, the purpose of Plato’s dialogues is to “prepare the way for
philosophizing,” 19 aiming only secondarily at clarity and precision. Hobbes does not
teach the readers of his treatises how to philosophize, or how to question. Rather,
Hobbes uses his treatises to teach the importance of following a specific method:
Hobbes’s method. 20 This difference in purpose can explain why Hobbes chose to write
his treatises in the manner he did. This does not explain, however, Hobbes’s switch from
writing treatises to writing in dialectic in his late career.
16
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Sheldon Wolin emphasized the importance Hobbes placed on following his specific method as “the
‘want of method’ signifies weakness. Without it, men err and are deceived, and while experience,
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Dialectical writing was not unknown or unpracticed in Hobbes’s time. 21
Dialogues on scientific matters, while less common, were written by a handful of
scholars, most notably Galileo, who wrote Dialogues Concerning the Two Chief World
Systems. Hobbes’s choice to format his discussions with Bishop Bramhall in dialectic
(Liberty, Necessity, and Chance) might imply that he tended to think of debates as
dialogues, but dialogues were also an important part of Hobbes’s overall rhetorical
repertoire outside of the Bramhall debate. His preference for the format can be seen in
the number of dialogues Hobbes wrote, including his works of natural science (Seven
Philosophical Problems and Decameron Physiologicum), his work on law (A Dialogue),
and his history of the English Civil War (Behemoth). This preference for the dialogue
format seems conspicuous, if only because dialectic seems to run counter to his criticism
of scholastic methods. Specifically, the artistic license available to the author using the
dialectical form might distort the clarity of a philosophical or historical investigation. 22
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For an excellent survey of dialogues in the post-Restoration period, see Eugene Purpus’s “The ‘Plain,
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Jeremy Collier, Isaac Walton, Roger L’Estrange, William Walsh, Ambrose Philips, and John Gay” (p. 54).
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Why would Thomas Hobbes, arguably the most precise and rigorous thinker of his time,
retreat to a style of philosophical discourse that sacrifices precision for artistic license?
There might have been pragmatic reasons for Hobbes to produce dialogues. The
unique characteristics of the format allow a philosopher to accomplish objectives that
cannot be accomplished in treatise form. Dialectic is a useful format for a philosopher
who wants to protect himself from critics who have the power to limit or prevent the
publication and distribution of the philosopher’s work, as a critic can never know which
of the characters speak for the writer. Because the author speaks through his characters
in a dialogue, the author can make controversial statements he might be unlikely to make
if he were writing in his own voice as himself as in a treatise. Any attempt by the
authorities to censor or condemn the philosopher could be easily countered, as the
philosopher can claim that no single character represents the philosopher. This gives the
philosopher who writes dialectically an essential safeguard against retribution: plausible
deniability. This was important for a philosopher who wrote at a time when books were
examined closely by royal or religious authorities who were quick to condemn an author
for attempting to publish seditious or heretical material.
There is some evidence suggesting that Hobbes wanted to insulate himself from
criticism in his late career. In a letter to Cosimo de’Medici from 1669, Hobbes discusses
his pamphlet explaining his geometric proof to square the circle. In it, Hobbes justifies
why he submitted his earliest copies to his harshest critics: “I submitted them not to

Extravagancy.” On the other hand, “in a good History, the Judgement must be eminent; because the
goodnesse consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse of the actions that are most profitable
to be known. Fancy has no place, but onely in adorning the stile” (Leviathan, I.8.135-136).
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friends, but to torturers—putting them, as it were, in a purifying fire. For I knew that, in
writing books just as in real life, enemies are more useful than friends in enabling us to
take precautions.” 23 Hobbes was no stranger to critics of his works, especially his
political ones. By the time Hobbes wrote this letter in 1669, most of the leading
intellectuals in Britain had condemned Hobbes’s Leviathan alongside his other political
works. Those who criticized Hobbes’s works comprise a veritable who’s who in
seventeenth century English political thought. Robert Filmer, George Lawson, John
Bramhall, Edward Hyde (better known as the Earl of Clarendon), and James Harrington
all wrote lengthy and learned critiques of Hobbes’s published thoughts on government.
While Robert Filmer agreed in principle with Hobbes’s general conclusion, he believed
Hobbes’s reasoning on natural law and the institutions of government “appear full of
contradiction and impossibilities.” 24 George Lawson called Hobbes “one of the worst
that ever wrote either of Civil or Ecclesiastical Politicks” due to Hobbes’s stance on the
relationship between economic power and political power. 25 Bishop John Bramhall
shows how Hobbes’s philosophy “destroyeth all relations between man and man, Prince
and subject, Parent and child, Husband and wife, Master and servant, and generally all
society.” 26 Clarendon’s criticism of Hobbes is made in equally strong terms “as he
[Hobbes] hath made a worse Man by much, by making him too like himself; so he hath
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made a much worse Common-wealth then ever was yet known in the World, by making it
such as he would have.” 27 In Oceana, James Harrington upholds the notion of an
“empire of laws and not men” and shows how “Leviathan goes about to destroy” the
traditional understanding that laws are the foundation of a lasting commonwealth. 28 With
all of these criticisms against Leviathan from Hobbes’s contemporaries, and Hobbes’s
growing concern that he could face execution for atheism and profanity, 29 it is easy to see
why he would want to take precautions against his intellectual adversaries. Unlike his
mathematical proofs, Hobbes would not have to submit his political works to the scrutiny
of torturers; it would seem that the torturers would scrutinize Hobbes’s political writings
whether or not Hobbes desired their scrutiny. Nevertheless, if Hobbes thought that he
needed to take precautions against his critics for something as harmless as squaring the
circle, it is only natural to assume that Hobbes also believed that he needed to take
precautions against his critics for something as contentious as political philosophy, as the
salience of the issues at stake is significantly greater in political philosophy. Not
surprisingly, the period when Hobbes wrote the de’Medici letter (1669) coincides with
the period when Hobbes was writing dialogues. Therefore, the possibility that Hobbes
used dialectic to protect himself from potential critics is a real one. What would Hobbes
want to conceal from critics?
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It is tempting to read Behemoth as an unqualified defense of Charles I’s reign, but
Behemoth includes a fair amount of criticism of Charles I. The most obvious criticism is
the episode describing the introduction of the Book of Common Prayer into Scotland.
Behemoth’s A surmises that the Scots “never would have ventured into the field” had
Charles I not introduced the Book into Scotland in 1637. 30 Goldsmith, MacGillivray, and
Holmes have interpreted this passage as Hobbes’s criticism of Charles I. 31 Specifically,
Hobbes believed that Charles I was unaware of the deleterious consequences of his
religious policy and could not manage the discontent it caused. This passage shows that
Hobbes was using his history as more than a defense of Charles I’s reign; he was also
criticizing it. The question, therefore, is not whether Hobbes was critical of Charles I,
but rather, how critical Hobbes was of Charles I. The depth of Hobbes’s criticism of
Charles I will be explored in detail in chapter V, but suffice it to say for now that
Behemoth is not an unqualified defense of Charles I’s reign. Given that Charles I’s son
was on the throne when Hobbes was writing Behemoth, and tensions were still high
30
31
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between the royalists and parliamentarians, there was ample reason for Hobbes to be
concerned that whatever criticism he believed was necessary to include might be
interpreted as treason. Therefore, it seems only natural that Hobbes would want to take
precautions when criticizing Charles I, or the royalist cause in general, and the dialogue
format allows Hobbes to do this in a way he might not be able to do when speaking as
himself as he would in a philosophic treatise.
Besides the capacity to insulate oneself from criticism, philosophical dialectic can
be useful to a philosopher as a way to test or refine ideas that would be inappropriate to
discuss through prose. In a treatise, the author places himself and his reputation as a
philosopher on display to the reader. This naturally causes the writer to convey only the
most obvious or demonstrable ideas, which excludes many other ideas that the author
might want to explore. In a dialogue, the author voices opinions or arguments through
the characters, and by doing so, is allowed to test or explore radical or even contradictory
propositions without harming his philosophical reputation. It is precisely for this reason
that Anthony Ashley Cooper (the Earl of Shaftesbury) stated that the ancients “give us
the representation of real discourse and converse by treating their subjects in the way of
dialogue and free debate.” 32 Shaftesbury knew that the dialectic the ancients practiced
was intellectually honest and stimulating in a way that the prose of his time could not
duplicate. When an author speaks to the reader through a treatise, the author’s interest is
to impress the reader. Conversely, the reader of a treatise sits in judgment of the author,
32
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determining whether the author produces a convincing case. In a dialogue, however, the
author has no interest in placating the reader, because the words the characters utter are
not necessarily a reflection of the author’s own opinion. Instead, the author can
concentrate on producing interesting lines of thought without having to consider how a
reader sitting in judgment will receive the words. The reader of a dialogue is similarly
not interested in evaluating the author. Instead of judging the author, the reader of a
dialogue focuses on the competing arguments the characters espouse. The writer of
dialogues is able to approach subjects freely and test ideas, and consequently, dialectic
can be an ideal form for a philosopher who wants to engage in self-criticism or a reevaluation of the philosopher’s previously established ideas.
There is evidence that Hobbes was not pleased with some of his pre-Restoration
writings. For example, Hobbes’s Philosophical Problems (1662) contains an epistle
dedicatory that is described by Molesworth as “an apology for himself and his
writings.” 33 In it, Hobbes conveys his regret for the material in Leviathan that was
“contrary to the general opinions of the divines.” 34 He explains that his writing should be
read as “neither atheism nor heresy,” since it only endeavored to place “the authority of
the Church wholly upon the regal power.” 35 Nevertheless, Hobbes admits that by
arguing against the Episcopal authorities, he also inadvertently cast aspersions upon some
of Charles II’s most loyal supporters. This is why Hobbes asks Charles II not to “think
33
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Vol. VII, (London: John Bohn, 1845), p. 3. This edition will hereafter be referred to as Philosophical
Problems.

34

Ibid., p. 5.

35

Ibid.

62
the worse” of him “if snatching up all the weapons to fight against your enemies” he
“lighted upon one that had a double edge.” 36 It seems odd that Hobbes would use this
epistle dedicatory from his work on physics to discuss the political controversy
surrounding his political work. Nevertheless, the epistle dedicatory of Philosophical
Problems shows us that Hobbes was still deeply concerned with his political treatises and
how they were received.
Philosophical Problems was not expressly a political work, as the dialogue begins
with a question by A concerning “the cause … that stones and other bodies thrown
upward … fall down again,” 37 indicating that this is primarily a work of physics with
some geometric propositions included in the last chapter. Nevertheless, this work can be
interpreted as a political work in the sense that it is an attack against “the old
philosophers” as they are unable to persuade A that the causes of natural forces such as
gravity are as they discern. 38 Given Hobbes’s statement in the Epistle Dedicatory, he
admits that Leviathan was unable to persuade the religious authorities on religious
grounds. However, if Leviathan is unpersuasive in battling the scholastics on religious
grounds, Leviathan may be able to battle the scholastics on the grounds where its science
is most at home: the explanation of natural phenomena. Therefore, Philosophical
Problems is political in the sense that it attempts to refocus attention on Leviathan as a
work of natural science rather than as an attack against religion. This is the most obvious
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explanation for the work, as A mentions Leviathan by name in the context of
understanding how “all sense is fancy.” 39
Yet a quick analysis of the actual placement of Leviathan in the text of
Philosophical Problems is intriguing. While Philosophical Problems is composed of
eight chapters, the full title of the work is Seven Philosophical Problems and Two
Propositions of Geometry. In the Epistle Dedicatory, Hobbes explains that his work is
arranged “under seven heads. 1. Problems of gravity. 2. Problems of tides. 3. Problems
of vacuum. 4. Problems of heat. 5. Problems of hard and soft. 6. Problems of wind and
weather. 7. Problems of motion perpendicular and oblique, &c.” 40 The last chapter is
not a part of the seven philosophical problems Hobbes discusses, but “two propositions of
geometry” added on to the end as a kind of appendix to the main text. 41 The fourth
philosophical problem is covered in chapter 4: “Problems of Heat and Light.” It is a
chapter composed of forty-one lines between A and B. The twenty-first line of the
chapter is a line by character A composed of three sentences. The second sentence reads
“and I perceive by your doctrine you have been tampering with Leviathan.” 42 This is the
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conclude why “the old philosophers” in the initial question are not believable. Specifically, science rests
“upon better ground than can be had for a discourse on ghosts” (p. 58).
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first and only time either of the characters mentions Leviathan, and the only time
Leviathan appears in any of Hobbes’s dialogues.
Besides the curious fact that this mention occurs in the middle sentence in the
middle line in the middle problem of the seven philosophical problems, the sentence in
context seems out of place. A does not need to mention Leviathan in order to respond to
B adequately, and the sentence could very well be omitted with no disruption to the flow
of the dialogue. Also, A’s accusation that B had been “tampering with Leviathan” seems
to run counter to what B actually said in the preceding line. If anything, B is faithfully
retelling the account of sense perception from Leviathan without alteration. 43 If A’s
declaration is not in reference to B’s retelling, then what purpose could the declaration
serve?
If this statement on Leviathan in the middle of Philosophical Problems is not in
reference to the exchange between A and B, might this sentence be a direct appeal to the
reader? That is to say, Hobbes might have included this passage as a reference to
something occurring outside of the narrative: a shift in perspective that Hobbes wanted to
share with his devoted readers. If we are to take Hobbes as literally saying that he can
perceive the reader’s doctrine, and that this doctrine may persuade the reader (or those
like the reader) to tamper with Leviathan, what could that doctrine be? Hobbes only
discusses two doctrines in the preceding pages of Philosophical Problems, and they
appear only in the Epistle Dedicatory: “the doctrine of natural causes” and the “doctrine
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“So that Sense in all cases, is nothing els but originall fancy, caused (as I have said) by the pressure, that
is, by the motion, of externall things upon our Eyes, Eares, and other organs thereunto ordained”
(Leviathan, I.1.86).
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of the kingdom of Christ.” 44 Which of these two doctrines does Hobbes attribute to the
reader in the middle of Philosophical Problems?
With the exception of the discussion on spirits and apparitions at the end of the
seventh chapter, 45 Philosophical Problems is devoid of any extended theological
discussion. Given his apology made in the Epistle Dedicatory for any incendiary
theological assertions made in Leviathan, it seems likely that Hobbes wanted to assure
the doctors of divinity that there was nothing of interest to them in the dialogue. Even
when the characters discuss spirits, the subject is quickly dismissed as “no part of the
subject of natural philosophy” and left at that. 46 Philosophical Problems is primarily
concerned with natural phenomena, and it is reasonable to assume that its readers were
more inclined towards the doctrine of natural causes than towards the doctrine of the
kingdom of Christ. Furthermore, it seems plausible that Hobbes wanted to appeal to his
fellow geometricians by placing his direct message to them in a place that would be
significant to any geometrician: the centerpoint. Therefore, it is plausible to consider that
the line containing Leviathan is intended to be a direct statement from Hobbes to those
who follow the doctrine of natural causes. This doctrine is certainly something that
Hobbes could perceive in others, since Hobbes himself is a proponent of the doctrine of
natural causes. However, why would another scientist want to tamper with Leviathan?
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The most obvious reason would be if the science in Leviathan was flawed in some
way or could be improved upon. Perhaps Hobbes realizes that Leviathan is open not only
to theological criticism, but scientific criticism as well. While Hobbes does not admit
any flaws in Leviathan, he may realize that his science can be improved upon. In other
words, Leviathan is not tamper proof. This statement can also be read as a confession,
for if Hobbes shares the same doctrine as the intended audience of the line, then Hobbes
is admitting that he himself may also be tampering with Leviathan. Given that this line is
also the last time in Hobbes’s dialogues that Leviathan is mentioned by name, one can
only assume that Hobbes did not want the readers to refer to it in his subsequent
dialogues.
This one line alone—however intriguing—is not in itself sufficient proof that
Hobbes disavowed the political science that was the foundation of Leviathan. However,
the line does support the theory that Hobbes might be using dialectic as a way to test new
concepts or refine old ones. It is in this sense that Hobbes may be tampering with
Leviathan, and it is through dialectic that Hobbes can develop various alternatives to
Leviathan in a constructive manner.
If Hobbes wanted to re-evaluate his own ideas, what exactly did he want to reevaluate? Hobbes gives us a clue that he intends to explore concepts in Behemoth
different from those he had explored in Leviathan. The first and only time in Behemoth
where we encounter Hobbes speaking as himself occurs in the Epistle Dedicatory to Lord
Arlington. After discussing the general overview and plan of Behemoth, Hobbes claims
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that “there can be nothing more instructive towards loyalty and justice than the memory,
while it lasts, of that war,” 47 which in this context refers to the English Civil War.
This statement is important is because it runs counter to Hobbes’s understanding
of political epistemology as previously stated in his pre-Restoration philosophy.
Specifically, Hobbes believed that his science achieved a level of certainty that memory
or common experience could never hope to achieve. The objective of science is to
elucidate “generall, eternall, and immutable Truth” that does not rely on a recollection of
past events that may be imperfect or incomplete. 48 By comparison, memory is described
as a “decaying sense” that imagines, with varying degrees of accuracy, sense perceptions
long after they are first received.49 Given the choice between the memory of a singular—
albeit important—event, and a scientific understanding of the causes of civil war, one
would think that Hobbes would prefer the latter.
Yet Hobbes does not seem to be making that claim in Behemoth’s Epistle
Dedicatory. Instead, he states that there is “nothing more instructive” than the memory of
the civil war. Behemoth was Hobbes’s last published work on politics, and since the
Epistle Dedicatory is the only time in the work that Hobbes speaks as himself, Hobbes’s
claim about the importance of the memory of the civil war is the last official statement by
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Hobbes on the subject speaking as himself. As we have seen, Hobbes is a careful writer.
He does not choose words casually, and in the case of Behemoth’s Epistle Dedicatory,
Hobbes chooses to write about the importance of the memory in superlative terms. The
significance of this claim cannot be overstated, for if there is truly “nothing more
instructive towards loyalty and justice than the memory, while it lasts,” of the English
Civil War, then by consequence, all other instructors are—at best—not fully instructive,
or at worst, not instructive towards loyalty and justice at all.
This might imply Leviathan and Hobbes’s science in general may not be the best
instructors, for if they were, we would expect Hobbes to inform his readers that they need
to refer back to his earlier works to understand loyalty and justice completely. However,
Hobbes does not refer his readers to any of his other works in Behemoth’s Epistle
Dedicatory, nor does he refer to any of his works by name in the Behemoth manuscript
proper. 50 All we have as readers of Hobbes is a rather definitive statement that the
English Civil War itself has something to teach those who are still able to recollect it, and
that those who are able to recollect it understand the need for loyalty and justice in a
better way than those who cannot. Hobbes does not promote his science here as an
alternative, nor does he claim that his history is the definitive recollection of the English
Civil War. If anything, Hobbes seems to be questioning or challenging the role of
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science as a teacher of moral duties which, if correct, constitutes a departure from his
previous conception of the role of science as an instructor of moral duties.
This one statement from Behemoth’s Epistle Dedicatory alone does not show that
Hobbes rejected his earlier science. What it does show is that Hobbes is assessing—or
reassessing—the experience of the English Civil War as a teacher of political principles.
Implied in this reassessment is a reassessment of science, because Hobbes had always
positioned science as a better alternative to experience and prudence as a teacher of
political principles. This reassessment of science does not imply, however, that Hobbes
is necessarily rejecting his science. Since Behemoth is a series of exchanges between two
characters, Hobbes may be of two minds, trying to refine or reconcile his understanding
of political science through a crucible of his own design. Therefore, it is no surprise that
Behemoth is written in philosophical dialectic, since it is a form that lends itself
beautifully to the purposes of Hobbes.
Section 2: Hobbes’s Dialectical Style
We have explored the reasons why Hobbes would write in dialectic, but we have
yet to explore how Hobbes wrote in dialectic. The best place to start understanding
Hobbes’s dialectical style is to examine Hobbes’s use of characters. A survey of
Hobbes’s extant dialogues shows that he limited the characters he used to two per
dialogue. This is typical of the style of the time. Eugene Purpus noticed that most
dialogues written in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries “were more
closely allied with a question-and-answer box or a didactic catechism than with realistic
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conversation between credible human beings.” 51 Purpus places Hobbes’s dialogues into
this group of question-and-answer monographs, noting that “this charge can be
directed…against serious works of considerable length, such as Hobbes’ Behemoth,
Decameron Physiologicum, and Seven Philosophical Problems.” 52
Hobbes’s dialogues also deviate from the question-and-answer format in a few
important ways. The convention at the time Hobbes was writing his dialogues was to
label the characters Q and A, corresponding to the character that asks the question and the
character that provides the answer. 53 Hobbes’s dialogues never specifically designate the
character who questions or the character who answers through the use of symbols. While
it is true that Hobbes generally designates the characters as A and B, it is by no means
clear that the letters always correspond to a certain role Hobbes has in mind for the
character. In Seven Philosophical Problems, Hobbes begins the dialogue with A asking
the question and B responding in turn. However, this is not the case in Behemoth, as the
dialogue begins with a statement by A rather than with a question for B. In A Dialogue,
Hobbes breaks with the convention completely, referring to his characters by occupation
rather than by A and B. What these variations indicate is that Hobbes did not limit
himself to any seventeenth century convention for dialectical writing. Instead, his
dialogues were more complex and he varied his style based on what he was trying to
accomplish in each work.
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This does not imply that Hobbes’s dialogues do not share a pattern. All of his
dialogues contain some discussion on politics even when the overall theme of a dialogue
does not particularly include politics. A prime example of this is Philosophical
Problems: a work of natural science that, as shown in the previous section, can also be
interpreted as an attack against philosophical scholasticism. Decameron Physiologicum
is another dialogue on natural science that has a political message. Unlike Philosophical
Problems, Decameron Physiologicum has no introduction or dedicatory statement that
describes the manuscript’s intent. However, the opening chapter of Decameron
Physiologicum shows the political intent of the work. The dialogue starts with A
wondering whether philosophy is something to be praised or despised. 54 B then answers
A’s question by claiming that “the honor and scorn falleth finally not upon philosophy,
but the professors.” 55 The rest of the chapter is a clarification of a distinction that is
familiar to readers of Hobbes: the distinction between relying upon “what other men say”
to discover the truth about natural causes, and relying “only upon reason” to discover the
truth about natural causes. 56 B then explains the problem of believing what other men
say about the world. He claims that men by nature “would have all the world, if they
could, to fear and obey them,” and because of this, scholars are more likely to be
“engaged in the maintenance of an error … for the saving of their authority” than to
54
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admit the truth that proves them wrong. 57 B then gives us an example that Hobbes used
in Behemoth: the account of the Ethiopian priests before the reign of Ergamenes as told
by Diodorus Siculus. 58 Due to their knowledge of the heavenly bodies, the priests “made
their kings … to stand in awe of them, that they durst not either eat or drink but what and
when they prescribed; no nor live, if they said the gods commanded them to die.” 59 B
also explains that the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers “were more addicted to
moral than to natural philosophy” and that they wrote “upon no other principles than their
own passions and presumptions, without any respect to the laws of the commonwealth,
which are the ground and measure of all true morality.” 60 B then explains the effect of
Christianity on philosophy, claiming that “the freedom of philosophy was to the power
spiritual very dangerous.” 61 This view of philosophy ultimately led to “the Schools”
which “were erected by the Pope and Emperor…to answer and confute the heresies of the
philosophers.” 62 At this point, A seems satisfied that understanding what other
philosophers say about natural causes is too fraught with self-interest and error to be
accurate. Therefore, A is ready to understand the definitions necessary in order to start
his own exploration of the subject. The first definition A must understand is that of body,
which immediately brings up the problem of how to differentiate the perception of a body
57
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from the actual body under investigation. B explains that perceptions of bodies “are all
but fancies” and that these must be distinguished from the actual body under
investigation, which B defines as “any thing that hath a being in itself, without the help of
sense.” 63 Now that A understands the difference between a body and an essence, he is
ready to begin investigating natural causes on his own.
Although Decameron Physiologicum is a scientific dialogue, its aims can be said
to be political as well. Part of the problem Hobbes perceives with political thought is that
philosophical authorities dominate it and these philosophical authorities have selfinterested motives that are in direct competition with science in understanding the world
as it truly is. The first chapter of Decameron Physiologicum is an attempt to free the
reader from acquiescing to philosophical authorities simply because of reputation and,
instead, encourages the reader to seek out better explanations of the world.
Philosophical Problems was Hobbes’s earliest dialogue (1662), while Decameron
Physiologicum was one of his later dialogues (1678). Both are similar in terms of style as
both begin with a student (A) asking a question of Hobbes himself (B). The reason B
cannot be anyone else but Hobbes in these two dialogues is that B is identified as the
author of works Hobbes wrote. In Philosophical Problems, B admits that “it was I that
writ” the paper on the duplication of the cube that Hobbes himself sent to Paris. 64 In
Decameron Physiologicum, A identifies B as the author of De Corpore: a work that A
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uses to understand “the causes of the diversity of colours.” 65 The student’s initial
question or request for clarification is the inciting incident that moves both of these
dialogues forward. In terms of chronology, A Dialogue falls somewhere between the two
scientific works: later than 1662 and before 1678. 66 Like the scientific works, A
Dialogue starts with a question from the lawyer to the philosopher about why “the study
of the law is less rational, than the study of mathematics.” 67 In this way, A Dialogue is
similar to the scientific dialogues, but the similarity ends here. Not only does Hobbes
refer to his characters by profession in A Dialogue, but also the professions are important
in understanding the meaning of the exchanges.
The full title of A Dialogue implies that the conversation is between a philosopher
and a student of the common law, suggesting at first glance that the lawyer is the student
of the philosopher. However, as Cropsey suggests, “Hobbes considers the members of
the legal profession, bench as well as bar, to be studiers of something that they do not
make but in which it is their duty simply to become versed.” 68 While the lawyer
character is technically a student, it would be a mistake to assume that he is a student of
the philosopher character, as the lawyer is both a student of the law and of philosophy.
Similarly, while the philosopher character understands the laws of natural philosophy, he
65
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does not understand the common law and how it is practiced. This makes A Dialogue is a
conversation between two experts on a subject in which both can claim some expertise:
the law. What makes the characters in A Dialogue different is what kind of law each
character understands; the lawyer is an expert in the common law, while the philosopher
is an expert in the laws of reason. While the lawyer character utters the opening question,
the philosopher through the course of the dialogue asks rather basic questions of the
lawyer such as the purpose of statute law. 69 This makes the philosopher just as much of a
questioner as the lawyer, making A Dialogue a discussion between relative equals in
terms of status. Unlike the scientific dialogues, A Dialogue portrays more than a simple
lesson between Hobbes and a student. Instead, A Dialogue portrays a clash of
perspectives concerning the topic at hand: the degree to which the practitioners of the
common law follow the law of reason.
On the surface, Behemoth seems to have more in common stylistically with the
scientific dialogues than with A Dialogue. Many who have examined Behemoth’s style
conclude that it is a “doctor and student dialogue” predicated on the assumption that the
doctor (A) teaches the student (B). 70 According to this view, the lesson that A teaches is
Hobbes’s science found in Leviathan and other treatises. This has led scholars to
conclude that Behemoth’s dramatic content centers around the success or failure of the
doctor character in educating the student character in Hobbesian political principles. 71
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However, this interpretation rests on the assumption that A is the elder doctor teaching a
naïve and younger B, an assumption that no scholar who has written about Behemoth has
ever attempted to explain. One can only surmise that the rationale behind the assumption
is the comment B makes about A’s age in the first lines of Behemoth, coupled with the
fact that B is the one who asks most of the questions. Specifically, B refers to the fact
that A “lived in that time and in that part of” his “age, wherein men used to see best into
good and evil.” 72 B also admits that during the period between 1640 and 1660, he “could
not then see so well” the nature of the events as they transpired. 73 Traditionally, scholars
have interpreted both of these statements in the opening lines of Behemoth as an
indication of the relative ages of the two characters, and consequently, have surmised that
the relationship between the two characters is that of master and student. However,
Hobbes never explicitly indicates the relationship between A and B, so any assumption
that one of the characters is deferential to the other is a matter of conjecture.
Furthermore, while the text may indicate an age difference between the two characters,
the most important difference is in perspective. A proposes that his understanding of the
events between 1640 and 1660 affords him a knowledge of injustice that is superior to
that of others. This is because it came “as from the Devil’s Mountain”: an allusion to the

21). Vaughan (2002) disagrees that the pedagogy was a failure by determining that “[b]y the end of
Behemoth, however, ‘B’ is much closer to ‘A’s position, implying that evil principles, both religious and
secular, are those that lead to civil discord” (p. 133).
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Biblical mountain where Satan showed Jesus all the nations of the world. 74 B admits that
he could not see the events as well as A claims to have seen them at the time when the
events occurred, but nowhere does B admit that he knows nothing of the events. While
the assumption is that B was a child during 1640 to 1660, the text itself only states that B
could not “then” see the events as well as A, meaning that at the time the events occurred,
A may have had a better perspective. The text, however, is silent on whether B can see
the events clearly in retrospect, or at the time the discussion takes place, which is some
time after the events of 1640 to 1660. The notion that the characters are more equal than
unequal makes more sense when we examine the implications of B’s observation that A
was in that part of his age where he could see best into good and evil. This observation
implies that B knew what age is best for seeing good and evil, further implying that he
himself is old enough to understand how perspectives change. Though there may be an
age difference between the two characters, there is no indication that this age difference
makes B’s recollection any less valid than A’s recollection. Instead of examining
Behemoth as the education of B, Behemoth seems to be a test of A’s recollection to see if
it is in any way superior to B’s recollection.
As we have seen with Philosophical Problems and Decameron Physiologicum,
Hobbes wrote dialogues that mimic the discourse between teacher and student. However,
there are enough differences between Hobbes’s teacher and student dialogues and
Behemoth to reconsider whether Behemoth is a teacher and student dialogue in the same
category as Philosophical Problems and Decameron Physiologicum. Hobbes’s teacher
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and student dialogues typically start with a question by A, who assumes the role of the
student, and Hobbes portrays himself as B. This is not the case in Behemoth; it is unclear
whether Hobbes wanted to be identified with either character. 75 The character most
associated with the teacher in the literature is A. However, Hobbes does not associate
himself with A in Behemoth as he associates himself with B in his scientific dialogues. If
anything, Hobbes takes active steps to disassociate himself from Behemoth’s A. 76
Behemoth starts with a statement by A that he has a clear understanding of injustice and
the significance of the English Civil War. However, A’s description is so cryptic that B
is unable to understand the merits of A’s perspective without further clarification. Both
Flinker and Vaughan view this opening statement by A as a temptation: a rhetorical
strategy by A to entice B into asking further questions. 77 In this sense, A succeeds in
tempting B, because B asks A to clarify his assertion “by the relation of the actions you
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then saw, and of their causes, pretensions, justice, order, artifice, and event.” 78 However,
it is important to note that by starting the dialogue with the statement about the vision
from the Devil’s Mountain, A also exposes his point of view to criticism. Behemoth is in
some sense the story of A’s defense of his position that the perspective from the Devil’s
Mountain is better than B’s in some way. This is different from the task of the instructor
in the scientific dialogues. In the scientific dialogues, the mind of the student character
(A) is truly “like a clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever” Hobbes (B) shall imprint in
it. 79 This is not the case in Behemoth, as B already has a perspective about politics that
he is willing to defend against A.
Given these differences, it is possible that Hobbes is employing a different
strategy in Behemoth from the one he employed in his teacher and student dialogues.
This becomes clearer when we see the points in Behemoth where A and B clash. One
subject that creates conflict is science: a topic that will be examined more thoroughly in
chapter III. Suffice it for now to say that the relationship between A and B in Behemoth
is more like the relationship between the philosopher and the lawyer in A Dialogue than it
is like the relationship between A and B in Hobbes’s other dialogues. Rather than a
portrayal of pedagogy, Behemoth and A Dialogue seem to portray a clash of perspectives,
with Hobbes refusing to take a side.
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If Behemoth and A Dialogue exhibit a form of dialectic different from the teacher
and student dialectic of the scientific dialogues, then what is this different form?
Considering for a moment that Hobbes was familiar with both Aristotle and Cicero, he
may have tried to emulate the dialectical style that existed in antiquity rather than the
dialectical style that became fashionable in Hobbes’s own time. The classical style
Hobbes seems to be emulating might be compared to what Werner Jaeger later identified
as “the dialogue of scientific discussion.” 80 It is a form that Jaeger attributes to Aristotle,
and consists of two characters that set “speech against speech, thus reproducing the actual
life of research in the later Academy.” 81 While one of the characters represented a kind
of teacher, this teacher was more of a moderator than an instructor. This character “took
the lead, gave the subject, and summed up the results at the end.” 82 Except for having a
procedural function, the teacher has the same status as that of the other character. In
short, the dialogue of scientific discussion is a dialogue between intellectual equals rather
than a portrayal of pedagogy between teacher and student.
Behemoth better fits the pattern of a dialogue of scientific discussion than it fits
the pattern of a teacher and student pedagogy. B does not accept A’s conclusions about
science and politics at face value, but instead challenges A’s assertions in order to
discover some ground agreeable to both. As far as characterizations are concerned,
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Hobbes portrays his character A as an academic examining the civil war as an intellectual
exercise “as from the Devil’s mountain.” 83 This would seem to fit Hobbes himself or
someone like him, using reason to gain a perspective on events not witnessed firsthand. 84
The fact that Hobbes does not associate himself with A means that he may also be wary
of A’s perspective: that reason can serve as a kind of “Devil’s Mountain” to those
seeking the truth about politics. In contrast to A’s personality, B’s personality is more
grounded, drawing A back to solid examples rather than philosophical conjecture. As
will be shown in the next chapter, B has little confidence in scientific conclusions when
they are not backed up by historical facts. If we are to see A as the pre-Restoration
Hobbes who wrote Leviathan, B serves as the personification of Hobbes’s doubts about
his philosophy after the Restoration. By examining the flow of the dialogue in this way,
B’s line that “he could not then see so well” the events from 1640 to 1660 takes on a
completely new significance. Assuming that B is also Hobbes, the line may indicate that
he may see the significance of the events more clearly in retrospect than he did at the
time they were occurring. What will be made clear in the following chapters is that
Hobbes’s dialogues depart from Leviathan not only in terms of style, but also in terms of
substance. Specifically, Hobbes takes a more realistic or even pessimistic approach to
the question of whether his science can create the political stability he once thought it
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could. In short, Hobbes himself might be closer to B’s position at the time of Behemoth’s
writing than previously assumed.
Now that Hobbes’s motivations and style have been explored, it is time to explore
the possibility that the dialogues Hobbes penned after Leviathan reflect Hobbes’s
growing pessimism about his previous conception of political science. This argument
becomes more compelling when we consider the problems Hobbes’s philosophy faced.
Criticism from the scholarly community, idealistic exuberance about the potential of
science to create peace, the peculiar circumstances of the Restoration, and an incomplete
assessment of the role of political skill are all reasons why Hobbes may have wanted to
reevaluate his political science. In short, Hobbes had ample reason to doubt his treatises,
and therefore, it should come as no surprise that we find a careful, more guarded Hobbes
in Behemoth and other dialogues. We find a Hobbes that not only questions the
philosophical tradition, but also questions—however delicately—his own philosophical
system. In short, what this study will show in Hobbes’s post-Restoration dialogues is a
different Hobbes, if only by degree. The next chapter will explore these differences as
expressed in Hobbes’s last word on politics: Behemoth.

CHAPTER III
THE PROBLEM OF SCIENCE TEACHING TRUTH TO POWER
Section 1: Hobbes’s Scientific Idealism
Before discussing how Thomas Hobbes approaches the subject of political science
in his dialogues, it is necessary to understand what Hobbes was trying to accomplish in
his treatises. Despite the many claims that Hobbes was a realist, 1 his faith in the power
of science to solve the perennial problems of politics makes him appear to be an idealist.
What Hobbes was trying to achieve can be found in his conclusion for the section on
commonwealth in chapter 31 of Leviathan. Hobbes observed that “neither Plato, nor any
other philosopher hitherto, hath put into order…or probably proved all the Theorems of
Morall doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how to obey.” 2 By
bringing clarity and certainty to moral doctrine, Hobbes hoped to solve the problem of
political irresponsibility due to ignorance or erroneous principles. Leviathan was
designed to convince the public that it is in their interest to obey the sovereign, whether
the motivation stems from the fear of violent death or rational calculation. Hobbes
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intended his Leviathan to be read and digested by the subjects of the English
Commonwealth. It was his hope that Leviathan “may be profitably printed and more
profitably taught in the Universities . . . . For seeing the Universities are the Foundations
of Civill, and Morall Doctrine, from where the Preachers and the Gentry, drawing such
water as they find, use to sprinkle the same . . . upon the People, there ought certainly to
be great care taken, to have it pure.” 3 The people could be educated in scientific
principles, provided Leviathan could be introduced into the university system. From
there, Hobbes was convinced that Leviathan would be well received, since he took great
care to write it in a fashion that was evident to the “meanest capacity.” Simply put, the
power of the average human being to reform politics was thought to be small, but when
enough people could be brought together to believe in one mode of justice, they could
become what Hobbes referred to as “A multitude of men . . . made One person.” 4 The
reason Leviathan could be persuasive lies in the work’s technique. Hobbes saw the
resolutive-compositive method, borrowed from geometry and the emerging natural
sciences of the seventeenth century, as an ideal tool for explaining complicated subjects. 5
This was the power of science, or in Hobbes’s case, political science. He acknowledged
that the power of scientific reasoning was small in the overall affairs of the
commonwealth at the time of Leviathan’s printing. However, he was convinced that
political innovation, like all other arts of public use, had its origin in science. 6 Hobbes
3
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believed that as more of the commonwealth’s subjects became exposed to a scientific
understanding of public policy, public consensus on the solutions outlined in Leviathan
could be achieved.
The solution Hobbes proposes at the close of Leviathan is more of a hope than a
realistic proposal for change. Leviathan is a work of political theory, but political theory
by itself can do nothing if it cannot be implemented in practice. Thus, the
implementation of political theory depends in large part on its ability to be persuasive to
those who have the power to put the theory into practice. 7 Hobbes believed that his
science of politics was not only persuasive to the powerful, but to all human beings with
the ability to understand speech. 8 For Hobbes, the reason science was persuasive was the
clarity in which it presents itself. Of course, even the best or clearest teaching will never
be persuasive if it is never promulgated.
Unfortunately for Hobbes, Leviathan was neither disseminated in the universities
as he had hoped, nor was it persuasive to the leading scholars of his time. 9 The list of
7
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political philosophers, historians, and theologians who wrote arguments against Hobbes’s
science is impressive, and the arguments themselves include reasoning that is just as
impressive as Hobbes’s science itself.
This is particularly true of James Harrington, whose work Oceana serves not only
as a critique of Leviathan, but as a work of political philosophy in its own right. As a
supporter of republics, Harrington had political reasons for rejecting Leviathan’s support
of absolute monarchy. However, Oceana is far from a mere polemic, and Harrington is
far from a mere politician. Harrington understood the political science of the ancients,
but he was also a reader of Machiavelli. The first chapter of Oceana was Harrington’s
attempt to reconcile both lines of reasoning against Hobbes’s science in Leviathan.
Harrington can do this because he reads Machiavelli as a successor to the ancients,
specifically in terms of the political theory of classical republicanism. The essence of
Harrington’s critique of Leviathan is that Hobbes’s conception of commonwealth consists
of an “empire of men and not of laws.” 10 He argues that Leviathan depends too strongly
on the absolute power of the sovereign whose legitimacy depends on the right of the
sword rather than any legal mandate or covenant. Furthermore, Harrington notes that
Leviathan holds monarchy to a standard of perfection with regard to stability that seems
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absurd. Harrington argues that it is impossible to construct a government where “no man
or men, in or under it, can have the interest” or “the power to disturb it with sedition.” 11
Moreover, Harrington shows that monarchy is no more or less immune to sedition than
any other sort of government, since even the most absolute governments are vulnerable to
sedition either within the army or within the nobility. 12 After all, both Harrington and
Hobbes wrote at a time when the monarchy of Charles I was itself challenged by both the
military and the nobility: segments of the commonwealth that had the interest and power
to see the monarchy end.
While there is no specific mention of either Harrington or Oceana in Hobbes’s
Behemoth, Hobbes seems to concede to Harrington’s critique. That is to say, Hobbes
shows that even an absolute government like Charles I’s is vulnerable to sedition by both
the army and the nobility when we include the clergy as part of the nobility alongside the
rest of the House of Lords. Hobbes depended in large part on the persuasive power of
science to convince citizens that it is their duty to obey the sovereign. In this way,
Hobbes was optimistic that science—and his science in particular—could create peace by
teaching citizens their duty, and providing a blueprint for how a commonwealth should
institute sovereignty. However, Hobbes wrote The Elements of Law, De Corpore, De
Cive, and Leviathan either before or during the English Civil War, while he would write
Behemoth after the Civil War. Accordingly, Hobbes gained a perspective that was
unavailable to him when he was producing his philosophical treatises, as he was able to
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view the war from its beginning through to its conclusion. In his later work, Hobbes had
the benefit of reading Harrington’s Oceana, 13 and may have wanted to modify or clarify
several contentious points in his science. Hobbes’s use of the term science in Behemoth
only makes this possibility even more likely.
Section 2: Science in Behemoth’s First Dialogue
Behemoth’s characters mention science once in each of the four dialogues, with a
fifth reference exclusive to the manuscript copy. A conversation between A and B over
the ship-money controversy 14 explodes into a heated digression over the ability of the
people to elect good members of Parliament. A believes that Charles I was justified in
levying the ship-money, because even though statute law prohibits the king from levying
a tax without consulting Parliament, the king had the prerogative to levy taxes as
sovereign. B seems to disagree, as the Magna Charta under the assent of Henry I claimed
that “no man shall be distrained, that is, have his goods taken from him, otherwise than
by the law of the land.” 15
The dispute then turns to the integrity of the members of Parliament, with both
characters seeming to agree that Parliament was corrupt. The difference between A and
13
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B is whether Parliament could have been any better. A believed that the Parliamentary
dispute over the ship-money was “conducing to the ends of some rebellious spirits in this
Parliament,” 16 implying that this Parliament was especially corrupt, but not all
Parliaments need be so. B believes that any Parliament would have chosen the same
course, since “they who were elected, were just such as had been elected for former
Parliaments, and as likely to be elected for Parliaments to come,” 17 implying that this
Parliament was no more or less imperfect than any other. In this respect, B believes that
human beings have certain moral imperfections that cannot be reformed, enlightened, or
changed. B claims that “people always have been, and always will be ignorant of their
duty to the public, as never meditating anything but their particular interest; in other
things following their immediate leaders; which are either the preachers, or the most
potent of the gentlemen that dwell amongst them: as common soldiers for the most part
follow their immediate captains, if they like them. If you think the late miseries have
made men wiser, that will quickly be forgot, and then we shall be no wiser than we
were.” 18
This statement starts with an observation that is familiar to those who have read
Hobbes: people are apt to pursue their own interest. B also observes that human beings
are apt to look to the spiritual and political authorities they prefer in order to satisfy
“other things.” People, as a general rule, look to either religious or secular authorities for
advice on how to live, or what to believe beyond simple self-interest. This is a common
16

Ibid., p. 38.

17

Ibid., p. 39.

18

Ibid.

90
observation that Hobbes makes throughout his treatises, but one that Hobbes’s science
intends to defeat on the grounds that “such men, as neither by lawfull authority, nor
sufficient study, are competent Judges of the truth.” 19 In terms of political pedagogy,
science is superior to taking the opinions of authorities at face value. Yet B’s line also
implies that human beings have the capacity to teach themselves, though there are
problems with lessons learned from experience. While it is possible that human beings
can learn from their misery, they forget the lessons of history with the passage of time. B
does not clarify whether the lessons are forgotten within a single generation or over
future generations. Either way, B asserts that the lessons that the people learn because of
a calamity such as the English Civil War are, at best, temporary reminders of one’s duty
to the public.
A never questions the truth of B’s assertion. Instead, A poses the question of
“why may not men be taught their duty . . . the science of just and unjust . . . from true
principles and evident demonstration?” 20 This exchange can be read as an internal debate
between two themes in Behemoth. On the one hand, B observes that there are certain
patterns in history that tend to repeat themselves. A suggests that human beings might
not be destined to repeat the same mistakes, for A believes that if men could be taught
“the science of just and unjust,” they could in fact lose their ignorance, become wise, and
prevent errors in judgment from subverting the commonwealth.
B is not so easily convinced and responds by asking, “who can teach what none
have learned? Or if any man have been so singular, as to have studied the science of
19
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justice and equity; how can he teach it safely, when it is against the interest of those that
are in possession of the power to hurt him?” 21 Here, B displays his skepticism toward
academic solutions to political problems. Assuming that a “science of justice and equity”
could ever be found, B believes it might never be taught if it happens to be “against the
interest of those that are in possession of the power to hurt” individuals within the
commonwealth.
A disregards the issue of how the science of just and unjust can be safely taught,
and instead tries to convince him that “the rules of just and unjust sufficiently
demonstrated . . . have not been wanting; and notwithstanding the obscurity of their
author, have shined . . . to men of good education.” 22 While A does not mention any of
Hobbes’s previous works by name, the characterization of “the rules of just and unjust
sufficiently demonstrated” is similar to Hobbes’s characterization of the purposes behind
his science. 23 Whether or not this passage refers to Hobbes’s scientific treatises, A
concedes that men who appreciated the rules of just and unjust sufficiently demonstrated
“are few,” because “ many cannot read: many, though they can, have no leisure; and of
them that have leisure, the greatest part have their minds wholly employed and taken up
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by their private businesses or pleasures.” 24 This passage points out a specific problem
that political theory faces: it can only ever appeal to a select few. Its rhetorical ability is
at first limited to those who can understand the argument, and amongst those who are
capable of understanding the argument, only some will have the leisure to busy
themselves with books. Of those citizens that possess the leisure time necessary to read
books, only a proportion will choose to spend their leisure in study rather than other
activities.
Since it is impossible for everyone to learn the science of just and unjust, the
science needs to be taught to those intellectual and religious elites who teach the common
citizens “from the pulpit and on holidays.” 25 The problem with teaching elites the
science of justice is that “the light” of the rules of just and unjust “has been hitherto
covered and kept under here by a cloud of adversaries, without the authority of the
Universities,” and that “the Universities have been to this nation, as the wooden horse
was to the Trojans.” 26 In other words, the elites who control the universities will not
admit any doctrine that fails to promote elite interests. With this passage, A concedes B’s
point that academic solutions are only effective if politics allows them to be.
The dialogue does not end here, as B asks A, “what was the Pope’s design in
setting up the Universities?” 27 B’s question seems out of place, since the original
establishment of the universities by the Pope and Charlemagne was already discussed
24
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earlier in the dialogue. 28 Why would B ask a question when he and A already know the
answer as established earlier in the dialogue? It seems that B is trying to test A or make
A reconsider his earlier statement about the efficacy of academic solutions to the
problems of pragmatic politics. A seems to recognize that B is trying to refute his claim
about the urgency of university reform. This seems plausible because A avoids
responding to B directly, and instead offers a question of his own, asking, “what other
design was he like to have, but (what you heard before) the advancement of his own
authority in the countries where the Universities were erected?” 29 This question starts a
long digression from the narrative of the English Civil War in which A attempts to show
B the power of the universities to “astonish the multitude of ignorant men.” 30 The
universities do this by making selective use of philosophical authorities such as Aristotle,
and by making “more use of his obscurity than of his doctrine,” they justify the rebellious
actions of the principal antagonists in civil insurrections. 31
There is no mention of who “those that are in possession of the power to hurt”
may be. Of course, the sovereign has—or at least should have—the power to punish or
physically harm citizens, yet Leviathan also gives citizens the right to resist physical
harm, as Hobbes believes human beings possess the liberty to “defend their lives, which
the Guilty man may as well do, as the Innocent.” 32 However, other individuals and
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institutions (those “immediate leaders” B mentioned) have the power to hurt individuals,
not only in a physical sense, but also in a social, spiritual, or economic sense. Of course,
Leviathan proposes that the sovereign take control of the educational system to protect
“against the danger that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall Person, from Rebellion.” 33
Behemoth mentions one particular sovereign who attempted to use the universities in this
way. Though Henry VIII’s break with Catholicism subsequently led to a reform of the
universities in England, the resulting reform did nothing to establish the English monarch
as above question. Instead, “the clergy within the Universities . . . and the clergy without
the Universities . . . did think that the pulling down of the Pope was the setting up of them
(as to England) in his place.” 34 What can a sovereign do when he is not in a position to
take control of the educational system, and unable to persuade the elites to cede control
without the ability to influence it?
A and B seem to agree that both the nobility and the clergy are powerful elements
within the commonwealth, but neither A nor B seems to believe that these factions can be
disempowered or dispensed with entirely. When B suggests that sovereigns should
“ready money enough to levy and maintain a sufficient army, and then to fall upon” 35 the
sovereign’s political rivals, A is shocked. Though the sovereign should “have money
enough readily to raise an army to suppress any rebellion,” the sovereign does not have
the prerogative to engage in violence “without actual committing such crimes as are
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already made capital by the laws.” 36 Though the power of the sovereign is absolute in
most respects, A believes that there are limitations on the conduct of a sovereign.
Therefore, if these immediate leaders that threaten sovereignty cannot be eliminated or
disempowered, they must be persuaded through education that it is their duty to place
their ambitions in check and defer to the sovereign. At the conclusion of Behemoth’s first
dialogue, B thinks it would be wise if “the nobility and gentry know that the liberty of a
state is not an exemption from the laws of their own country,” 37 and in this respect B
agrees with A. However, A is not even sure that university reform will completely
mitigate the problems caused by ambitious elites, for even if “the Universities shall be
thus disciplined,” only “from time to time” will “well-principled preachers” come forth,
and only “from time to time” will preachers “that are now ill-principled . . . fall away.” 38
A’s strong critique of the universities has led many scholars to conclude that
Behemoth supports Hobbes’s argument from Leviathan’s review and conclusion: that
“the Universities are the Fountains of Civill, and Morall Doctrine” and “there ought
certainly to be great care taken, to have it pure.” 39 While this very well may be the case,
Hobbes also considered the feasibility of university reform as a practical means of
solving the problems of the commonwealth. While B eventually concedes “that we never
shall have a lasting peace, till the Universities themselves be . . . reformed,” 40 A spends
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nearly the entire length of Behemoth’s first dialogue convincing B that university reform
is the best—if not the only—solution to civil war. Even so, the way B states his response
leaves the reader wondering whether reforming the universities solves the problem A
says it does. On the one hand, the universities must be reformed in order to “imbibe good
principles” to the future ministers and gentlemen. On the other hand, in order to reform
the universities, the ministers and gentlemen must first “know they have no authority but
what the civil power gives them,” and “know that the liberty of the state is not an
exemption from the laws of their own country.” 41 It seems that university reform
depends on having well educated religious and political elite. But there is no way to
create a well-educated elite class without the universities to create them. That is why
university reform is problematic as a practical means of preventing civil war: it is too
dependent on optimal political circumstances. Even after B’s concession, the reader is
left to wonder about B’s motive for it. Did B concede because he actually believed that
university reform was a practical solution to the problem of civil war, or did B concede
because A would not continue his narrative until B conceded? Right after B’s
concession, he attempts to bring A “back to the place from whence” his “curiosity drew”
A into the topic of university reform; namely, Parliament’s use of the ship-money
controversy “to single out . . . the King from his subjects.” 42 At this point, A retires from
the conversation, asking B to be patient for “some other day that” B “shall think fit.” 43
Despite all the discussion surrounding the universities in the latter half of Behemoth’s
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first dialogue, the question of whether “late miseries have made men wiser” is never
brought up or satisfactorily resolved, and the actual practicality of university reform
seems questionable. It would seem that the answer to these questions will have to wait
until A and B choose to discuss them again, which will be in the second dialogue.
Section 3: Science in Behemoth’s Second Dialogue
The first mention of science in Behemoth’s second dialogue concerns the House
of Lords and the nobility. While discussing the trial of the Earl of Strafford, B wonders
why the House of Lords is indifferent to “the ruin of the King’s power,” because what
happened to Charles I could very well happen to the nobility as a whole. 44 A responds by
claiming that the nobility is no more or less “skillful in public affairs, than the knights
and burgesses” of the lower house. 45 Though the nobility may be “prudent and able men
as any in the land” in terms of private business, they are unable to govern the
commonwealth “without infallible rules and the true science of equity and justice.” 46 As
we have seen from the first dialogue, the “science of equity and justice” has yet to be
fully recognized or respected amongst the elites.
True to his pessimistic manner, B concludes that “it is impossible that any
commonwealth in the world . . . should continue long without change, or sedition tending
to change, either of the government or the governors.” 47 Like his statement in
Behemoth’s first dialogue, B is rather wary of A’s belief that a perfect solution can be
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found to the problem of civil upheaval. A agrees that there has been no solution
throughout history, nor have “the greatest commonwealths in the world been long free of
sedition,” but maintains that this is due to the “want of rules of justice for the common
people to take notice of.” 48 This is again the hope Hobbes holds for his science: that if
the science of commonwealth were sufficiently known and practiced, there would be no
sedition. B realizes that the scientific solution rests upon a rather tenuous if, and doubts
whether the elites or the people may ever know or practice the science of justice. B
responds by claiming that “all the states in Christendom will be subject to these fits of
rebellion, as long as the world lasteth.” 49 A’s only response is that the problem of
rebellion “may be easily mended, by mending the Universities.” 50 Yet this seems to run
counter to what A previously concluded in dialogue one: that very few ever partake in a
university education, and the ones who do are not interested in reforming the universities
from within. A sufficiently strong sovereign must force the universities to reform; the
sovereign must be strong enough to enact reforms against the powerful elite interests that
dominate English politics. We have to wonder how simple or easy this task may be,
given that not even Henry VIII could fully neutralize the subversive tendencies within the
universities.
Understanding the relative status of the characters has implications in
understanding Behemoth’s overall message. If we take the view that A speaks as the
authoritative Hobbes, we might very well conclude that Behemoth is simply a restatement
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of Hobbes’s view that science is the only real solution to the commonwealth. However,
as the last chapter showed, B may be just as important to the dialogue as A in terms of
Behemoth’s structure. B does not seem to agree with A, or acknowledge that the problem
of sedition can be so easily solved. Instead, B brings A back to the historical record by
asking, “How long has the Parliament now sitten?” 51 In fact, the Parliament had been
sitting since the Scottish rebellion in 1637, as Charles I was unable to govern effectively
without it. B perhaps realizes that the answer to the question of Parliament illustrates the
difficulties of university reform better than any other argument, since it shows that
Charles I could not govern as he pleased. Because Charles I needed Parliament to levy
funds, Parliament became much more defiant toward the king and his allies. The notion
that the sovereign should reform universities says little about whether sovereigns could
reform universities, which may be why the dialogue moves from the speculative to the
concrete at this stage.
Hobbes chooses to follow his discussion about science and university reform with
Charles I’s reaction to the sentence of the Earl of Strafford. The reason this discussion is
important is that it illustrates how sovereigns are often forced to act contrary to their
better judgment because of political considerations. Though Charles I “declared himself
unsatisfied concerning the justice” of the Long Parliament toward the Earl of Strafford,
the king was nevertheless “counseled to give way to his [the Earl of Strafford’s]
execution.” 52 The reason Charles did not intercede in the execution was political, for he
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wanted to avoid “the fury of the people,” 53 which was apt to erupt had Charles I
intervened.
A recalls how Charles I “did not stick to confess afterwards, that he had done
amiss, in that he did not rescue” 54 the Earl of Strafford. B believed that Charles I’s
abandonment of Strafford was “an argument of good disposition,” and cites Augustus’
abandonment of Cicero to Antonius as another example where a sovereign must be
willing to abandon friends for the sake of maintaining the image that the sovereign does
not play favorites. 55 This is something both A and B can agree upon: that friends of the
sovereign should not receive special treatment. The term A uses is preferment, and he
disparages those who seek it, as well as sovereigns who rely on it as a political strategy.
A states that those who seek preferment “have missed their aim,” while “princes that with
preferment are forced to buy the obedience of their subjects, are already, or must be soon
after, in a very weak condition.” 56 The reason why preferential treatment has no place in
the commonwealth is that it is a violation of equity: “that Justice be equally administered
to all the people.” 57
We must examine which party Charles I sought to “buy” through preferment. In
the case of the Earl of Strafford, the king sought to buy the support of the people, or at
least stave off their anger. This is further evidence that Charles I did not have what we
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might call the political capital to govern with the sort of prerogative one might expect
from an absolute sovereign. Furthermore, the execution of the Earl of Strafford shows us
why the science of equity and justice could do little to help those in the House of Lords or
the nobility in general. While the sovereign acting out of preference for other nobles
might prevent the ruin of the power within the nobility as a class, the sovereign must not
distinguish claims on the basis of class. One might argue that the very notion that one
class has special claims above another is itself antithetical to Hobbes’s science of
commonwealth. 58 The science of equity and justice could do nothing to save one
particular noble, the Earl of Strafford, from the charge of treason. Though the charge was
questionable, Charles I placated the rebellious elements in his kingdom by upholding the
charge, thereby sealing the fate of the Earl of Strafford.
Science is mentioned again in Behemoth’s second dialogue. This time, the
characters are discussing the clergy. A discusses the history of Diodorus Siculus,
specifically in regard to the power of the Ethiopian priestly caste over the king.
According to this source, it was customary for the priests to force the kings to commit
suicide, since “the Kings did obey the priests, not as mastered by force and arms, but as
having their reason mastered by superstition.” 59 This custom ended, however, when an
Ethiopian king named Ergamenes “killed all the priests, abolished the custom, and
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rectified the kingdom according to his will.” 60 Though B believed that the priests were
“damnable impostors,” he also believed that Ergamenes’ violence toward them “was
cruel.” 61 Was this violence “cruel” according to Hobbes’s science?
In Hobbes’s science of the commonwealth, sovereigns are obligated to preserve
the lives and maintain the safety of all the people in the commonwealth. However, the
sovereign also possesses the right to execute subjects that rebel against the sovereign. 62
Whether or not the killing of the priests was justified depends on whether the custom of
the priests to instruct the king to die was rebellious. If it was rebellion, it certainly was
not an armed rebellion or a conspiracy. While Hobbes’s science finds such a custom to
be incomprehensible for a king or any other subject to obey, it was nevertheless the
custom of Ethiopia. If anything, Ergamenes rebelled against the settled custom. Though
the sovereign in Hobbes’s science is not bound to uphold past customs, 63 it is unclear
whether Hobbes’s science gives the sovereign the right to take lives when changing the
customs. In the Ethiopian case, the sovereign could simply ignore the suicide requests
when made, or abolish the custom without resorting to violence. The fact that Ergamenes
killed the priestly class when it was questionable whether he needed to do so is the basis
for calling the act “cruel.”
Yet just because the cruelty was outside the scope of what a good sovereign
should do does not mean that sovereigns should not engage in such cruelty. A agreed
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with B that the murder of the priests was cruel, but A believed that Ergamenes’ cruelty
was somewhat justified since “the King’s act may be colored with the good of his
people.” 64 A then applies the same reasoning to the English Civil War by placing the
blame for the 100,000 dead on the Presbyterian ministers that inspired the Long
Parliament. He wonders whether it would have been “better that those seditious
ministers, which were not perhaps 1000, had all been killed before they had preached.” 65
Though A acknowledges that such a move would be “a great massacre . . . the killing of
100,000 is a greater” massacre. 66 Neither character seems willing to call the use of
murder as a political tool righteous or just. Charles I was described by A as the “best
King perhaps that ever was” in part because the king did not resort to such murderous
measures during his reign. Nevertheless, the Hobbes in Behemoth seems to claim that
such murderous measures are often necessary if the total number of lives potentially
saved is to outweigh the ones taken. This is a departure from A’s position on the use of
cruelty as a political tool from dialogue one, where A stated that the sovereign should
only kill those who are guilty of a capital crime.
B does not question A’s statement about the political use of violence by the
sovereign. He is simply glad that the Anglican bishops “were out at this business,”
having been dispossessed of their seats in the House of Lords. 67 Though these bishops
were loyal to Charles I, and appeared as “enemies” to the Presbyterian faction blamed for
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the insurrection, there was reason to suspect the Anglican bishops of future treason. In a
statement that only appears as an erased thought in the manuscript copy, B argues that the
bishops “pretended a divine right (not depending on the King’s leave) to the government
of the Church.” 68 Though the bishops may have been loyal, their loyalty was not
absolute, and was not based on any scientific reason for being so. This becomes
immediately clear in A’s response, disregarding B’s remark about the bishops,
underscoring instead “what the reputation of those [theological] sciences can effect
among the people.” 69 What the Presbyterian, Episcopal, and Catholic political
philosophies share is that they take their bearings from “the babbling philosophy of
Aristotle and other Greeks” which “has no affinity with religion, and serves only to breed
disaffection, dissention, and finally sedition and civil war.” 70 In other words, the
philosophy that comes out of the religious conflict between sects is based upon the strong
opinions of a few leading intellectuals: the “doctrinal politics” that Hobbes sought to
replace with his conception of political science. 71 According to A, doctrinal politics is
hostile to “all true philosophy, especially civil and moral,” because it is a form of
reasoning that “looked with an ill aspect upon their interest.” 72 This is presumably why
the true science of politics was attacked so vigorously, as it can “never appear propitious
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to ambition,” or provide the basis for “an exemption from . . . obedience due to the
sovereign power.” 73
For Hobbes, part of the reason why doctrinal politics is so pervasive in 17th
century England is that the proponents of it are entrenched in the universities. This is
why A believes so strongly in university reform, as he believes that philosophy based on
nothing more than authoritative opinion will not last long when it can no longer claim a
privileged place as the only doctrine that is permitted to be taught. In contrast, science
does not seem to need the institutions of pedagogy to prove its authenticity as true
knowledge. Hobbes believed that a properly described science is self-evident to the
reader, requiring nothing else than a mind capable of understanding words. 74 When
Hobbes’s science comes across a particularly counterintuitive problem, he challenges his
reader to look “into himself,” rather than look to the authority of the teacher. 75 In a
passage that Hobbes attempted to erase from the manuscript copy of Behemoth, A
mentions “a company of gentlemen for the promoting of natural philosophy and
mathematics,” showing that scientists who believe in the rhetorical power of science are
not deterred by the lack of support for science. The problem for A is that “the authority
of licensing the books that are written” on science is not in the scientists themselves “but
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in some divines, who have little knowledge in physics, and none at all in mathematics.” 76
While this seems to be more evidence of Hobbes’s desire to reform the universities, the
passage also reveals a not so obvious weakness of Hobbes’s science: it too needs the
sanction of authorities in order to claim a privileged position as fact. It would seem that
science is not as self-evident and rhetorically persuasive as Hobbes originally surmised.
While copies of scientific treatises such as Hobbes’s own are invariably promulgated to
interested parties, it would seem that science can do little to further its own cause without
some sort of official sanction from authority.
The general consensus among scholars is that Hobbes tried to erase this and other
passages from the manuscript copy as they contained “statements of opinion too strong to
be made known.” 77 We can certainly see how this passage in dialogue two would be
controversial, since it contains accusations against the religious authorities in England at
a time when Charles II was attempting to placate the representatives of the various
religions in England. 78 This passage shows us that Hobbes was becoming skeptical that
science could be responsible for bringing forth a strong and stable ruler. Instead, it
would seem that the only way that science can ever be useful to the commonwealth is if it
is first promoted by a strong and stable ruler. Therefore, reforming the universities is of
secondary importance to peace; it is second to a sovereign who has the political skill
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necessary to promote peace and stability. This will become more readily apparent as we
consider the passage where science is mentioned in dialogue three.
Section 4: Science in Behemoth’s Third Dialogue
Dialogue three starts at the time in the narrative when sovereignty had more or
less passed to Parliament after Charles I’s imprisonment in 1647. Unlike Charles I or
previous sovereigns, Parliament would reform the universities in 1648 under the
leadership of the Earl of Pembroke, who “together with some of the doctors” in Oxford,
systematically “turned out all such as were not of their faction.” 79 We can presume that
Parliament did this to eliminate the universities as a place of potential dissent. In terms
of Hobbes’s science, a university or any educational institution “teacheth by publique
Authority,” 80 and the sovereign has a vested interest in ensuring that no teachings that are
contrary to the maintenance of sovereignty are promulgated. In short, Parliament’s
reform of the universities appears to be an exercise in good policy. Character A “cannot
but commend” 81 the Long Parliament for the university purge, even given A’s generally
negative opinion concerning the Long Parliament’s service. B does not agree, because
even though the university professors by A’s admission said God’s name in vain and
were found “in the company of lewd women,” B wonders how a man can “correct his
vices, better than in the universities erected for that purpose?” 82 For B, the universities
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are places where citizens might correct personal vices, but beyond this pedantic function,
do not significantly impact the stability of the regime in the way A conceives.
A does not believe that the universities are capable of eliminating the vices of the
people. In fact, A believes the opposite: the universities are places that corrupt the
citizens. Here, however, A does not cite the corrupting nature of the doctrines proffered
there as the cause of the corruption. It is the corrupting environment of the university
more than the corrupting doctrines proffered at the university that make it corrupt. In an
argument not all that different from those made today, 83 A claims that the universities
promote a life and culture of “drunkenness, wantonness, gaming, and other vices
consequent to these.” 84 He goes on to say that the Parliament itself had little respect for
the universities as places where virtue could be taught, but understood the significance of
the institutions as excellent servants “to the clergy; and the clergy, if it be not carefully
looked to . . . is an excellent means to divide a kingdom into factions.” 85
Unlike previous institutions, the Long Parliament was able to appreciate the
political significance of the universities, taking measures to eliminate the university as a
source of potential dissent. This is exactly what Hobbes recommends a politically astute
sovereign should do and the fact that the Long Parliament used the power of sovereignty
to reform the universities is telling. While the Long Parliament may have not been the
most virtuous institution in England, it may have been a better practitioner of Hobbes’s
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political teaching, at least in terms of maintaining political power. However, political
skill is something altogether different from ethical ruler. After A’s thorough
condemnation of the universities, B asks if there is any place where one may learn
“philosophy and other humane sciences … better than in the Universities?” 86 A responds
to this in a similar fashion to the way B responds to him in dialogue one: by asking
another question. He asks, “what other sciences? Do not divines comprehend all civil
and moral philosophy within their divinity?” 87 After hearing A’s previous condemnation
of the divinity schools it seems highly doubtful that A truly believes that the school
divines understand all civil and moral philosophy. An exception would be Hobbes’s
science of politics, or the “science of just and unjust” previously mentioned by A in
dialogues 1 and 2. According to A, natural science was “removed from Oxford and
Cambridge to Gresham College in London . . . to be learned out of their gazettes,” which
implies that natural science was a controversial subject within traditional curricula.88
While this seems to be more of an exaggeration than a fact, the major universities did
take measures to limit the influence of Hobbes’s political science around the time he
wrote Behemoth. 89 True to his character, A still maintains that the universities and their
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authoritative opinions caused the problems that led to civil war. But A’s argument here
in dialogue three is a lot less coherent and factual than his earlier statements; and A
concedes that his outburst is “gone from our subject” of “where philosophy and the
humane sciences” can be learned. 90 B no longer feels it is necessary to continue the
discussion about the universities, and reminds A that “we are indeed gone from the
greater business of the kingdom,” 91 postponing talk about the universities until dialogue
four.
It is important to notice B’s increasing skepticism about the political value of the
universities. He equates the university with a hospital: a place where a man can “correct
his vices” in the same manner as the lame man can correct his gait.92 Examined this way,
the universities are not places that should be purged of those with bad character, as A
would suggest. Rather, they are places where individuals with bad character can learn
good personal habits but, beyond this pedagogical function, the universities have no
impact on the affairs of the state. B believes that the real “business of the kingdom” is
outside the academy, and by extension, outside of academic arguments.
Section 5: Science in Behemoth’s Fourth Dialogue
The word “science” appears two times at one specific point in dialogue four.
When discussing the Rump Parliament’s enactment of the fundamental laws of the
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nation, A argues that it levied taxes to pay soldiers, quartered soldiers in private homes,
and performed “many other actions, which if the King had done, they would have said
had been done against the liberty and propriety of the subjects.” 93 B seems to mock the
people for believing the Rump’s hypocrisy, calling the common people “silly things . . .
to be cozened as they were so grossly!” 94 Why would Hobbes emphasize B’s response?
We must remember what B stated in dialogue one: that anything the people learn from
the past “will quickly be forgot, and then we shall be no wiser than we were.” 95 It seems
that the excesses of the Rump not only mirror the excesses of Charles I, but if A is
correct, the excesses of the Rump have the capacity to become worse than those in
Charles I’s reign. 96 It validates B’s previous statement that the people will forget the
lessons of history, allowing the conditions that create civil disturbance to manifest
themselves anew.
Just as A responded to B’s cynical outlook in dialogue one, A responds to B’s
accusation here in dialogue four. He first shows that the Rump and the people share a
common level of wit, a similar notion of justice, and a similar hatred of monarchy. 97 A
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then shows how “a good natural wit” alone cannot teach individuals to obey a sovereign
and he offers an alternative to natural wit. Only “a science . . . built upon clear principles
. . . to be learned by deep and careful study . . . or from masters that have deeply studied
it” can prevent history from repeating itself. 98 A then spends the remainder of the
dialogue criticizing “the Presbyterian preachers, who, by a long practiced histrionic
faculty, preached up the rebellion powerfully.” 99 B’s response is brief: he asks “to what
end” the Presbyterian ministers preached in favor of the rebellion. 100 A explains that the
end of the Presbyterians’ preaching was to bring forth a state governed by popular decree
so that the clergy could govern, satisfy their longing for wealth, and use their “power to
undo all men that admired not their wisdom.” 101 B’s characterization of the people as
“silly things” is countered by A, who argues that the reason the people could not see this
ulterior motive was not due to “want of wit, but want of the science of justice.” 102 A then
issues B a challenge: to persuade him that good wit is sufficient to protect an individual
from the ambitions of the crafty. B, however, does not pick up the challenge
immediately, but asks A to return “to the proceedings of the Rump.” 103
Why does B not pick up A’s challenge that natural wit is sufficient to make
individuals understand why “one person has a right to govern, and the rest an obligation
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to obey?” 104 One of the advantages B has is that he already knows the sequence of
events A must retell, because it is part of the historical record. The reason B urges A to
get back to the historical record is because B knows the facts will eventually prove him
right, for B knows that the Rump will eventually submit to Oliver Cromwell. A starts
with the Rump’s inability to raise an army to counter the Scottish rebellion of 1649. He
then describes how Cromwell was made a doctor of the civil law at Oxford before taking
possession of Ireland. After General Fairfax “refused to fight against the [Presbyterian]
brethren in Scotland,” Oliver Cromwell became the “general of all the forces in England
and Ireland.” 105 When hostilities broke out between England and the Dutch, Cromwell
became even more indispensable. In 1653, he was “but one step to the end of his
ambition, and that was to set his foot upon the neck of this Long Parliament.” 106 Earning
the loyalty of the people, Cromwell “went to the Parliament House, and dissolved them,
turning them out, and locked up the doors. And for this action he was more applauded by
the people than for any of the victories in the war, and the Parliament men as much
scorned and derided.” 107 Understanding the need for the legitimacy that comes from
Parliament, Cromwell “called a Parliament, and gave it the supreme power, with the
condition that they should give it to him.” 108
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Eventually, B brings up the issue of whether wit can teach individuals whom to
obey, and why they should do so. Specifically, B argues that “this Parliament, which has
seen how Cromwell had handled the two former, the long one and the short one, had
surely learned the wit to behave themselves better to him than those had done,” to which
A replies “yes, especially now that Cromwell in his speech . . . told them . . . that every
member of the House, before they sat, must take a recognition of his power in diverse
points.” 109 From this passage it seems that people do not need the science of justice to
understand obedience. Absolute power alone is sufficient to compel obedience if for no
other reason than that one’s life depends upon it. Science may teach individuals why it is
natural or advantageous to obey an absolute sovereign, but individuals do not necessarily
need science to learn whom to obey and why it is necessary to do so. In order to
determine whether good wit is enough to shield individuals from the ambitions of the
crafty, we have to determine if the Rump possessed “good wit” to begin with. The best
we can say is that if the individuals that comprised the Rump had good wits before the
rise of Cromwell, they certainly had better wits afterword, but it was not science that
informed them. Witnessing the downfall of the Parliament orchestrated by the craftiest
figure in the narrative was enough to teach the Parliamentarians whom to obey, and
perhaps more importantly, the power of craft. That is why B stated that the
Parliamentarians “learned the wit” to obey, rather than simply possessed the wit.
Science is not brought up in the remainder of Behemoth’s text. As we examine
how science is used throughout the text, several interesting patterns arise. A seems to
bring up science right after B points out the failings of human beings to be moral. In
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dialogue one, B argued that people never consider anything other than their self-interest
and the advice given to them by their superiors. Also, B argued that civil society is prone
to making the same mistakes again, since it tends to forget the hard lessons civil unrest
teaches them. A responds by offering science as a solution to the problem of
forgetfulness, but admits that such a solution requires significant changes to the
educational system. In dialogue two, B discusses the House of Lords’ folly to believe
that their power is not tied to the king’s power. A counters by reminding B that both the
House of Lords and the House of Commons lack the science of equity and justice. Later
in dialogue two, B argues that the king Ergamenes acted with cruelty toward political
rivals that seemed harmless. A responds by pointing out how harmful doctrines can be,
not only because they promote civil disturbance, but they also prevent the science
necessary to peace from being taught. In dialogue three, B argues that the university
reform of 1649 was just an example of pious showmanship that is counterproductive to
the university’s end of bringing people to virtue. A counters by stating that the
universities cannot teach virtue, because they have purged science from their curricula.
Finally, in dialogue four, B mocks the people for being lulled into believing that the
Rump could exercise its prerogatives better than the late monarchy of Charles I. A
counters by claiming that the reason the people were so deceived was due to a lack of the
science of justice.
When A brings up the subject of science, B always brings A back to the historical
record. He is willing to entertain A’s belief in the power of science for a time, but as
Behemoth progresses, B’s tolerance for A decreases. In dialogue one, B asks A to
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describe again why the Pope set up the universities in the first place. In dialogue two, B
asks A to turn his attention away from university reform, and back to Parliament. The
second place where A brings up science in dialogue two is an exception to this rule, but A
seems to bring himself back to the historical record without being prompted by B. In
dialogue three, B asks A to turn his attention back to “the greater business of the
kingdom” after a digression into the reasons moral science is not taught in the
universities. This pattern is reaffirmed in dialogue four when B asks A to return to the
proceedings of the Rump. It would seem by these examples that B is not the type of
person who is convinced by A’s belief in the power of science to heal the ills of the
commonwealth. After all, B knows very well that the civil war ended, and that science
played no role in bringing the civil war to its conclusion. B does not need to argue with
A about the utility of science to heal the ills of the commonwealth. Instead, B only needs
A to finish the historical narrative, which provides a case where peace was found without
the help of science. In dialogue four, B gets A to admit that the people eventually learned
whom to obey, and more importantly, how vulnerable the commonwealth actually was to
personal ambition.
It is difficult to conclude that Hobbes definitively rejected his previous scientific
model as put forth in The Elements of Law, De Cive, and Leviathan. Hobbes devoted
nearly his entire life creating and promoting a new way to understand politics: one that he
vigorously defended throughout his career. Yet was this science actually necessary in the
way Hobbes claimed? That is to say, if science was not responsible for creating the
peace, there has to be some other means by which the people could find peace or, more
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specifically, some other means by which the people may place those tendencies that
promote civil conflict in check. A is convinced that the want of a true science of justice
is what caused the people to rebel, since they did not know whom to follow. B does not
see the civil war as a problem of doctrine as much as it is a problem of human nature.
Specifically, human beings seldom follow anything past their self-interest, and they fail
to learn the necessary lessons that will prevent calamity in the future. In the course of the
narrative, we learn that the universities have always promoted the interests of those who
attend the universities, and a science that does not promote the political power of the
educated will never find a home in the curriculum. Even if some regime like the Rump
purges the universities of everybody not favorable to the ruling regime’s interest, this
itself is no guarantee that the regime will be stable. All it takes for a regime to fall is a
particularly crafty politician like Oliver Cromwell: a man who was able to gain both
academic and military honors.
While B acknowledges that a science of justice based upon definite and sure
principles can be useful, science takes a back seat to the grim reality that human beings
will strive for power: an attitude that is certainly very Hobbesian. However, it is a
mistake to think that Hobbes intended simply to describe the disposition of human
beings. The ultimate goal of his science was to change the disposition of human beings
by giving a clear explanation of why it is in their interest to place the relentless pursuit of
power in check. What Behemoth shows us is that this might not be possible: that there
are limits to what science can do both politically and psychologically. Fortunately,
however, science might not be necessary. Behemoth also shows us how people may learn
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their duty by seeing the consequences of not upholding it, with the clearest example
being Oliver Cromwell’s acquisition of the very same absolute power that the
Parliamentarians sought to eliminate through the execution of Charles I. What made the
people of England recognize the folly of the rebellion was not science, but bearing
witness to Cromwell’s regime, one that possessed all of the power of Charles I’s regime,
but without the attendant duty of ensuring salus populi, or the safety and well-being of
the people. 110
As stated in the first chapter of this study, scholars have assumed that A’s
argument holds up throughout Behemoth under the assumption that A represents the
authoritative Hobbes. According to this view, Behemoth is another argument in favor of
Hobbes’s previous conception of science. While it may be the case that A promotes
science as the only way to solve the problems of the commonwealth, A is eventually
forced to concede that the rebellious faction “learned the wit” to behave better without
understanding the science of justice. This would seem to indicate that Hobbes was open
to the possibility that there may be other avenues to understanding obligation than
science alone. This would also explain why Hobbes would write in Behemoth’s Epistle
Dedicatory: “there can be nothing more instructive towards loyalty and justice than will
be the memory, while it lasts,” of the English Civil War. 111 While it might well be the
case that science offers a clearer understanding of the need for loyalty and justice, given
the fact that science is not readily available, the memory may be all the majority of
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people will have to guide them on the proper political course. In this sense, the memory
of the events between 1640 and 1660 might not be more instructive in terms of clarity,
but definitely more instructive in terms of availability, at least in terms of Hobbes’s
audience in the latter part of the 17th century. Specifically, Behemoth points out the
limitations of science to create change, and the capacity for human beings to learn from
mistakes. However, if the Restoration was not brought about by his science of politics,
how was peace brought about? This will be the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV
THE PROBLEM OF THE UNEXPLAINED RESTORATION
Section 1: The Limitations of Hobbes’s Science
While Behemoth is a chronicle about civil war, it is also a chronicle about peace. This
becomes clear when we compare Behemoth’s and Leviathan’s conclusions. Hobbes
chooses to end his discourse on commonwealth with a section entitled “The Kingdome of
Darknesse,” an analogy for a commonwealth governed using “dark, and erroneous
Doctrines.” 1 In contrast, Hobbes’s history of the English Civil War ends with the newlyelected Parliament having “done all that a Parliament can do for the security of our
peace” by ushering in the reign of Charles II and giving him “the right of the militia in
virtue of the sovereignty . . . without any particular act of Parliament directly to that
purpose.” 2 What Behemoth’s character A describes here is the Militia Act of 1661,
which A characterizes as “more instructive to the people, than any arguments drawn from
the title of sovereign.” 3 Behemoth—unlike Leviathan—has a happy conclusion. Yet this
happy conclusion also presents new challenges to Hobbes’s political science.
Specifically, was the Restoration something that Hobbes’s political science could
predict?
1
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Hobbes was in a much different position when writing Leviathan than he was
when writing Behemoth. Published in 1651, Leviathan was a product of “the disorders of
the present time,” when the ultimate outcome of the civil war was unknown. 4 By 1668,
the war had been over for eight years, allowing Hobbes to see the entirety of the struggle
from beginning to end. He was in a much better position to see how peace could be
achieved in 1668, as he witnessed it unfold in a way that was not available to him in the
midst of the civil war. Commentators have often assumed that Hobbes wrote Behemoth
as either an addendum or a precursor to Leviathan, yet the most unexamined aspect of
Behemoth is that it provides an implicit challenge to Hobbes’s previous political science.
Specifically, Behemoth offers a convincing case that peace can be achieved without
Hobbes’s political science, and not because of it.
Leviathan’s readers have often been puzzled at Hobbes’s lack of evidence for his
more radical assertions. The most obvious example is Hobbes’s vision of the state of
nature, a theory that relies on assertion more than proof. Strauss observed that Hobbes
“almost apologized for employing” the state of nature,5 because Hobbes could marshal
no convincing evidence that such a state was indeed the general condition of human
beings before the commonwealth. The examples Hobbes provides are, by any standard,
unsatisfactory. He points to examples among native Americans in “many places” as
proof that his theory of the state of nature is valid, and offers a thought experiment to his
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skeptical readers “who desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience.” 6 Yet
Hobbes knew that these arguments were not sufficient in themselves to establish the state
of nature as fact. 7 At best, the state of nature would only apply to certain—but not all—
pre-political societies, and the argument that locking chests and doors is proof of a
general state of hostility among individuals denies the much more realistic possibility that
thieves are just common enough for property owners to exhibit a degree of prudence.
The argument for the state of nature in De Cive is even less persuasive, as Hobbes
asks his readers to “consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and
suddainly (like Mushromes) come to full maturity without all kind of engagement to each
other.” 8 For Victoria Silver, the lack of anecdotal or empirical evidence to support
Leviathan’s claims was not a problem for Hobbes when writing it, as “self-evidence in
that work is first and foremost an aspect of his own verbal performance, and only
secondarily of the reader’s intellectual consent.” 9 In other words, Hobbes was more
concerned with Leviathan’s internal cohesion than he was with testing or verifying his
theory. The examples for the state of nature are designed to clarify the general
framework Hobbes constructed, and are not designed to describe “what actually
happened in fact, in history.” 10 The state of nature is true for Hobbes because it follows
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from the preceding premises. Likewise, the concept of the state of nature and the
accompanying “warre of every man against every man” was a natural antecedent to
Hobbes’s greater theory of the commonwealth, for it explains “The Passions that encline
men to Peace,” such as the “Feare of Death.” 11 Despite these epistemological issues,
Leviathan still qualifies as a science insofar as it presents a logical argument, beginning
“with the Definitions of Words,” proceeding “by Connexion of the same into generall
Affirmations.” 12
Hobbes’s Leviathan produces a streamlined model of human nature and
government. In the words of Gabrielle Slomp, “the state of nature can be analyzed as a
thought experiment,” 13 or as a convenient starting point for a model of political decisionmaking similar to the game theories proposed by economists in recent decades. Not
surprisingly, several scholars have used game theory to illustrate Hobbes’s theory, most
notably Gauthier, Hampton, and Slomp. 14 This is a natural progression, as both Hobbes’s
science and game theory use reified models to explain political behavior. There are
dangers in using reified models to explain real events, as they might be so abstracted
from reality, they inaccurately depict whatever phenomena the models try to explain.
Brian Martin explains the problem of modeling as a problem of simplification. He claims
that “in any process of mathematical modeling, simplification is a necessity. The
11
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important point is that there are innumerable ways in which a situation can be simplified,
depending on which features are to be emphasized and which are to be ignored. Values
enter through the decision to make a particular set of simplifications and to build a
mathematical formalism based upon these simplifications. So in simplifying a situation,
one inevitably introduces a bias; the question is, which bias?” 15 Models are designed to
simplify a given situation in order to understand the underlying relationship between the
critical factors. In terms of natural science, this can be rather useful in ascertaining the
processes behind motion, matter, and energy. However, human action is far more
complex and nuanced. Inevitably, scientists can only model the most important features
of human action, or model the particular human activity that is most useful or interesting.
The danger is that models of human action may become so simplified that the model
starts to resemble a caricature of human activity rather than an accurate representation of
human activity. This was the case with game theory in its earliest and most simplistic
forms (such as the prisoner’s dilemma), as they proved inadequate to explain most forms
of decision-making where one or both parties were operating from incomplete
information concerning the outcomes. 16 Simple game theory also proved inadequate
when examining human motivations for choices, as it is unable to “consider someone
who is to make a choice in which he has no personal selfish stake (or is prepared to
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renounce any personal stake) who says that his only interest is in making the ‘right’
choice—a good moral or ethical choice.” 17
As a result of such criticisms, game theory has grown from a simple and elegant
set of concepts to a highly complex body of theory. However, such complexity comes at
a cost, as the game theory in the twenty-first century loses some of the elegance that
made it an attractive proposition in the twentieth century. Variations on the basic model
include G-games (games with perfect player information), I-games (games with
imperfect player information), single contest games, iterative contest games, normative
game theory, behavioral game theory, evolutionary game theory, and derivative theories
such as drama theory. 18 Rather than providing a simple, universal framework for human
decision-making, game theory has become as nuanced and particular as the human
decision-makers it attempts to model. If a model is too simple, it fails to fit the actual
phenomena it attempts to understand. If a model is too complex, it ceases to be a
scientific model, and becomes a non-generalizable description of the actual phenomenon.
How does one test or verify whether a model effectively represents the modeled
phenomenon? In the social sciences, quantitative empirical testing seems to be the
method of choice for verifying whether a model is a useful representation. Sociologist
Trond Peterson, who is skeptical of game theory’s application in the social sciences,
points to the methodological problems associated with game theory. He claims that while
17
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“GT [game theory] holds considerable potential for sociology, I believe it will not diffuse
very quickly, mainly because the dominant form of theoretical reasoning in sociology, at
least in the United States, is middle-range theory coupled with empirical investigations.
This is theorizing with a limited scope, with empirical implications that can be confronted
with data, with the proponent of the theory being the one who confronts the data.” 19 To
be fair, some game theorists have been successful in providing empirical evidence for
game theoretic concepts through experimental designs using computer simulations. 20
However, game theory is far more conducive to empirical testing than is the theory
advanced in Leviathan. Hobbes’s science is far from a “middle-range” theory, as Hobbes
wanted to create a comprehensive theory of commonwealth arising out of a
comprehensive account of human nature. The language of game theory makes it easy to
operationalize for empirical testing, as it lends itself naturally to quantifiable proportions
of benefit or penalty. Hobbes, however, did not speak in the language of quantifiable
proportions, even when it seemed advantageous for him to do so, as in the case of his
geometrical dispute with M. Renè-François de Sluse. 21 Rather, Hobbes’s science is
necessarily nominal, as it is a science of how words are used in political discourse. While
the science is causal insofar as the conclusions follow necessarily from the preceding
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elements, Hobbes “begins with the Definitions of Words,” 22 which are typically
considered more value-laden than the variables used in game theory. Hobbes hoped that
by removing ambiguity from the definitions of words, a more accurate depiction of the
underlying political forces that cause civil war and peace could be better understood.
However, Hobbes only provides the reader with anecdotes and thought experiments to
test Leviathan’s theory, relying more on the elegance of the theory to convince the
skeptical reader.
The best proof of Leviathan’s applicability to real politics would come after the
English Civil War ran its course in the Restoration monarchy of Charles II. Here was a
real transition from civil instability to stability that everybody within the English
Commonwealth experienced, providing a natural reference point for understanding the
cause of civil war, and perhaps more importantly, the cause of peace. This raises an
important question that must have been on Hobbes’s mind when writing Behemoth: do
the events between 1640 and 1660 prove that Hobbes’s Leviathan is an accurate
depiction of the cause of war and the cause of peace?
Section 2: Behemoth’s Solution to Civil War
Hobbes scholars will point to several themes explored in Behemoth that seem to
verify Leviathan’s model about the cause of civil war. In his introduction to the second
edition of Behemoth, Goldsmith claims that “explaining the rebellion did not require a
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new theory; it only required that Hobbes use his old one to explain the phenomena.” 23
Specifically, ambitious elites from both the clergy and the academy were responsible for
the English Civil War, an argument that mirrors similar arguments in the treatises. 24 For
Kraynak, Behemoth seems to mirror Hobbes’s earlier conclusions about the danger of
competing doctrines within the university system. 25 Both ambition and divisive doctrine
are prominent themes throughout Hobbes’s work in terms of the causes of civil discord.
However, Hobbes’s political theory of the commonwealth explains more than the causes
of civil discord. It also explains how civil discord can be eliminated.
Leviathan is a book about peace as well as war. The entire second part of
Leviathan is devoted to determining which actions cause peace, as opposed to actions that
are not conducive to peace. Behemoth is also a book about peace, but describes an actual
peace. Several discrepancies become apparent when we compare Hobbes’s thoughts
about how peace can be achieved with the facts of the Restoration. Though the English
Civil War would carry on for approximately twenty years, the war ended. This alone is
not problematic for Leviathan’s theory, but when we consider how the war ended, we
find that Leviathan has a difficult time making sense of the peace. When we examine
Behemoth, we find that the simple answer to the question of how the Restoration came to
be is that the Long Parliament originally responsible for the constitutional crisis was
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unable to win reelection. As A puts it, “few of this Long Parliament (the country having
felt the smart of their former service) could get themselves chosen again.” 26 It would
seem that the same people who “were corrupted generally” 27 twenty years before learned
something from the experience, but what did they learn, and from where?
From all indications, the universities were still corrupt, the ministers were still
preaching seditious doctrines, and nothing in Behemoth suggests that the people were
better educated at the end of the English Civil War than they were previously.
Throughout Behemoth, the character A readily admits that there is no system yet in place
for the English people to learn the “science of just and unjust.” 28 Instead, England
operated under a university system dominated by school divinity and ancient philosophy:
the sort of “doctrinal politics” Hobbes’s science attempted to replace. 29 It seems that “the
late miseries” really “have made men wiser,” 30 but this wisdom was not taught as a
science. Rather, the people voted for new representatives based upon their unaided
opinion about the Long Parliament’s service.
Behemoth’s characters allude to three reasons why the people abandoned the
Long Parliament. First, the Long Parliament in the waning years of English Civil War
was no longer accountable to the people. Popularly referred to as the “Rump,” the
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Parliament had already purged itself of several members who refused to find Charles I
guilty of treason. 31 Because no monarch was available to dismiss Parliament, the Rump
Parliament continued indefinitely without elections throughout the officers’ rebellion.
The longer the Rump Parliament stayed in power, the more alienated the original
supporters of popular government became. This discontent would coalesce into the “Free
Parliament” movement in the waning days of the English Civil War. 32
Second, A cites overbearing taxes as a cause of discontent with the Rump
Parliament, especially in the large cities. A cites a “100,000l” a month tax on London
that caused considerable disagreement with the Rump, causing the Rump to send General
Lambert “to break down the city gates and their portcullises, and to imprison certain
obstinate citizens.” 33 As a result, the Rump became increasingly dependent on a standing
army to keep the peace, requiring further taxation in order to pay for it.
The need for an army illustrates a third reason for the Rump Parliament’s failure.
Despite its power over the purse, Parliament was unable to fulfill its duty of securing
salus populi. Instead, a council of officers was convened to carry out the most important
function of government. 34 Not only was the Rump increasingly unaccountable to the
people’s interests, but it was becoming apparent to the general population that it was
altogether unnecessary. Character B states the predicament of the Rump Parliament
perfectly, “for they that keep an army, and cannot master it, must be subject to it as much
31
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as he that keeps a lion in his house.” 35 Perhaps the best example of B’s observation is his
characterization of Lord Monck’s coup d’état as “the greatest stratagem extant in
history.” 36
This praise would seem to indicate that B approved of Lord Monck’s actions to
compel the Long Parliament into obedience, but what B actually means is somewhat
puzzling. The problem with accepting B’s praise of Lord Monck’s actions is that it
seems to run counter to B’s previous statements. For example, B implies in dialogue two
that a victorious general should “either take the government upon himself, or to place it
where he himself thinks good,” 37 but General Monck did neither. One biographer
argued that his speech to the Rump Parliament after his capture of London “did not
satisfy anybody,” for he made no statement that supported the Royalist cause, the Rump’s
cause, the cause of the secluded members, or the Free Parliamentarians. 38 Rather than
take power, Lord Monck not only ceded power, but also ceded in favor of an unpopular
institution that had already failed. Moreover, B implies that if a victor does not accept
sovereignty, the victor “will be thought a fool; and if he do, he shall be sure to have the
envy of his subordinate commanders who will look for a share in the present government,
or in succession to it.” 39 Since Lord Monck neither accepted sovereignty, nor delegated
power or honors to his subordinates, one would think that B would characterize him as
35
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foolish and certainly not worthy of having performed “the greatest stratagem extant in
history.” Statements such as this only underscore the complicated nature of the
Restoration in Hobbes’s writings. Hobbes praises the Restoration, but his science cannot
fully explain how the Restoration could occur.
Leviathan cannot account for the type of altruism General Monck displays. By
contrast, Hobbes’s theory can explain the actions of the other principal actors in the civil
war as glory-seekers, with Oliver Cromwell fitting most of the descriptions in chapter 13
of Leviathan. 40 Yet there is no indication from Hobbes or any of the secondary accounts
that General Monck was an ambitious man. 41 While ultimately Lord Monck’s actions
would restore the monarchy, there is no mechanism within Hobbes’s mechanical account
that can explain why a figure with the sort of power and authority Monck possessed
would willingly give up that power. Monck’s promise to protect the Long Parliament
could not be considered a covenant, because there was no “right and force sufficient to
compel performance” 42 on the Long Parliament’s part. Monck held the power of the
sword: something that Parliament in all its forms was unable to master. Yet Monck does
not fit the criteria of a conqueror, because he never intended to rule England, but to
facilitate the rule of Parliament and later King Charles II.
40
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While Monck’s actions may have ultimately facilitated peace and stability within
the English Commonwealth, the means Monck used to achieve this peace do not coincide
with what Leviathan identifies as peaceful conduct. Described by one contemporary
biographer as “a veritable Machiavelli,” 43 Monck—like Cromwell before him—had a
talent for playing factions against each other for a desired end. If anything, General
Monck was a deceptive personality unwilling to enforce the claim of the Long Parliament
he pledged to protect. 44 Secretly, Monck desired the restoration of Charles II, but did not
openly advocate reestablishing the absolute monarchy. Monck could see that the
Londoners viewed the Rump as an increasingly heavy-handed and despotic organization,
and he suspected that if the Rump Parliament would became accountable again through
the electoral process, there was a good chance Charles II would be installed as
monarch. 45
This sort of duplicitous politics is something Hobbes’s scientific model cannot
fully appreciate, except in a negative sense. Duplicity is tantamount to breaking
Leviathan’s third law of nature: “that men performe their covenants made.” 46 If General
Monck was loyal to the King, he was duplicitous by making a covenant to serve
Parliament. If General Monck was loyal to Parliament, he was duplicitous by facilitating
Parliament’s dissolution. Nevertheless, neither A nor B castigate Monck for this
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duplicity. On the contrary, B praises General Monck highly, and A says nothing that
would indicate that Monck was a man of bad character.
Monck’s speculation was not based upon any scientific understanding of human
nature as much as it was based upon his own conjecture from experience. The outcome
of free elections could very well install more Presbyterian factionalists rather than
Royalists intent on restoring the monarchy. Monck hoped that his expectation would be
borne out according to his observations. Yet for Hobbes, conjecture from experience “is
an error: for the signs are but conjectural; and according as they have often or seldom
failed, so their assurance is more or less; but never full and evident.” 47 Monck may have
selected the course that had the greatest probability of success, but certainly no guarantee
of success. It would appear that B’s “greatest stratagem” was, by Hobbes’s own
standard, fortuitous rather than great. Despite the questionable methods by which
General Monck brought peace to the commonwealth, Hobbes chose to end Behemoth
praising Monck, and not Charles II, showing us that he wanted to draw attention to this
humble, yet instrumental, figure in the Restoration. What could Hobbes be trying to
accomplish here?
Given the facts of the Restoration, Hobbes may have reconsidered how
commonwealths establish sovereignty. Traditionally, we have assumed that sovereignty
can be established one of two ways: either through institution (contract) or through
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acquisition (conquest). 48 Using Goldsmith’s account of sovereign claims, the Restoration
cannot be considered “sovereignty by institution.” The people and Monck did not restore
the monarchy directly, but chose representatives in Parliament who then subsequently
decided to restore Charles II’s claim to the throne. Given the desire for free elections, it
is a mistake to assume that the people voted for representatives in Parliament with the
intention of giving up this freedom wholly over to a monarch’s will, as was the case in
Charles I’s reign. Clarendon observed that the restored monarchy did not have the same
autonomy or prerogative as the previous monarchy, because “the king was not yet master
of his kingdom,” even after the passage of the Militia Act. 49 Additionally, Charles II
continued to quarrel with Parliament over matters of religious toleration until 1681, when
Parliament was dismissed indefinitely over the Bills of Exclusion. Though primarily
Royalist in composition, the Parliament viewed Charles II as a vehicle for serving
Parliament’s interests, which included measures to strengthen Episcopacy at the expense
of Presbyterian and Catholic freedoms of conscience. As Clarendon observed, “very
few” of the Royalists in Parliament “did not think themselves qualified to reform
whatsoever was amiss in church or state, and to procure whatsoever supply the king
would require.” 50 The Presbyterian Long Parliament advanced Presbyterian interests at
the expense of the whole kingdom, but the post-Restoration Parliament advanced
Anglican interests at the expense of whole kingdom as well. While Behemoth’s B admits
48
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the post-Restoration Parliament “has done all that a Parliament can do for the security” of
the English Commonwealth, he also recommends that “preachers would take heed of
instilling evil principles into their auditory.” 51 Since B does not refer to any preachers in
particular, the “preachers” could refer to Anglican as well as Presbyterian preachers.
Given the central role the Anglicans would play in the new Parliament between 1660 and
1668, it seems highly likely that Hobbes may have been giving a warning to politicians of
his own time, rather than recalling earlier abuses by Parliament. Nevertheless, while B
makes no mention of the post-Restoration Parliament in his chronology of sovereigns,
England was still very much under Parliament’s control. Rather than absolute monarchy,
the post-Restoration government resembled what A calls “mixarchy,” or divided
sovereignty: an institutional arrangement favored by both Royalist and anti-Royalist
members of Parliament. 52 Therefore, it is difficult to view the post-Restoration political
system as instituting absolute sovereignty in any single institution.
While it is questionable whether the people actually chose Charles II to exercise
complete sovereignty, the fact remains that the elections were called as a direct result of
General Monck’s coup d’état. General Monck acquired a monopoly on the use of force
in London, forcing elections, which subsequently created a change. This raises the
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question of who was actually responsible for changing the regime. On the one hand, the
people were empowered to make their own decisions. On the other hand, the people
might not have had the opportunity to elect their representatives in Parliament, had Lord
Monck not taken control of London. In this respect, the Restoration was brought about
more by the point of a sword, rather than through any popular or Parliamentary consent.
Forcing a change of regime through force of arms is not necessarily a problem for
Hobbes’s conception of the rightful origins of sovereignty. As previously mentioned,
Hobbes considered “sovereignty by acquisition” as another method by which a
commonwealth can establish a rightful sovereign. However, we have to ask whether
Lord Monck’s coup d’état qualifies as the establishment of sovereignty through
acquisition. To begin, Lord Monck did not take control of England directly. He let the
Rump Parliament govern as it always had done until the secluded members could be
readmitted and new elections could be called. Lord Monck would also cede control of
his army to Charles II, who took no part in acquiring the regime that he would eventually
control. As far as conquering sovereigns are concerned, neither Lord Monck nor Charles
II really qualifies according to Hobbes’s definition, as neither of them was willing to
“destroy them [the people] if they refuse.” 53 While peace was eventually reestablished, it
is unclear from Hobbes’s scientific model how the reestablished sovereign power came to
be. If the Restoration monarchy was neither consented to nor acquired through conquest,
how does Hobbes explain the peace brought about by the Restoration?
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Section 3: Sovereignty by Strategy
Behemoth seems to allow for a third way in which sovereignty can be established:
through “great strategy” or political maneuver. Hobbes does not discuss political
maneuvering in his scientifically oriented works, probably because he was more
concerned with the general dispositions and behaviors of sovereigns, delving into the
specifics of particular sovereigns and notables only later in Leviathan. Using Lord
Monck and Charlemagne as examples of great strategists, we can start to identify how
Hobbes views leadership as a means to establish or reestablish sovereign authority.
First, only a great strategic personality can be responsible for creating a great
strategy. Sovereignty through great strategy depends on the political skill of elites to a
far greater extent than sovereignty by institution or acquisition. While sovereignty by
institution relies upon an existing groundswell of public support, great strategists often
have to build public support out of anarchy. While great strategists have the advantage in
force of arms, they do not use force to acquire sole sovereignty over a regime. Rather,
great strategists use compromise, public relations, and experience to bring order back to a
commonwealth.
Second, only a commonwealth suffering from a constitutional crisis can be saved
by a great strategy. By contrast, perfectly stable and healthy commonwealths can be
changed through institutional reform or through acquisition. When we see the two
examples of great strategy outlined in Behemoth, we find that both General Monck and
Charlemagne were responding to the absence of sovereign power, restoring some
measure of security in a climate of insecurity. The Rump Parliament could not control
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the army and, by extension, could not enforce the laws without Lord Monck’s help.
Similarly, local bishops and Pope Leo III were spiritual leaders and unable to protect
church holdings from the Lombards. 54 Like Lord Monck, Charlemagne was responding
to a regime with an established government that was unable to carry out the duty of
securing salus populi. In this respect, leaders who establish sovereignty through great
strategy are similar to leaders who acquire sovereignty simply. The difference between
great strategists and conquerors is that great strategists recognize the value of maintaining
the established ruling institution while conquerors replace the previous ruling institution
entirely.
This leads us to the third defining characteristic of sovereignty through great
strategy: institutional division. While institutional division is a mark of bad or unhealthy
regimes in Hobbes’s Leviathan, 55 scholars have noticed that Hobbes praised collaborative
government in A Dialogue. 56 Specifically, Parliament is necessary to express “the assent
of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal,” 57 implying that laws must pass through
Parliament’s litmus test, rather than through the monarch’s litmus test. Lord Monck
could have simply removed the Rump Parliament and installed Charles II by force, as he
had a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Instead, he used his power to
manipulate Parliament into restoring the monarchy by its own volition. Monck

54

Behemoth, p. 12.

55

Leviathan, II.29.368.

56

See Joseph Cropsey’s introduction to Hobbes’s A Dialogue , p. 48. For a different interpretation of the
value of Parliamentary oversignt in Hobbes’s later writings, see Okin (1982), pp. 49-75.
57

A Dialogue, p. 167.

140
apparently knew that Parliament, for all its faults, was an institution that held tremendous
symbolic and actual importance to a significant portion of the English people. To abolish
Parliament completely, or to leave it utterly disempowered, would cause more discord
than peace. A better option would be to maintain Parliament’s authority and symbolic
importance in order legitimize the King in some manner, which is exactly what A
claimed happened when the Parliament bestowed “the right of the militia in virtue of the
sovereignty without dispute . . . without either of his Houses of Parliament.” 58 A does
not underestimate the importance of this gesture, claiming that the Militia Act was “more
instructive to the people, than any arguments drawn from the title of sovereign, and
consequently fitter to disarm the ambition of all seditious haranguers for the time to
come.” 59 Hobbes does not seem concerned with whether Parliament had the right to
bestow anything upon the monarch, nor does he seem overly concerned that the sovereign
decides the powers of Parliament, and not vice-versa. 60 Instead, Hobbes views the
actions of Parliament as more instructive than any argument for the king’s legitimacy,
including perhaps his own.
Similarly, Charlemagne removed the Lombards from the church lands in Italy,
only to give them back to the Church to govern. 61 Yet Charlemagne received something
in exchange for his deference to the prevailing religious authorities: the “gift of the
empire,” or the right to rule as the Holy Roman Emperor bestowed upon him by Pope
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Leo III. 62 While the question arises whether any religious authority ultimately has the
right or power to bestow divine legitimacy upon a sovereign, in the case of Charlemagne,
Hobbes seems less concerned with the legitimacy of Pope Leo III’s coronation than he
was with the practical effect of such a gesture. While “the empire was understood to be
given him [Charlemagne], on the condition to be directed by the Pope,” the coronation
solidified support amongst the people of Charlemagne’s empire. This consolidation of
temporal power was based less on any scientific argument than on shrewd political
maneuvering. As A states, “when the Pope invested him with the regal ornaments, the
people all cried out Deus dat, that is to say, it is God that gives it; and the Emperor was
contented so to take it.” 63 Gestures of symbolic value designed to placate the needs of
disparate factions seem to play a large role in how great strategists bring order into the
commonwealth.
To be fair, the coronation of Charlemagne by Pope Leo III did nothing to
consolidate temporal and spiritual authority in one sovereign, and this would have severe
consequences over half a millennium later. According to A, Charlemagne was
responsible for erecting the divinity schools that would produce the seditious doctrines
responsible for creating public tumult against Charles I. 64 For a time, however, peace
and authority returned to Europe. Since great strategy requires an unusually capable
personality such as Lord Monck, the longevity of sovereignty through great strategy
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seems to depend on the continual influence of the strategy’s author, both in life and after
the author’s death. Perhaps this is why A offers up a prayer at the end of Behemoth,
hoping that the Restoration monarchy “have as often as there shall be need” of a general
like Monck. 65 By contrast, Hobbes’s scientific solution aims at an “immortal peace” that
is not dependent on the presence of leaders with political skill. 66 We have to wonder
whether any regimes, even those that follow Hobbes’s scientific model of absolute
sovereignty, can constitute an immortal peace. The closest historical example Hobbes
examines in Behemoth was the Roman Empire under Constantine, 67 but even this regime
was unable to protect Rome in succeeding years. Given the circumstances surrounding
the Restoration, Hobbes may have realized that peace is often the result of actions that are
unexplained or not sufficiently examined by his previous account of human nature.
Consequently, Hobbes needed to identify great strategies that seem counterintuitive to
what his science would ordinarily predict.
We must remember that Hobbes’s science in The Elements of Law, De Cive, and
Leviathan reduces human behavior to its most basic and generalizable characteristics. In
this respect, Hobbes’s science is the precursor to game theory, and other general models
of political behavior. Yet if this emphasis on the general tendencies within political
behavior has a weakness, it is that reductive models cannot easily model the behavior of
exceptional cases in exceptional circumstances. Great strategy is a function of
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exceptional political skill, coupled with exceptional circumstances, creating peace despite
conditions that favor continual war. Behemoth’s ending seems to imply that the
Restoration can only be explained by the application of political skill by the skillful: a
notion that is never emphasized in Hobbes’s science, but finds its expression most clearly
in Hobbes’s history.

CHAPTER V
MODELS OF SOVEREIGN POWER
Section 1: Hobbes’s Use of Historical Examples
In the previous chapter, we saw how Hobbes used history to explain how the
English commonwealth was able to create peace out of civil war. Lord Monck’s great
stratagem was the cause of the Restoration, which in itself shows the weakness of
Hobbes’s science. Specifically, the unique qualities of political leaders such as Monck
go beyond Hobbes’s generalizable theory of politics, and explain the Restoration in a way
that Hobbes’s science alone could not. Hobbes’s decision to end Behemoth in praise of
Lord Monck’s great strategy alludes to a more fundamental lesson that Hobbes tries to
teach us in his later works: the importance of political skill. He teaches us this lesson
through specific examples of sovereigns in his later works, a practice that is almost
entirely absent from Hobbes’s writings until Leviathan.
From The Elements of Law (1628) through the first part of Leviathan (1650),
Hobbes does not typically use historical sovereigns from England in the explanation of
his political science. 1 Instead, Hobbes relies on the internal coherence of his argument to
convince the reader. Hobbes does not use historical case studies in these earlier works
because he believed he did not need historical examples to formulate his political science.

1
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When we read Hobbes’s writings on method from De Corpore, we can understand why
he came to this conclusion. Hobbes separates knowledge into two basic types:
knowledge from ratiocination and knowledge from experience. 2 True philosophy and
science create knowledge through ratiocination, which includes both analytical reasoning
and synthetic reasoning. 3 Analytical reasoning, or the resolutive part of Hobbes famous
resolutive-compositive method, is the “knowledge of singular things.” 4 It is the process
of isolating and defining the singular elements of a complex phenomenon under
investigation. For example, human nature taken in its entirety is simply too complicated
to understand. However, the component motivations that cause human beings to act are
much easier to define and comprehend. This is exactly what Hobbes does in his political
treatises: he breaks down human nature and volition into their component elements,
giving each element a simple, axiomatic definition. In The Elements of Law, Hobbes
names human characteristics in terms of the presence of a given quality (positive) or the
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absence, defect, or lack of a given quality (private). 5 In both The Elements of Law and
De Cive, Hobbes further reduces the panoply of qualities that are either positive or
private into “four kinds; bodily strength, experience, reason [and] passion.” 6 By
examining human beings in terms of these specific qualities, one may understand what
makes particular human beings act.
Ratiocination is not only capable of understanding singular things. Synthetic
reasoning, or the compositive portion of the resolutive-compositive method, is the
“knowledge . . . of universals, and of their causes.” 7 Just as analytic reasoning is
necessary to make complicated phenomena simple to understand, synthetic reasoning is
necessary to make a particular theory about a particular example a comprehensive theory
that encompasses all examples. Synthetic reasoning is the use of a true definition to
understand definitions of greater complexity through the use of syllogisms. Hobbes uses
the example of how a geometrician can discern points and lines from the more general
conceptions of place and motion. 8 In this way, human beings can understand phenomena
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that are unobservable or so complicated that they cannot be understood clearly in any
other way.
The second source of knowledge Hobbes describes is the knowledge that comes
from experience, but when we examine the relationship between ratiocination and
experience, we discover that ratiocination requires experience. Just as Hobbes asks the
readers of his Leviathan to “read thy selfe,” 9 the fundamental requirement for any
scientific investigation is an effort to understand one’s own “phantasms of sense and
imagination.” 10 In this respect, ratiocination for Hobbes is a way of understanding the
world of sense and experience, a world that concerns itself with what he calls “the
motions of the mind.” 11
Hobbes also concedes that ratiocination is not necessarily required for human
beings to learn something, particularly human nature. Principles of human nature are
discovered “not only by ratiocination, but also by the experience of every man that takes
the pains to observe those motions within himself.” 12 From this passage, we can surmise
that human beings do not necessarily require ratiocination, as most of the truths contained
in Hobbes’s philosophy “may be known to be so by any man’s experience, that will but
examine his own mind.” 13 Passages such as these raise questions concerning the
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necessity of science at all. If human beings need only to examine their own minds, what
need is there to pursue Hobbes’s scientific method?
Experience, from Hobbes’s epistemological standpoint, is deeply flawed. While
experience can lead a human being to truth, it can equally lead a human being into error
and absurdity. This is because memory or experience is “unconstant and fading,” as the
perceptions of what the memory is or means are variable. 14 History is even more
problematic, because it is not only memory, but also the memory of someone else who
may be biased or misinformed. The preface to Hobbes’s translation of Thucydides
remarks upon the tendency of historians to go beyond the mere historical narrative,
inserting commentary alongside the bare historical facts. 15 Due to its richness, history is
more than an account of times past, but is also a window into the minds of both the
author and the author’s subjects. Hobbes considered Thucydides unique among the
historians, because “he setteth his reader in the assemblies of the people and in the senate,
at their debating; in the streets, at their seditions; and in the field, at their battles.” 16 Part
of the reason for this is Thucydides’ technique of reproducing the speeches of the various
historical figures that take part in the Peloponnesian War. Hobbes understood that that
the speeches in Thucydides were not written as a verbatim account, but rather as a proxy
14
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account that “used the arguments that best might serve to the purpose which at any time
was at hand.” 17 In other words, the characters who uttered the speeches were not
necessarily responsible for uttering the speech in fact, but the characters stood as
personifications of commonly held arguments of several people or a particular faction.
Hobbes did not consider this a failing of Thucydides, but rather, his strength. 18
Like all historians, Thucydides had to strike a balance between style and substance in
order “to instruct and enable men, by knowledge of actions past, to bear themselves
prudently in the present and providently towards the future.” 19 Like any work of art, a
work of history depends upon the artistic tools available to the historian to explain the
facts so that the reader understands not only the thoughts of people from the past, but
also, the feelings of the people from those former times. This is what makes history
persuasive, but this is also what makes history dangerous for Hobbes. He noticed that
“for the greatest part, men came to the reading of history with an affection much like that
of the people in Rome: who came to the spectacle of the gladiators with more delight to
behold their blood, than their skill in fencing.” 20 Political science as Hobbes understood
it is far less dangerous than the investigations found within history because science
appeals to reason as opposed to passion. 21
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Hobbes did not reject the use of history as an instructional medium, but he was
suspicious of the tendency of history to resemble poetry rather than any serious attempt to
explain the truth. 22 For Hobbes, the irony of historiography is that the very qualities that
produce a history like Thucydides’ are also the qualities that make history dangerous. By
inviting the reader to experience the events of the past in a firsthand way, the ambitious
generals of the past act as models to emulate. Although Thucydides’ use of opposed
speeches provides clarity concerning the debates of the past, he and other historians were
so effective that readers would often be inspired to recreate the escapades so gloriously
described in the historical record. That is why Hobbes later condemned history as an
instructional medium, as often the readers would receive “a strong, and delightfull
impression, of the great exploits of warre.” 23
Just as Hobbes condemns history as a means of instruction, he nevertheless uses
history to convince Leviathan’s readers. Typically, Hobbes uses biblical history to
illustrate his theological assertions, a perfectly good use of history given Hobbes’s
concession that science cannot be used to understand theological concepts or revelation
generally speaking. 24 What is far more interesting is Hobbes’s use of history when he
does not have to use it—specifically with respect to his theory of the state and
22
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sovereignty. Given Hobbes’s desire for a universal theory of human nature and politics,
the scientific method he chooses seems to work well enough for his intended purposes.
After all, scientific conclusions are intended to be ahistorical, or valid in all times and in
all circumstances. In the words of Goldsmith, Hobbes wanted to create “a useful,
systematic account of the world from a set of basic principles.” 25 Hobbes would succeed
in creating a systematic account in his political science treatises by reducing the complex
nature of politics into a general set of laws derived from simple and well-defined
elements. Given Hobbes’s objective and his stance on history, it seems counterintuitive
that he would use historical case studies to validate his science. Why, then, does Hobbes
use examples of sovereigns from England’s past?
Despite Hobbes’s criticism of history, he nevertheless uses it extensively from
chapter 19 of Leviathan on through to his last political work: Behemoth. 26 Given the
sharp criticism of his science from Hobbes’s contemporaries and the inability of his
science to find its way to both the people and elites, Hobbes may have questioned the
effectiveness of his science to create the sort of change necessary to prevent the political
chaos that characterized the English Civil War. Behemoth gives us a clue that Hobbes
may have previously underestimated the ability of Parliament to learn from experience,
conceding in Behemoth that they have “learned the wit” to behave more prudently
without the benefit of science or ratiocination. Hobbes’s science may have also
underestimated the capacity of individuals such as Lord Monck to achieve peace through
25
26
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great strategy. These underestimations may have caused Hobbes to rethink or reflect
upon his scientific project to incorporate new facts not available to him in the earlier part
of his career. Since the “first grounds of all science are not only not beautiful, but poor,
arid, and, in appearance, deformed,” 27 Hobbes may have sought a more complete
understanding of politics by going back to rethink the first principles of his political
science.
The dialogues do not seem to follow the model of the treatises in terms of their
objectives. Rather than create a model of the world, the dialogues seem to take the world
as it appears in all its complexity. The dialogue form of Behemoth and A Dialogue seems
to magnify the chaotic nature of the subject. The characters take the discussion into
digressions that deviate far from the central narrative. Instead of the methodical
progression from basic definitions found in the treatises, the dialogues seem to present
the commonwealth as a conglomeration of various laws, precedents, and customs
resembling the “crasie building” discussed in Chapter 29 of Leviathan. 28 If the dialogues
are an attempt by Hobbes to reformulate or reassess his science, the project does not
appear to be scientific.
Yet the nature of the dialogue format, and the way in which Hobbes describes the
commonwealth in his dialogues, seems less problematic when we observe Hobbes’s
characterization of the first grounds of science described in De Corpore. While the goal
of science is to produce a simplified and precise model of the phenomenon studied,
Hobbes is realistic enough to understand that scientific models are, in many cases,
27
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incomplete or obscure in their first forms. If Hobbes wanted to rethink his philosophical
and scientific project, the dialogue format gives him the opportunity to do so. What
remains to be asked is what Hobbes specifically wanted to rethink, and why was his
previous science unsuccessful?
Turning back to the “crasie building” analogy from Leviathan’s Chapter 29,
Hobbes mentions that human beings as makers of institutions have the capacity “to
conforme themselves into one firme and lasting edifice.” 29 However, “an imperfect
institution,” or a defect in the constitutional structure of the regime, can prevent them
from conforming into one commonwealth. 30 One wonders if anyone would—or even
could—fashion all aspects of the commonwealth to fit harmoniously into a single plan in
the manner of Leviathan’s “very able architect” from chapter 29. Sovereigns rarely—if
ever—come to the throne with the people “like a clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by
Publique Authority shall be imprinted in them.” 31 The only circumstance where a
sovereign would have no previous laws or customs would be at the commonwealth’s
founding: that moment when a disparate people becomes a body politic through an
original covenant. Like the state of nature construction, Hobbes can point to no specific
point in history where there was not some established rule from a previous ruler. This
presents a problem for Hobbes because it presents a challenge to sovereignty: to what
extent are sovereigns bound by previous laws, customs, and rules made before the
sovereign’s reign?
29
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Hobbes solves this problem by arguing that the sovereign is under no obligation
to uphold past precedents. Not only does the sovereign have the power to legislate
against past custom, but Hobbes also makes it very clear that unless the sovereign is free
from the obligation to uphold past precedents, the sovereign is unable to fulfill the duty to
protect the commonwealth. 32 Given the Long Parliament’s accusation that Charles I
broke the law by levying the ship money without Parliament’s consent, Hobbes might
have felt it was necessary to explain that the sovereign need not follow the customary
procedure of calling Parliament to levy funds merely because past sovereigns have done
so. Edward I instituted the customary procedure in question and provided Parliament
enough of a legal precedent to challenge Charles I. 33 The use of such legal precedents to
bind or find fault with the sovereign was something Hobbes’s scientific philosophy
argued against. Instead, Hobbes explained that the sovereign has the power to uphold or
forego previous customs and precedents as the sovereign sees fit. 34 Hobbes argued, as A
argued in Behemoth, that Charles I had the right to levy the ship money as a power
inherent to the sovereign office. Therefore, Charles I could not be considered as a
lawbreaker, since the sovereign through his observance or supersession of precedents
defines which precedents are still applicable.
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Whether Charles I possessed or did not possess the right to ignore the custom has
very little to do with Parliament’s negative assessment of Charles I. While readers have
assumed that Behemoth portrays Charles I in a favorable light, 35 he is not the only
monarch that Hobbes discusses. Hobbes portrays William I, Henry VII, Henry VIII, and
Queen Elizabeth as strong sovereigns possessing qualities that were lacking in Charles I.
At one point in the dialogue, A talks of “two great virtues, that were severally in Henry
VII and Henry VIII. . . . That of Henry VII was, without much noise of the people to fill
his coffers; that of Henry VIII was an early severity; but this without the former cannot
be exercised.” 36 The qualities found in these two monarchs point to a facet of politics
rarely discussed in Hobbes’s treatises: the power of political skill. 37 In Behemoth,
sovereignty entails more than the recognition of the duty to secure salus populi;
sovereignty also requires the political skill to acquire and maintain the political power
necessary to ensure salus populi. Read as a practical guide, Behemoth seems to
emphasize political skill in a similar fashion to the way Machiavelli portrays it, which is
something of a departure from Leviathan.
Using the examples of leaders portrayed in Behemoth and A Dialogue, we will
examine how political skill influences political stability. What we will discover is that
these dialogues contain a more pragmatic view of politics, a view similar to
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Machiavelli’s, which is different from the theoretical argument found in Hobbes’s earlier
treatises. We will also explore the possibility that the collapse of Charles I’s rule may
have been due to a lack of political skill, offering a view different from that of the
standard interpretation of Behemoth as a defense of Charles I’s regime.
Section 2: William the Conqueror
The first historical sovereign we consider is William the Conqueror, partly
because of his appearance in Hobbes’s dialogues and also because scholars consider
Hobbes’s treatment of the Norman Conquest an important model for understanding
Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty by acquisition. One scholar who affirms this view is
Deborah Baumgold, who writes that “England was an absolute monarchy by virtue of the
subjects’ consent to the Conquest; and the Stuarts had inherited their title to the throne
from William.” 38 In short, Hobbes uses the example of the Norman Conquest as
evidence of a form of rightful sovereignty different from sovereignty by consent. Hobbes
considered sovereignty by acquisition or conquest as another means by which
sovereignty could be transferred from one regime to another. The relatively peaceful and
complete transfer of power from the Saxon regime to William the Conqueror was
evidence that sovereignty by acquisition could be considered just as legitimate and
enduring as a covenant operating on the principle of the tacit consent of the people to the
new monarch.
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What is important to keep in mind, however, is what we observed in the previous
chapter. Specifically, a rightful commonwealth may come into being through other
means than simply through consent or conquest. Skill, or what was called “great
strategy,” may also play a role. While the record clearly states that William I acquired
the English lands through conquest, the mere act of conquest alone might not have been
enough to maintain the regime. We must be careful not to let the mere act of acquisition
overshadow the fact that conquerors are also governors and, as such, require skill to
govern effectively. Though much has been written about the Norman Conquest in
Hobbes’s work, not much has been written about Hobbes’s assessment of the man
responsible for the Norman Conquest: William I. What did William the Conqueror do or
not do in Hobbes’s estimation to provide for the successful transition from Saxon to
Norman rule?
Hobbes’s description of William I in Leviathan portrays him as a strong, but not
particularly restrained, conqueror. His assessment is mostly critical, describing
William’s oath to Rome “not to infringe the liberty of the Church” as an example of
William’s surrender of his sovereign prerogatives. 39 He also describes William’s
appropriation of “divers Lands reserved to his own use . . . and divers services reserved
on the Land he gave his subjects.” 40 Hobbes uses William’s appropriation as evidence of
the sovereign’s right to distribute wealth. He does this not to explain why William’s
appropriation was good. If anything, he uses the example of William as evidence of how
monarchs “may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their Passions . . . but this is
39
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not enough to authorise any subject, either to make war upon, or so much as to accuse of
Injustice, or any way to speak evill of their Soveraign.” 41 While William’s appropriation
of lands to himself might be an example of his iniquity, it is not injustice by Hobbes’s
standards. Yet as iniquitous as William I’s actions were, 42 why was the transition of
power between Saxon and Norman rule so successful? Despite being perhaps far more
iniquitous than Charles I, William I would hold on to his possessions, eventually
transferring them successfully to his son William Rufus.
In A Dialogue, Hobbes creates an exchange between the lawyer and the
philosopher that may shed some light on why the transition was successful. The lawyer
asks the philosopher whether William I governed by virtue of his “natural capacity, as he
is a man,” or his “politik capacity, as a king.” 43 This distinction between natural and
political capacity goes to the heart of the differences between the earlier and later Hobbes
on the foundations of leadership. The pre-Restoration Hobbes argued that the office of
sovereign, or the sovereign in his or her political capacity, created the legitimacy
necessary for governance. This is because Hobbes’s conception of nature can offer no
guidance for determining who should rule, as “the difference between man, and man, is
not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which
41
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another may not pretend, as well as he.” 44 In other words, Hobbes’s science as written
from Elements of Law through Leviathan cannot determine a natural cause for why one
human being should rule another. The question of who should rule is a matter that is
decided by convention, as nature can offer no guidance. This is why the office of
sovereign is, at its source, a political creation. The actual practice of governing is less
important than the application of the rules that are discernible through ratiocination, and
that receive the commonwealth’s consent, that create the office in the first place. While
Hobbes also mentions that conquest is another legitimate means to institute a
commonwealth, the actual mechanism that establishes the conqueror as the new
sovereign has little to do with the conqueror’s natural superiority to govern better than the
original. Instead, the reason the commonwealth submits to the conqueror is because the
conquered sovereign is divested of political power. 45 Thus, the natural power of the
sovereign for the early Hobbes is in large part dependent on the political power the office
grants.
A Dialogue has a different conception of the origin of sovereign power. When the
philosopher examined the reign of William the Conqueror more completely, he
concluded that the legitimacy of William’s reign could not be explained in terms of
political capacity alone. A sovereign acting in his political capacity is limited to those
actions that are consistent with the public good. 46 In this way, the sovereign who acts
according to the authority of the office of sovereign is not absolute, and is in fact, rather
44
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limited. A sovereign’s political capacity is so limited that his actions are subject to the
review and discretion of Parliament. This is a radical departure from Hobbes’s previous
conception of sovereignty that is not lost on Susan Okin. 47
The philosopher quickly points out that William the Conqueror had power in
excess of his political capacity. William I had the authority to acquire and distribute
property for his own personal use as he saw fit. He did not need to consult Parliament for
permission to distribute property, and he did not need to distribute the property
exclusively for “the benefit of his people.” 48 On the contrary, a significant portion of
England’s territory was retained “in his own hands by the name of forests for his own
recreation or magnificence.” 49 In order to explain how William I was able to reserve
such lands, Hobbes has to go beyond mere political capacity to find the justification.
This is how Hobbes establishes natural capacity as the basis of sovereign legitimacy, for
only natural capacity can explain how William I could possess such discretion regarding
the disposition of lands in his kingdom.
If we are to assume for the moment that natural capacity is the same as political
skill, then what are the signs that a sovereign has a natural capacity to govern? The
philosopher tells the lawyer that “great monarchies” are established in two ways: “by
war” and by “the number and riches” of the monarch’s subjects. 50 In other words, what
separates a great monarchy from an average one has very little to do with the powers and
47
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autonomy of the ruler. Rather, great monarchs and great monarchies are determined by
political results. The sovereign’s ability to provide military victory and domestic
prosperity is the measure of the sovereign’s greatness.
This is a departure from Hobbes’s previous conception of politics, the conception
found in his scientific treatises. In his scientific treatises, Hobbes seems to emphasize
that the constitutional arrangement of the institution of sovereign determines the power of
the sovereign. What matters most is not the person who fills the role of sovereign, but
rather, what the constitution allows the sovereign to do. In Hobbes’s dialogues, the
constitutional arrangement that defines the office of sovereign seems less important than
the personal disposition of the sovereign who fills the role. To be fair, effective
sovereigns are those who can act, and a well-arranged commonwealth allows a sovereign
to act effectively. While this explains how constitutionally disempowered sovereigns
fail, this does not explain how constitutionally strong sovereigns such as Charles I fail.
In addition, constitutional arrangement does not explain why constitutionally constrained
sovereigns succeed. This is a matter that looms large for the simple fact that Hobbes
argues in A Dialogue for a stronger role for Parliament than we are accustomed to seeing
from him.
Hobbes’s support for a strong Parliament in A Dialogue is a puzzle that both
Joseph Cropsey and Susan Okin have attempted to solve. For Cropsey, Hobbes
interpreted Parliament as “the people’s consent” in institutional form. 51 That is to say,
Parliament acts as a sort of rubber stamp that determines which of the sovereign’s
proclamations have the approval of the people. For Okin, Parliament is a more active
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participant in the affairs of the sovereign and “the advice and deliberations of Parliament
are an important supplement to his [the sovereign’s] natural reasoning powers.” 52
Despite these differences, both Cropsey and Okin support the notion that Parliament is an
indispensable element in proper governance; what distinguishes an effective monarchy
from an ineffective one depends on adherence to the proper form of government, and this
means adhering to a system where the sovereign governs jointly with Parliament.
While this explanation seems to solve the puzzle, two questions come to mind.
First, what if Parliament is wrong? Hobbes makes a rather clear case in Behemoth that
Parliament is wrong far more often than it is right. This is due primarily to the nature of
the individuals who comprise Parliament. For example, Behemoth describes the
Parliament of the civil war period as composed of “ambitious ministers and ambitious
gentlemen” who saw Parliament as a means of self-aggrandizement. 53 This observation
coincides with Hobbes’s assessment of sovereign assemblies in chapter 19 of Leviathan;
the members of such assemblies “serve one anothers covetousnesse and ambition by
turns.” 54 Given this continuity between the scientific Hobbes and the post-Restoration
Hobbes, it is safe to say that Hobbes maintained the belief that members of Parliament
place personal ambition ahead of the common good.
The second question we should ask is why a sovereign who provides for the
common good through edicts and executive orders should feel the need to govern through
a representative body such as Parliament? Given Hobbes’s view that parliaments in
52
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general can be self-serving, it is quite possible that parliaments serve the common good
less often or with less concern when a sovereign works through parliaments. Conversely,
if a sovereign is both capable and cognizant of the duty to promote salus populi, he is
able to serve the common good through his prerogative alone without the need to seek
Parliament’s approval. To force an otherwise capable sovereign to consult with or cater
to Parliament would be unwise. At best, the process of governing would be needlessly
cumbersome, redundant, and slow. At worst, the process would become corrupt or
contentious, creating a scenario that Hobbes knew all too well: civil war, or more
specifically, the English Civil War. How can Hobbes promote a strong Parliament while
at the same time ensuring that the capable sovereign has enough autonomy to govern
effectively?
According to A Dialogue, the sovereign can exercise his authority in one of two
ways. The first way includes commands that the sovereign enacts “by consent of the
people of his kingdom.” 55 One may interpret “consent” in this instance as the consent of
Parliament: the body that represents the people. The sovereign acts this way by virtue of
his “politik capacity” or in the capacity of the powers vested in the office of sovereign.
The second type includes commands “by word of mouth only, or by letters signed with
his hand, or sealed with any of his private seals.” 56 These acts do not go through
Parliament, and consequently, cannot be considered acts that include the consent of the
people. They are, however, reflections of the sovereign’s judgment, albeit from a
different source from the constitutional powers vested in the office. Instead of deriving
55
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their authority from the sovereign’s office, these commands derive their authority from
the sovereign’s “natural capacity” or from the sovereign’s personal qualities. Their
efficacy does not depend on whether the people consent to them and, in fact, does not
depend on whether the sovereign is even granted the power to enact them within the
scope of the office. Rather, the efficacy of such commands depends on the sovereign’s
abilities and capacities as a human being to enact and enforce them.
Thus there seems to be two bases on which a sovereign may enact policy. He
may govern through his political capacity in full view of the public, relying on his
constitutional powers in a relationship with a parliament to pass legislation.
Alternatively, the sovereign can govern based upon his natural capacity, relying on his
judgment outside of conventional procedure. When the sovereign relies on natural
capacity to govern, the powers derive less from the office as constituted and are instead
derived from the sovereign’s natural capacity, which might include resources such as
natural charisma, public opinion, military strength, or personal wealth. The lawyer in A
Dialogue distinguishes political and natural capacity as “no more than private and public
right,” and agrees with the philosopher that all policies—whether driving from political
or natural capacity—ultimately derive from the sovereign’s natural capacity. 57 The
question we must ask ourselves is why a sovereign would even bother to govern in his
political capacity when a sovereign can govern from his natural capacity. It would seem
that governing from natural capacity is far less problematic because the sovereign does
not have to govern with a parliament.
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There are reasons why a sovereign would want to govern in consultation with a
parliament. If a measure is controversial or burdensome, it might behoove a sovereign to
work with the representatives of the people so he may resist accusation and blame. While
the sovereign reserves the right to enact any policy he sees fit without consulting
anybody, having the right to act independently does not imply that the sovereign should
always work independently. A good example of how a sovereign can use Parliament to
enact controversial measures is the first Tudor monarch and holder of one of A’s “two
great virtues,” Henry VII.
Section 3: Henry VII
Henry VII is important for understanding Hobbes partly because Hobbes’s former
employer Francis Bacon published a biography about Henry VII in 1622, around the time
when Hobbes served as Bacon’s secretary. So successful was Bacon’s History of the
Reign of King Henry the Seventh that “it became the standard account of Henry’s times,
life, rule, and character,” 58 but that does not imply Bacon’s History was a wholly positive
assessment of the first Tudor monarch. Bacon’s assessment of Henry VII’scharacter is
mixed. Henry VII was “one of the best sort of wonders; a wonder for wise men.” 59 But
Bacon was also acutely aware of Henry VII’s flaws.
Two flaws of Henry VII become immediately apparent to the reader of Bacon’s
history: Henry’s lack of foresight and Henry’s greed. When discussing Henry VII’s
misfortunes, Bacon asserts that “the perpetual troubles of his fortunes … could not have
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been without great defects and main errors in his nature, customs, and proceedings.” 60
While not precisely sure about the nature of these “defects and main errors,” Bacon is
convinced that they involve “the shortness of his foresight, or the strength of his will, or
the dazzling of his suspicions.” 61 Bacon proposes these character flaws as explanations
for Henry VII’s inability to “prevent and remove” dangers “afar off.” 62 Henry VII made
up for this lack of prudence by employing “a dexterity to deliver himself from dangers
when they pressed him,” 63 which is to say that Henry VII’s lack of foresight only
increased his resolve to solve problems when they arose. Henry’s inability to foresee
dangerous circumstances caused him to be more suspicious of plots than was typical for a
monarch. Bacon noticed that Henry VII was “full of apprehensions and suspicions” 64
and created “secret spials which he did employ both at home and abroad” to warn him of
plots against his regime. 65 If we examine Henry VII’s faults in Machiavellian terms, it
would be difficult for us to view Henry VII as an astute sovereign according to The
Prince, assuming that Bacon’s assessment of Henry’s lack of foresight is true. For
Machiavelli, foresight was part of a sovereign’s virtù and a quality that separated good
and bad princes. 66 While Bacon’s Henry was rather adept at handling difficulties when
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they arose, he was unable to prevent such difficulties before they befell him and his
kingdom.
While Henry’s lack of foresight may have been a defect of intellect, Henry’s
second flaw was one of character. Bacon describes Henry VII’s desire for material
wealth, or a desire for “gathering and heaping up of treasure . . . beyond his purpose.” 67
Two magistrates in Henry VII’s service, Empson and Dudley, are alleged by Bacon to
have used “sundry artificial devices and terrors to extort” from the people and lords
“great fines and ransoms.” 68
Henry’s taxes became a major source of discontent among the people causing
several popular uprisings. One occurred in Yorkshire, when the people “grew into a great
mutiny . . . and neither could nor would pay the subsidy.” 69 Complicating matters was
that Yorkshire fared well under the previous regime of Richard III. Consequently, the
fond “memory of King Richard was so strong” in Yorkshire that any perceived slight by
Henry VII against the people could cause an insurrection. Eager to prove his loyalty to
Henry VII, the Earl of Northumberland “assembled the principal justices and freeholders”
of Yorkshire and informed them of the King’s demands, using the same “imperious

forsees from afar, one can easily find a remedy for them but when you wait until they come close to you,
the medicine is not in time because the disease has become incurable” (The Prince, ch. 3, p. 12). It should
also be noted that in Jerry Weinberger’s introduction to Bacon’s history, Henry VII is portrayed as a
transitional figure between the personality driven principality and the constitutionally driven republic. In
this respect, Henry VII can best be described by Machiavelli’s republican tradition as outlined in the
Discourses rather than the model Machiavelli describes in The Prince. See Weinberger’s introduction in
Bacon’s History of Henry VII, p. 13.
67

Ibid., p. 183.

68

Ibid., p. 184.

69

Ibid., p. 79.

168
language wherein the King had written to him.” 70 Of course, the Earl’s demeanor proved
unpopular among the people who subsequently “slew him and divers of his servants” in
his home. 71 Under the leadership of John Egremond and John a Chamber, the people of
Yorkshire fought against Henry VII “for the maintenance of their liberties.” 72
Perhaps the most conspicuous example of Henry VII’s greed was how he used the
Scottish rebellion to levy an additional tax against his subjects. This tax allowed Henry
VII to raise ₤120,000 requiring an additional tenth and fifteenth to be levied against each
subject. 73 Lord Audley and his Cornish followers considered this unjust, as they believed
“it was not their duty to finance a campaign against the King of the Scots.” 74 So
egregious was this tax in the eyes of the residents of Cornwall that they felt “grinded to
powder with payments,” and subsequently decided to rebel against the crown. 75 While
there is no indication that Bacon approved of the Cornish Rebellion, his characterization
of the tax supports his conclusion that Henry VII suffered from an inordinate love of
money. Instead of avoiding wars, Bacon’s Henry saw wars as an opportunity, or “as a
mine of treasure of a strange kind of ore; iron at the top, and gold and silver at the
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bottom.” 76 With the exception of the Scottish rebellion, most of the trouble during Henry
VII’s reign concerned taxation.
Another clue that Henry VII might be an important model for Hobbes is that he is
the first English sovereign Hobbes considers in his philosophical works and the sole
representative English monarch considered by Hobbes in the period between the
Elements of Law and the first half of Leviathan. While Hobbes does not mention Bacon
in his Elements of Law, 77 he does use Henry VII’s reign to describe one of the “two
sorts” of discontent that “dispose men to sedition.” 78 The type of sedition described is
“the fear of arrest and imprisonment” and the example that illustrates Hobbes’s point is
the rebellion “of the Cornish men that refused to pay a subsidy, and, under the conduct of
the Lord Audley, gave the King [Henry VII] battle upon Blackheath.” 79 This is in
reference to the battle of Deptford Bridge in 1497, when Henry VII put down an
insurrection from Cornwall over the king’s tax policy. Hobbes also mentions the
Yorkshire rebellion and observes that rebels “murdered the Earl of Northumberland in his
house.” 80 No other mention of Henry VII’s reign is found in Elements of Law, but the
context in which Hobbes uses the reference is noteworthy because it portrays the failings
of Henry’s regime rather than any successes. If we were to read nothing else about
Henry VII’s reign from Hobbes, we would assume that his reign was marked by
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insurrections and fear of punishment. Hobbes in this way takes a similar view to that of
his employer Francis Bacon, who blamed Henry VII’s greed for destabilizing the English
commonwealth. In this respect, Hobbes seems to view Henry VII as a bad sovereign who
disrupted the people’s peaceable pursuit of commodious living.
This alone makes Henry VII worthy of further examination, but when we consider
that Henry VII possesses one of “the two great virtues” mentioned by A in Behemoth, 81
we find that what was portrayed as a problematic reign in Elements might not be so
problematic after all. On the contrary, Behemoth’s praise informs us that Hobbes might
have viewed Henry VII as a model sovereign that should be admired for his ability
“without much noise of the people to fill his coffers.” 82 According to the historical
record that Hobbes considered, we could hardly say that Henry’s taxation policy was
carried out “without much noise of the people.” As we have seen, Henry’s assessments
caused such an uproar amongst the people that civil insurrections took place in Cornwall
and Yorkshire. Given the Hobbes that we know, we would think that he would see Henry
VII’s reign as a failure because his taxation policy caused civil unrest. Yet despite the
civil insurrections, Hobbes’s A claimed that Henry VII possessed one of the two great
virtues that great sovereigns should possess. What is Hobbes trying to tell us here?
Hobbes fails to mention that Henry VII was a master at manipulating Parliament.
Biographers from the twentieth century marvel at Henry VII’s ability to use Parliament as
a means to impose his will on the kingdom. One biographer writes, “Henry exercised
firm control over the deliberations of all his parliaments . . . he himself was a capable if
81
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not brilliant parliamentarian who intuitively knew when to compromise and when to
stand firm and insist on having his own way.” 83 Another biographer was less flattering,
but could not deny that it was “Henry’s success in using the power he had acquired over
Parliament to secure a legal basis for his despotism and arm it with still further powers
that is the most novel feature of his rule.” 84 Part of the reason Henry VII was able to
acquire so much wealth from his subjects was that he was able to convince Parliament
that new stipends, taxes, and war funds were needed. The best example of this was
Henry’s speech in 1497, “where he did much exaggerate both the malice and cruel
predatory war . . . made by the King of Scotland.” 85 Convinced by Henry VII’s speech,
the Parliament granted him the subsidy that eventually led to the Cornish Rebellion.
Unlike the rebellion against Charles I, the Cornish Rebellion did not topple the
monarchy. Having prepared for war against the Scots, Henry VII was able to suppress
the rebellion through force before it could engulf London. Part of the reason Henry VII
was so decisive is because of his suspicious nature. He knew that the war against
Scotland, the conspiracy under Perkin, and the Cornish Rebellion “would come at him all
at once” 86 if he did not put down the Cornish Rebellion while he could. Though
criticized for his lack of foresight, perhaps Henry VII did have just enough virtù to
understand threats to his regime before they grew too large to quell. Nevertheless, Henry
VII’s decisive action against the Cornish Rebellion shows that he could govern through
83

Alexander (1980), p. 136.

84

See Gladys Temperly’s Henry VII (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914), p. 251.

85

History of Henry VII, p. 146.

86

Ibid., p. 150.

172
natural capacity with as much skill as he could govern in his political capacity through
Parliament.
Section 4: Henry VIII
Behemoth’s A mentions a second monarch that embodies the second of the “two
great virtues”: Henry VIII. The virtue Henry VIII possessed is “an early severity,” or the
ability to spot potentially troublesome developments within the commonwealth, using
harsh methods to quell the potential danger. This was not the first instance where A
discussed Henry’s severity. Earlier in Behemoth’s first dialogue, A explained to B how
Henry VIII was able to “extinguish the authority of the Pope in England.” 87 The
character lists five reasons why Henry VIII was so effective. Of the five reasons, three
involve circumstances and dispositions favorable to the Reformation both inside and
outside of England at the time. 88 Two had to do with Henry’s character or policies. Of
the two reasons directly attributable to Henry VIII, one was that “King Henry was of a
nature quick and severe in the punishing of such as should be the first to oppose his
designs.” 89 Unlike Henry VII, Henry VIII apparently had enough foresight to anticipate
potential dangers before they could ferment into a full rebellion.

The other reason for
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religious houses” giving Henry considerable influence over “the most eminent gentlemen
in every county.” 90 These gentlemen wanted their share of the considerable wealth that
suddenly came into the king’s possession. The closing of the monasteries created a large
group of displaced friars, priests, nuns, and monks. Some of the revenue generated by
the former monasteries went towards pensions and stipends to those left without a
vocation. 91 This helped ensure the loyalty of a great many potential adversaries, which
might be the reason why Hobbes lists the pensions as one of the reasons for Henry VIII’s
success.
Henry VIII’s character and his pension policy were reasons that the removal of
papal influence was so successful during his reign. His foresight and willingness to go to
drastic lengths to quell potential sources of unrest are natural characteristics of Henry
VIII that made him an effective sovereign. Henry VIII knew that the monasteries had so
much wealth and influence that they could constitute a significant threat to his regime. 92
Given his desire to break away from Rome, Henry knew that the religious orders would
oppose him. Therefore, it seems only natural that Henry VIII would go to great lengths
to destroy the monasteries. However, the more interesting aspect of the suppression of
the monasteries is the method Henry VIII used to dissolve them. As Behemoth’s B
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suggested, Henry could have waited until he raised enough money for an army to destroy
the monasteries, killing his political opposition in the process. 93 That way, he could have
kept all of the wealth for himself and his kingdom. Instead, Henry chose to either sell
most of the property well below the market price or give it away in the form of
pensions. 94 Far from a misstep or weakness of Henry VIII, this liberality with the spoils
was, as we have seen, one of A’s reasons why England was able to break away from
Rome’s authority so easily. Why was this liberality so successful?
Writing in the 1950’s, Kenneth Pickthorn asked, “why he [Henry VIII] did not
keep it all for himself?” 95 The answer is that the monastic property became useful as a
way of breaking up the potentially dangerous coalition between the religious authorities
and the nobility. By the time of Henry VIII’s reign, the monasteries had developed
significant connections to the nobility. As nobles and other private citizens took over
more of the administrative duties of the monastic estates over time, it was in the interest
of this new class of administrators to maintain the monasteries. 96 Keeping the wealth
would have upset both the religious orders and this new administrative class, potentially
uniting them against their common foe. Instead, Henry used the spoils to empower this
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administrative class and select religious notables at the expense of the religious orders.
By offering the spoils, Henry VIII earned allies at a time when significant and potentially
dangerous changes could have undermined his regime. At the same time, Henry VIII was
able to shape Parliament in a way that ultimately served his interests. Before the
dissolution of the monasteries, the House of Lords contained twenty-eight abbots and two
priors constituting “a clear and permanent majority” when combined with the twentyeight bishops. 97 After the dissolution, the number of religious authorities in the House of
Lords decreased while the number of landed gentry in the House of Lords increased. 98
By using the spoils in the way that he did, Henry VIII was able to achieve a double
victory over his political foes: he would decrease the power and influence of those
elements that opposed his religious reforms and increase his allies within the Parliament
through the use of land grants and pensions.
One can view this political maneuver as another example of how strategy can be
useful for a sovereign in his obligation to maintain stability. While it is well within the
sovereign’s power and right to work outside the established constitutional framework, a
much better option is to use political opportunities to shape competing interests within the
constitutional framework. As separate sources of legitimacy, Parliament, religious
movements, and landed elites are also sources of potential unrest. However, they need
not be sources of unrest if a sovereign is able to manipulate these competing interests
through whatever means the sovereign has at his disposal. Rather than assert his

97
98

Ibid., pp. 384-385.

Pickthorn (1951) states that “after the Dissolution the lay lords for ever outnumbered the bishops” (ibid.,
p. 385).

176
superiority over Parliament and the religious authorities, Henry VIII used the spoils from
the monasteries to shape Parliament and religion into institutions more amicable to his
interests. Perhaps this is why Behemoth’s A lists the distribution of the spoils as one of
the five factors that made England’s separation from Rome so successful.
What makes Henry VIII’s reign an important case study for Hobbes? Since a
sovereign should govern Hobbes’s ideal commonwealth as both the chief religious
authority and the chief secular authority, 99 conventional wisdom might conclude that
Henry VIII’s enduring legacy was his success in placing himself at the head of the
English church. However, Hobbes’s assessment of Henry VIII’s success in ultimately
uniting religious and temporal authority is, at best, lukewarm. This is because the
religious authorities “did think the pulling down of the Pope was the setting up of them
(in England) in his place . . . that their spiritual power did depend not upon the authority
of the King, but of Christ himself.” 100 In each of the three places where A discussed the
consequence of removing papal authority in England, 101 he came to the same conclusion:
that the rise of the factional Protestantism that led to the English Civil War was a direct
result of Henry VIII’s removal of papal authority. What A does not criticize, however, is
Henry VIII’s decision to acquire the monasteries and use the spoils to quell discontent
against his authority. In other words, Henry VIII is important because of his ability to
make wise decisions applicable to the moment, rather than in light of some grand design.
One can view this as a more pragmatic view of sovereignty than is typical in Hobbes’s
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philosophy. To use Hobbes’s language from Leviathan, Henry VIII was not an “able
architect” as much as he was a shrewd carpenter: one who was able to see and repair the
problems arising in the “crasie building” of the English commonwealth. This is not a
weakness of Henry VIII. On the contrary, Hobbes praised Henry VIII for his “early
severity,” which can be interpreted in this context as his ability to overcome potentially
difficult circumstances using the natural and political resources at hand.
Section 5: Elizabeth I
Henry VIII would leave it to his daughter, Elizabeth I, to quell the discontent
caused by the removal of papal authority from England. If Hobbes’s assessment of
Elizabeth’s success in this endeavor was correct, she was very successful. Behemoth’s
account of Queen Elizabeth’s reign is especially favorable towards her, praising her “fear
and jealousy” for keeping religious and popular factions from tearing down her regime
during her reign. 102 Unlike her predecessor Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth did not need
to banish religious and popular minorities from England to prevent their insurrection.
Even though Elizabeth allowed religious and popular factions to preach freely and make
their views heard, “neither of them did this very boldly during the time of Queen
Elizabeth,” 103 implying that she was able to mitigate dissent in a way that Charles I was
not.
Compared with the boldness of these factions during the reign of Charles I,
factional conflict during Queen Elizabeth’s reign was, by Hobbes’s account,
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comparatively benign. Like Britain during the reign of Charles I, the religious
composition of Britain at the time of Elizabeth’s reign included Catholics, Anglicans,
Presbyterians, and small Protestant groups “commonly called by the name of fanatics.” 104
Unlike these same factions in the time of Charles I, however, religious factions would not
overthrow Queen Elizabeth. Obviously, Elizabeth possessed some skill or instituted
some policy that allowed her to govern effectively despite the disposition of the various
religious factions within her commonwealth.
There is historical evidence confirming that religious factions were indeed wary
of Elizabeth’s “fear and jealousy.” Together with her secretary Sir Robert Cecil,
Elizabeth I presided over what one recent historian called “a national-security state based
on both formal and informal intelligence apparatuses.” 105 Given the high state of
religious tension during Elizabeth’s reign as evidenced by the Northern Rebellion and the
Spanish Invasion, it would seem only natural that the Queen would take extra precautions
to quell any sort of dissent before it could fully manifest itself. However, Elizabeth’s
Parliament was far more aggressive in suppressing religious dissent than was Elizabeth
herself. 106 A particularly instructive episode is Parliament’s attempt to pass a bill to
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modify the 1559 Act of Supremacy. In this bill of 1563, anyone who maintained the
authority of the Pope by refusing to swear the oath of supremacy to the crown would
suffer “praemunire (loss of lands and goods and imprisonment during pleasure) for the
first offense, and treason for the second.” 107 The intent of the bill was to mitigate the
threat posed by Catholics who refused to acknowledge a Protestant queen as their lawful
sovereign. While this bill at first glance appears as something that Hobbes might support,
we as readers of Hobbes have to question whether a bill of this severity serves the
ultimate interests of the sovereign and the commonwealth the sovereign oversees. In
other words, does a bill that requires a subject to swear an oath against his or her
conscience truly serve the interests of salus populi? More importantly, who is a better
judge of what is in the interest of salus populi than the sovereign commissioned to
oversee the safety and welfare of the people? In the case of the 1563 bill, Elizabeth
thought the penalties Parliament sought were too severe to serve her interests and the
interests of the commonwealth as a whole. However, to refuse royal assent would
severely weaken her standing with her Parliament, her church, and her advisors. Instead,
Elizabeth refused “to execute a legal provision of which she disapproved,” 108 and would
seldom enforce the penalties against Catholics who refused the oath of allegiance. In
fact, she would vigorously defend her sovereign prerogatives against Parliament’s
attempts to enact legislation with the intent of undermining her authority, especially on
matters pertaining to religion.
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Elizabeth’s actions against the “Bill and Book” cases of the late 1580’s show how
vigorously she defended her sovereign authority when it was challenged. In an attempt to
make the Book of Common Prayer more acceptable to Presbyterians and other nonAnglican Protestants, Anthony Cope attempted to introduce a version through Parliament
in 1586. This was the first of many “Bill and Book” cases in the later part of Elizabeth’s
reign. The attempt by members of Parliament to override the Queen’s authority in
religion was something that “would bring on themselves her Majesty’s indignation for
daring to deal with matters belonging to her own charge and direction.” 109 She would
imprison those who questioned her authority as Defender of the Faith in Parliament,
including Cope himself, as a “display of discipline.” 110 The majority of her Parliament
and Privy Counselors were quick to view Catholicism as the greatest threat to Elizabeth’s
supremacy, but “the Queen’s instinct about the danger from Puritanism was clear and
sound,” and she was equally vigilant against attempts by Protestants to divest her of her
role over matters pertaining to religion in her realm. This vigorous defense of her
prerogatives should not lead us to believe that Elizabeth intended to promote any
particular version of worship. Episodes such as the refusal to enforce the 1563
Supremacy Act suggested that Elizabeth used her power sparingly, and showed mercy
and toleration in matters of conscience. While Hobbes acknowledged Elizabeth’s “fear
and jealousy,” he also acknowledged her toleration and restraint in his later works by
referring to her High Commission on heresy several times in his works.
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Hobbes mentions Elizabeth’s High Commission on heresy in three of his works:
Leviathan, A Dialogue, and Behemoth. According to Leviathan, Elizabeth dissolved “the
Power of the Popes” in England under her commission of bishops, and the bishops would
instead “exercise the same in Right of the Queen and her Successours; though by
retaining the phrase Jure Divino, they were thought to demand it by immediate Right
from God.” 111 Looking at this assessment alone would suggest that Hobbes disapproved
of Elizabeth’s handling of the bishops, suggesting that the inclusion of the language of
jure Divino “untyed the first knot” that prevented the people from exercising their own
liberty in matters of conscience. While this may have been the ultimate result of
Elizabeth’s High Commission on heresy, Elizabeth’s intent was to reduce the power of
the bishops to interpret scripture with regard to the basic question of who should be
punished for violations of Christian doctrine. Hobbes emphasizes this intent in his postLeviathan writings, especially in the discussion of heresy in A Dialogue. According to
the lawyer, Elizabeth’s intent was to take the authority of judging heresy out of the hands
of individual bishops, and instead “declare what should be heresie for the future; but with
a restraint, that they should judge nothing to be heresie, but what had been so declared in
the first four General Councils.” 112 In other words, Elizabeth wanted to take the power of
interpreting scripture away from the bishops by giving them all a standard definition of
heresy that does not allow room for individual interpretive fancy.
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A reiterates this in Behemoth, declaring that “the meaning of the word heresy is
by law declared in an Act of Parliament in the first year of Queen Elizabeth.” 113 This
implies there was no definition before Elizabeth’s reign. Of course, B rightly observes
that the language of the definition still leaves significant room for interpretive fancy. The
“high court of Parliament” has the authority to determine what is or is not a violation of
the general councils or scripture. 114 Even more importantly, B wonders “who can tell
what is declared by scripture, which every man is allowed to read and interpret to
himself?” 115 Given that “divers Councils have declared a great many of our doctrines to
be heresy,” depending on the interpretation of the councils’ intent, how can Constantine’s
councils offer a better standard of what constitutes heresy than the subjective whims of
the bishops? Turning back to A Dialogue, Hobbes did not seem concerned with declaring
Constantine’s councils the standard for heresy as “not one man of ten thousand had ever
read them, nor were they ever published in English.” 116 As far as definitions are
concerned, Elizabeth’s definition of heresy left much to be desired. Nevertheless, the
Queen at least attempted to consolidate her authority in spiritual matters, especially as to
heresy, a spiritual crime that intersects with the temporal functions of sovereignty more
acutely than any other spiritual crime. Hobbes’s only example showing the weakness of
Elizabeth’s definition occurred in the reign of King James I, but the burning of
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Bartholomew Legat 117 only confirms what the characters in A Dialogue conclude about
heresy: it is a matter that can only be “authorized by the King, the High Commission
being long since abolished.” 118
Although Elizabeth I is not mentioned in A’s explanation of the “two great
virtues,” Hobbes’s characters in Behemoth praise Elizabeth for her ability to quell
religious discontent through a combination of toleration, force, and legislation.
Elizabeth’s definition of heresy may have been incomplete, but it did serve to maintain
her authority in both temporal and spiritual matters during her reign. Like her
predecessors William I, Henry VII, and Henry VIII, Elizabeth I governed according to
the needs of the moment, using a combination of political and natural ability to ensure the
safety and well-being of those under her dominion. Perhaps that is the best a sovereign
can do, as the future is always uncertain. This does not imply, however, that sovereigns
cannot learn from their predecessors who were particularly skillful in the art of rule. This
is why Hobbes turns to historical case studies, so that sovereigns may “bear themselves
prudently in the present and providently towards the future.” 119 Just as Hobbes
emphasized the actions of Lord Monck, so too does he emphasize the virtues of the great
English sovereigns of the past. Though Hobbes did not require historical case studies to
prove his science, he nevertheless saw the utility of providing examples of sovereigns
facing difficult challenges. The fact that these sovereigns were successful in maintaining
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their sovereignties despite the challenges they faced testified to their skills as politicians
as well as administrators, a testament Hobbes provides in his late career.
Section 6: Hobbes’s Assessment of Charles I
Although these historical sovereigns have a pedagogical function, the significance
of these historical models of sovereign power goes beyond the anecdotal. As readers of
Hobbes, we often assume that Behemoth is an unqualified defense of Charles I’s reign.
Hobbes’s analysis of the causes and exacerbations of the conflict places the blame
squarely on the shoulders of those Parliamentarians who opposed Charles I’s strong
monarchic rule. There is little doubt that Hobbes believed Charles I was a good man, but
that is only if we define goodness in terms of “a man that wanted no virtue, of body or
mind, nor endeavoured anything more than to discharge his duty towards God in the well
governing of his subjects.” 120
This raises the question whether a good man is necessarily a good sovereign. For
when we consider the difficulties that confronted William the Conqueror after his
invasion of England, Charles I’s difficulties seem minor by comparison. He was not the
founder of a new dynasty in the same sense as Henry VII was, nor was he the founder of
a new religion in the way that Henry VIII was. Yet each of these two Henrys had little
difficulty raising funds, quelling discontent, and governing in the manner in which
sovereigns need to govern to maintain order. Despite having considerable trouble with
religious unrest throughout the commonwealth, Elizabeth I was able to control Parliament
and the people in a way that eluded Charles I. Despite having considerable advantages
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over his predecessors in what we might call political capital, Charles I would be unable to
satisfy the most basic requirement of any sovereign, to protect the regime, because only
by protecting the regime can the sovereign hope to protect the citizens.
Because Charles II was on the throne, Hobbes obviously could not offer an overt
critique of Charles I. A strong and overt critique of Charles I might prevent Hobbes from
gaining the royal approval he so desperately desired to have for his manuscript.
However, Hobbes’s accounts of William I, Henry VII, Henry VIII, and Elizabeth I imply
a critique of Charles I. Like his predecessors, Charles I faced religious factions, a lack of
financial resources, a contentious Parliament, and challenges to his authority. Unlike his
predecessors, Charles I would eventually lose his regime through civil war. Far from
being “the best king perhaps that ever was,” 121 when examined in light of the sovereigns
that were previously examined, Charles I seemed, at the very least, extremely vulnerable
and, at the worst, extremely ill-suited to the task of maintaining the peace.
Part of this assessment can be attributed to how Charles I was unable to control,
or at the very least govern with, Parliament. One difference between Hobbes’s science
and his dialogues is that the dialogues do not necessarily view a strong Parliament as bad.
What constitutes bad government is not a strong monarch governing with a strong
Parliament, but “divided power, in which there could be no peace.” 122 Even if the
Parliament has strong powers and prerogatives in its own right, this is not necessarily a
problem if the sovereign is wise and skillful enough to use Parliament’s powers and
prerogatives to his advantage. In Hobbes’s explanation of the origin of Parliament in A
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Dialogue, the lawyer explains how “the Kings called together the Bishops, and a great
part of the wisest and discreetest Men of the Realm” to make “laws by their advice.” 123
The philosopher then describes how the creation of Parliament in no way harms the
ability of the sovereign to govern, as “there is no King in the World, being of ripe years
and sound mind, that had made any Law otherwise; for it concerns them in their own
interest to make such Laws as the people can endure, and may keep them without
impatience, and live in strength and courage to defend their King and Countrey, against
their potent neighbours.” 124 It is important to consider here the phrase “of ripe years and
sound mind,” as the philosopher is making the qualitative assessment that governing with
Parliament does not weaken the ability of experienced and wise sovereigns to govern
effectively. This statement also implies that governing with Parliament can be difficult
for inexperienced or ignorant sovereigns. The danger is that the sovereign will fail to use
Parliament when it ought to be used to pass “such Laws as the people can endure,” or that
the sovereign will cede too much authority to Parliament, weakening his own ability to
lead. This becomes extremely relevant when examining how Charles I interacted with
Parliament, for it would seem that Charles I made the first error by failing to consult
Parliament before sending the Book of Common Prayer into Scotland and failing to
consult Parliament before levying the ship-money. He also made the second error by
ceding too much of his authority to Parliament by granting assent to the various petitions,
remonstrances, and legislation designed to strip him of his sovereign power in the years
preceding the Civil War.
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One such piece of legislation was the Triennial Act mandating the assembly of
Parliament every three years with or without the king’s approval. The motivation for
Charles I’s assent was examined in detail by the characters in Behemoth. Given that this
is a weakening of Charles I’s prerogative to call Parliament at will, B “cannot
comprehend how any sovereign can well keep a people in order when his hands are tied,
or when he hath any other obligation upon him than the benefit of those he governs.” 125
A, however, is reluctant to offer an explanation for why Charles I gave up his power to
call Parliament, but only offers B the procedure for calling a Parliament when the king is
unwilling to do so. A describes how the responsibility would fall to the Lord Chancellor,
and in the event the Lord Chancellor refused, the responsibility would fall unto “the
Sheriffs of the several counties” in the event the sovereign refuses to call Parliament. 126
B sees a flaw in this arrangement, because “if the King, upon the refusal [to call
Parliament], should fall upon them [those that would call Parliament in the king’s
absence] in his anger; who shall (the Parliament not sitting), protect either the Chancellor
or the Sheriffs in their disobedience?” 127 A responds in a way that can only be seen as a
plea to B: “I pray you do not ask me any reason of such things as I understand no better
than you.” 128 The reason this is a plea is because A knows the answer to B’s question,
but is reluctant to share what he knows. Perhaps the reason A does not want to answer B
is that it brings into question whether Charles I is the “best king perhaps that ever
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was,” 129 as it reveals a flaw that impedes Charles I’s ability to make wise decisions.
After hearing of two other bills given assent by the king, B puts the state of Charles I’s
regime into perspective:
What a great progress made the Parliament towards their ends, or at least
towards the ends of the most seditious Members of both Houses in so little
time! They sat down in November, and now it was May; in this space of
time, which is but half a year, they won from the King the adherence
which was due to him from his people; they drove his faithfullest servants
from him; beheaded the Earl of Strafford; imprisoned the Archbishop of
Canterbury; obtained a triennial Parliament after their own dissolution,
and a continuance of their own sitting as long as they listed: which last
amounted to a total extinction of the King’s right, in case that such a grant
were valid; which I think it is not, unless the Sovereignty itself be in plain
terms renounced, which it was not. 130
After hearing A’s account of additional concessions such as “the putting down [of] the
Star-chamber and High-Commission Courts,” B asks “what money, by way of subsidy or
otherwise, did they grant the King, in recompense of all these his large concessions?” 131
It is then that we discover the reason for Charles I’s concessions, the reason A was
reluctant to share before when B was questioning the wisdom of Charles I’s decision.
“None at all; but” the Parliament “often promised they would make him the most glorious
King that ever was in England; which were words that passed well enough for well
meaning with the common people.” 132
Flattery, it would seem, was Charles I’s undoing, but perhaps Charles I’s
susceptibility to flattery was more instrumental to his undoing. Instead of actually using
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the powers he had to serve the commonwealth, he was more apt to give his power away,
perhaps in an attempt to appease the growing number of interests that were opposed to
him. One can also see how Charles I could never adopt a middle course with Parliament
and dealt with it in terms of extremes: consulting them too little when it was
advantageous for him to do so, and allowing too much of his authority to fall into
Parliament’s hands in his attempt to appease it. Vainglory is not only a quality that is
dangerous for citizens to possess, but it can also be dangerous when a sovereign’s
ambition outweighs his good sense. Therefore, Parliament might only possess, at best,
half the blame for causing the undoing of Charles I.
We are now in a better position to understand why the historical monarchs were
assessed by the characters in Behemoth. While all of them used their natural power to go
beyond what the prescribed, they were also deferential to the institutions, customs, and
the laws that underpinned the commonwealth whenever possible. However, this is not
how Charles I viewed his relationship to the laws and the other authoritative institutions
in the commonwealth. While Charles I is considered a good man, he also attempted to
assert his royal prerogatives against the traditions that previous monarchs upheld:
specifically the traditions that revolved around the role of Parliament in the monarchical
system. What matters here is not whether Charles I had the right to govern without
Parliament for over a decade or that the king had the right to levy the ship-money.
Behemoth’s A and B seem not to contest this point. However, by breaking conventions,
Charles I gave “skillful hunters,” like the Presbyterians and parliamentarians, “sufficient
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ground for their purpose” of usurping the commonwealth for themselves. 133 While A
hopes that a scientific understanding of duty will insulate the sovereign from such
usurpations, it is difficult to expect subjects who are already intent “not to endure to hear
of the King’s absolute power” to allow the sovereign much discretion to act contrary to
long standing customs. 134
What all the historically important English monarchs described in Hobbes’s
dialogues share a willingness to defer, but not relinquish, their sovereign prerogatives
when it was not necessary to use them. Although William the Conqueror by right had the
authority to overturn all the Saxon customs in favor of Norman ones, “he did not innovate
unnecessarily. . . . He granted to the English their own laws and he accepted with the
kingdom the shire and hundred courts in which the English law ran.” 135 While Henry VII
was by most accounts hungry for financial gain, he always went through Parliament to
procure his funds and, by doing so, kept popular unrest at manageable levels. Despite
Henry VIII’s reputation for exacting his will on the people, he worked closely with
Parliament to procure the monasteries and administer his new church. Though Elizabeth
I would not allow Parliament to undermine her constitutional authority, she allowed
Parliament to pass laws and govern as it traditionally did. The deference to the laws
displayed by these historical monarchs did in no way lower the praise given to them by
Hobbes. On the contrary, Hobbes seemed to accept this deference as a political
necessity.
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What these models of sovereign power show is that all sovereigns are not created equal.
The ability of the sovereign to lead is not only a product of the institutional arrangements,
but also a product of the personality and skill of the sovereign who fills the role. Implied
in Hobbes’s use of these historical models of sovereign power is a philosophy of
leadership, one that goes beyond the limits of his science. The actual content of this
philosophy of leadership will now be considered.

CHAPTER VI
HOBBES ON LEADERSHIP
Section 1: Hobbes’s Science on Questions of Leadership
Evidence has been presented that shows some significant differences between the
Hobbes we associate with the treatises and the Hobbes who wrote the dialogues. The
form is perhaps the most obvious difference, and chapter II explained how dialectic
helped Hobbes accomplish objectives that would be difficult to accomplish in treatise
form. Specifically, dialectic is a form that allows a scholar to compare differing
conceptions of the phenomena under investigation. This would be an ideal form for the
philosopher who may be uncertain how to approach a subject, implying that Hobbes
himself was uncertain that his science was complete. As definitive as Hobbes makes
himself out to be in Leviathan, only a brief glance at Hobbes’s career shows us that he
continually refined his ideas. His science was continually developed from the philosophy
as outlined in The Elements of Law, through De Cive, and eventually to Leviathan. What
his treatises show us is that Hobbes always considered his philosophy as a work in
progress that he continued to improve. Therefore, it would come as no surprise that
Hobbes continued to refine his philosophy through his dialogues. What is surprising is
the degree to which Hobbes is willing to consider perspectives in his dialogues that are
antithetical to the teaching found in his treatises. Hobbes’s scientific treatises identify
memory, experience, and prudence as insufficient to understand man’s political condition
192

193
and inadequate to discover solutions to the commonwealth’s problems. In contrast,
Hobbes’s dialogues seem to point in the opposite direction: that memory, experience, and
prudence can be sufficient, provided that there is a suitable example from which to draw
such as the English Civil War. Perhaps the most important aspect of politics Hobbes’s
dialogues consider is political skill, an aspect of politics that is conspicuously absent in
his treatises. The reason it is absent implies a limitation of Hobbes’s science that the
facts of the Restoration must have made clear to him.
While it is understood that Hobbes created his political science in the midst of the
English Civil War, he could not have known the fate of his political science after it. In
fact, Hobbes’s political science would suffer several setbacks. Condemned by the most
prominent scholars of his age, Hobbes’s method and observations would not reach the
widespread audience he anticipated. Not only was his political science never
promulgated as was required, but it also seemed to fall short of a complete explanation of
political phenomena. Specifically, Hobbes’s science gives neither experience nor
political skill much credit for solving political problems. This was problematic for
Hobbes, and chapters III and IV show why. Simply put, the peace of the Restoration had
more to do with experience and political skill than Hobbes originally assumed. The
important experience was the observation of the tenacious ambition of Oliver Cromwell,
a figure possessing absolute sovereign authority without understanding the
responsibilities of such a position within the commonwealth. The important application
of political skill was the observation of the skillful political maneuvering of Lord Monck,
the pivotal figure that brought about the Restoration. The facts of the Restoration seemed
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to imply that Hobbes’s science could be better refined. Therefore, it is no surprise that, in
his late career, he attempted to offer a more complete explanation of politics an
explanation that went beyond what his science conveyed.
The fundamental aspect that was missing in Hobbes’s science was something that
it was not particularly suited to explain: particularity. His treatises were designed to
discover those general inclinations that all human beings share: inclinations such as “a
restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death.” 1 Peculiar inclinations
that human beings express as citizens, leaders, or peoples are significant only insofar as
they demonstrate how unreliable a foundation for good order they prove themselves to
be. This is part of the reason why Hobbes finds fault with the ancients. In Hobbes’s
view, the classical authors derived their knowledge of concepts like liberty “not from the
Principles of Nature,” but from the inherited practices “of their own Common-wealths,
which were popular; as the Grammarians describe the Rules of Language, out of the
Practice of the time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the Poems of Homer and Virgil.” 2
Examined in this way, the cultural particularities found within the commonwealth
provide no solid basis for solving the problem of civil war. In fact, particularities are
often the causes of disputes “both by the Pen and the Sword,” as human beings “appeale
from custome to reason, and from reason to custome, as it serves their turn; receding
from the custome when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as
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oft as reason is against them.” 3 Perhaps the greatest controversies caused by custom
come in the form of legal precedents: laws that were traditionally understood to grant
certain historically demonstrable privileges to the people that may run counter to the will
of the sovereign. While Hobbes’s science grants that “the Subject hath the Liberty to
demand the hearing of his Cause,” 4 the subject’s liberty to appeal to custom is not as
important as the sovereign’s liberty to act against it. Seen in another way, the subject
cannot use custom to override the sovereign’s authority, as “he that brings an action
against the Sovereign, brings it against himself.” 5
Particular qualities of sovereigns also cause discord, but not because the survival
of the regime depends upon the sovereign’s virtues. The reason Hobbes’s science does
not include a list of personal prerequisites for sovereigns is that it could be used to justify
a rebellion against an otherwise lawful sovereign. Hobbes admits that human beings may
be miserable under a peculiarly self-indulgent leader, “being obnoxious to the lusts, and
other irregular passions of him, or them that have so unlimited a Power in their hands,”
but notes that “all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses . . . through
which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance.”6 Qualities that may be
inconsequential or even beneficial all too often become pretexts for rebellion while a
sovereign’s good qualities rarely—if ever—instill loyalty or deference.
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Ultimately, Hobbes’s science tells us that the qualities of the sovereign are less
important for the stability of the regime than are the absolute powers and prerogatives of
the sovereign: rights of the office that need to be both universally acknowledged and
understood. While Hobbes admits that “men may fancy many evil consequences” from
“so unlimited a Power” vested in the sovereign, he asserts that “the consequences of the
want of it, which is perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbor, are much
worse.” 7 Hobbes’s science conceived of sovereignty as an institution vested with various
powers, rights, and responsibilities. It did not, however, delve very deeply into how
sovereigns should use those powers, rights, and responsibilities. Questions concerning
leadership show the limitations of Hobbes’s science, for these questions are not answered
by general conclusions derived from pure thought. In order to study leadership, one
needs to study leaders: whether contemporary or historical; and in order to study leaders,
one needs to study the times and the circumstances when the leaders ruled.
Section 2: Hobbes and Machiavelli on Method and Leadership
The lack of discussion in Hobbes’s scientific treatises of the traits that separate
effective sovereigns from ineffective ones does not imply that a general theory of
leadership is not possible. Machiavelli’s political thought provides a good example of
how an inquiry into leadership can deliver very applicable solutions to the problems
leaders face. So compelling is Machiavelli’s treatment of politics that he is sometimes
called the first modern political scientist, preceding Hobbes’s Leviathan by roughly 150
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years. 8 Included in his political thought is a robust conception of leadership: one that
“dares to discuss and give rules for the governments of princes.” 9 In both The Prince and
The Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli views leadership as a combination of the
sovereign’s fortune (fortuna) and virtue (virtù), which in Machiavelli’s language
indicates a kind of prudence, foresight, or political skill. 10 While fortune certainly plays
a role in the success of regimes, Machiavelli was clearly of the mind that a sovereign who
relied solely on the good fortune of his circumstance was in a dangerously vulnerable
position. Machiavelli discovered that skill, not fortune, constituted the far greater factor
that determined a sovereign’s success when governing. 11 Even when the people
acknowledge the prince’s right to govern with absolute power, absolute power alone will
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not save a regime if the sovereign is not particularly skillful. 12 While Machiavelli does
spend a considerable portion of The Discourses discussing the merits of various political
offices, the actual scope and limitations of any political office are less important than the
individual official who occupies it. 13 This is what makes Machiavelli’s political thought
personality driven, as it relies on the personal characteristics of the individuals who
govern. In contrast, Hobbes’s science as outlined in his political science treatises is
institutionally driven. That is to say, the main aim of Hobbes’s political science is to
discern the correct powers, duties, and establishment of the political office of sovereign
and all offices under the sovereign’s jurisdiction. Hobbes’s science is primarily designed
to show how one should construct a government. It is—at best—only secondarily suited
to be a philosophy of how to govern.
Nevertheless, there is enough similarity between Machiavelli’s thought and
Hobbes’s science for scholars to place Hobbes in the Machiavellian tradition. Both
thinkers possessed a generally negative view of human nature and neither thinker seemed
to place much confidence in the science of the classical world. In order to understand
12
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this similarity, it is best to contrast this classical science of the ancients with
Machiavelli’s political thought and Hobbes’s modern science. For a philosopher like
Aristotle, political science begins by understanding what the objects of concern for
politics are. What Aristotle soon discovers is that the objects of concern for politics
(virtue, happiness, goodness, and the like) are loaded with meaning and that the meaning
will vary among individual human beings. Therefore, Aristotle believed that the
appropriate way to understand the objects of concern for politics is to proceed “from
things which are familiar relative to us” working from commonly held opinions about the
object in question. 14 Since inquiring about the ends of politics requires some experience
with those ends, Aristotle naturally assumes that his audience is already “brought up well
in ethical habits.” 15 Understanding the objects of concern for politics in this way,
Aristotle then proceeds to examine how human beings can attain those objects within the
constraints that nature allows. A good example of Aristotle’s method can be seen in how
he explains virtue in Nicomachean Ethics. He explains that virtue is neither naturally
acquired nor unnatural to acquire, but is nevertheless subject to natural constraints; for “it
is in the nature of such things to be destroyed by deficiency as well as excess.” 16
Machiavelli and Hobbes, however, do not start from the place from which
Aristotle starts. While Aristotle starts from the objects of concern for politics, both
Machiavelli and Hobbes start from a place that they believe is more fundamental than the
14
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objects of concern for politics. Like most modern philosophers, they start from what they
conceive are the natural or the pre-political conditions of man. Machiavelli and Hobbes
can do this because they do not assume that human beings are political animals by nature
as Aristotle assumed. Instead, Machiavelli and Hobbes start from the standpoint that
human beings become political out of convenience and not necessarily because it is in
their nature to live in a political community. 17 After describing the natural conditions
human beings are under in a state of nature, both Machiavelli and Hobbes discover what
the objects of concern for politics may be. That is to say, the place where Aristotle starts
his inquiry (the object of concern for politics) comes later in Machiavelli’s and Hobbes’s
respective inquiries only after they have established the natural condition in which human
beings find themselves. Conversely, the place where Machiavelli and Hobbes begin their
respective inquiries (natural constraint) comes later in Aristotle’s inquiry only after
Aristotle establishes the objects of concern for politics.
The nature both Machiavelli and Hobbes start from is not orderly and rational, but
chaotic and hostile. We can see this in Machiavelli’s discussion of fortune early on in
The Prince. He starts his discussion of human nature by offering up an example of how
human nature runs contrary to the reality of the natural order: “that men willingly change
their masters in the belief that they will fare better” but “they are deceived because they
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see later by experience that they have done worse.” 18 The reason human beings make
this mistake is because they do not respect fortune: “for time sweeps everything before it
and can bring with it good as well as evil and evil as well as good.” 19 Far from living in
harmony with nature, mankind is constantly tested and tried by a malevolent natural
order, one in which Fortuna “shows her power where virtue has not been put into good
order to resist her and therefore turns her impetus where she knows that dams and dikes
have not been made to contain her.” 20
Similarly, Hobbes describes the difficulties human beings face “not only to the
procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life.” 21 Like Machiavelli, Hobbes
describes a natural order that can guarantee no future certainty, and therefore man
“cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the
acquisition of more.” 22 This naturally leads individuals into conflict, making Hobbes’s
state of nature synonymous with a state of war. 23 Just as Machiavelli and Hobbes have
similar views of mankind’s relationship with nature, so too do they have a similar
understanding of the objective of politics: nothing more and nothing less than security
against the uncertainty found in the natural order. What Machiavelli and Hobbes share is
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a belief that human beings cannot ever hope to live in harmony with nature. Instead, the
only way human beings can ever hope to live prosperous, long, and fulfilling lives is to
harness the collective power of individuals into a body politic for the purpose of
mastering nature and all the uncertainty nature represents. In this respect, both
Machiavelli and Hobbes can be considered political thinkers that are cut from the same
modern cloth.
It is tempting to claim that Hobbes was influenced or inspired by Machiavelli.
However, it would be premature to assume that Hobbes’s political science is a successor
to Machiavelli’s political thought. We know that Machiavelli’s writings were available
in England in Hobbes’s time, as James Harrington refers to him extensively in his
Oceana. 24 We also know that Hobbes’s predecessor Francis Bacon was deeply
influenced by Machiavelli, and Bacon’s appreciation for Machiavelli’s clarity in
explaining “what men do, and not what they ought to do” can be seen in Bacon’s
Advancement of Learning. 25 However, the fact that Hobbes does not mention
Machiavelli in any of his works or correspondence means that any association between
the two thinkers is a matter of conjecture. Hobbes certainly had the opportunity to study
Machiavelli. In the late 1620’s, Hobbes was asked by Lord Cavendish to take an
inventory of all the books in the library at Hardwick Hall, the library Hobbes used in his
secretarial period. The list indicates that the library contained Machiavelli’s Florentine
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Histories and Discourses on Livy, both works translated into English. 26 Whether or not
Hobbes actually read the books is another matter, but the library contained more than
works by Machiavelli. It contained a large number of works from authors who discuss
Machiavelli, most notably Giovanni Botero, and works from many other Italian authors
procured during Hobbes’s trip to Venice alongside Cavendish around 1614. 27 Given the
materials available to Hobbes in his early years as a tutor and scholar, it would seem
highly unlikely that Hobbes would not have had at least a second hand account of
Machiavelli’s thought. Yet the fact that Hobbes had access to Machiavelli’s thought
raises an interesting question; if it is true that Hobbes knew something of Machiavelli’s
writings and their impact on many of the leading figures in political thought, why is there
no mention of Machiavelli in Hobbes’s works?
While the similarities between Machiavelli and Hobbes have been explored, there
are also great differences between the two thinkers. The primary difference is one of
method. Hobbes started his career as a student of the classics and a translator of
Thucydides. Later, Hobbes started to question the value of ancient political thought. His
critique of classical methods has previously been explored, but is perhaps best summed
up in chapter 4 of Leviathan: that “words are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by
them: but they are the mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a
Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man.” 28 In other words, the
26
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practice of political philosophy had become mere recitation of the words and wisdom of
previous philosophers with little thought as to whether the words and wisdom can be
applied in new circumstances. Although the ancients took experience and prudence as
wisdom, Hobbes insists that “such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all
circumstances, be very fallacious.” 29 That is to say, the wisdom gained from experience
may, in fact, be of little consequence in solving present problems. What is needed is a
knowledge of more than particular circumstances, but a “knowledge of consequences” 30
that is true regardless of whatever particular historical circumstance presents itself. Such
knowledge is not gained through history or experience, but only through the application
of a rigorous method “attained by Industry”: one that systematically builds a model of
human and political behavior. 31 This model is not designed to explain the real world as
much as it is designed to show how to produce a desired outcome. 32
Machiavelli’s thought was not systematically presented in the same way Hobbes’s
science was, and he did not consider himself a modern scientist in the same way as
Hobbes did. Machiavelli did not believe that human nature or politics was a science
based on ratiocination, but an historical discipline that understood how the circumstances
of the present are similar or different from those of the past. Solving political problems
comes only from a shrewd understanding of the particular circumstances of the times: “he
29

Ibid., I.3.97.

30

Ibid., I.5.115.

31

Ibid.

32

See Watkins (1965), “Hobbes saw the main task of the natural philosopher to be, not the discovery of
principles (these being, for Hobbes, already sufficiently known), but the devising of hypothetical models
showing how various natural phenomena may be produced” (p. 63).

205
is prosperous who adapts his mode of proceeding to the qualities of the times; and
similarly, he is unprosperous whose procedure is in disaccord with the times.” 33 In
Machiavelli’s estimation there is no single general solution to every political problem that
may appear, but instead, only better or worse solutions based upon the circumstances. To
use Hobbes’s (and Bishop Bramhall’s) language, politics resembles “tennis play” more
than it resembles geometry. 34 History and prudence can provide the person who consults
them an advantage, but in order to understand what history teaches, one must possess an
experience with present circumstances alongside an intimate knowledge of past
circumstances, noting carefully the differences between the two. The Epistle Dedicatory
for The Prince explains this standard, and Machiavelli’s “long experience with modern
things and a continuous reading of ancient ones” is what qualifies him to give advice to
Lorenzo de’Medici. 35 Therefore, experience, prudence, and history—all of the sources of
wisdom rejected by Hobbes’s science—provide the keys to political wisdom in
Machiavelli’s political thought. In this sense, the method Machiavelli uses to discern
political wisdom appears far more dated than Hobbes’s method, and it is in this respect
that Machiavelli saw himself more as a successor to the classical tradition than as an
opponent of it.
While noting the radically modern way Machiavelli and Hobbes approached
political questions, it remains to be asked whether Machiavelli himself believed that he
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was overturning the classical tradition. Although Machiavelli saw his work as entering
“upon a path still untrodden,” 36 it is less clear whether this statement implies that
Machiavelli was engaged in a repudiation of classical political thought or a reappraisal
of classical political thought. As far as classical political thought is associated with the
classical philosophical tradition found in Plato’s dialogues and Aristotle’s treatises, we
could say that Machiavelli was engaged in a repudiation of classical political philosophy.
However, it is far from clear that classical political thought, generally speaking, is
synonymous with classical political philosophy in the form of Plato’s dialogues and
Aristotle’s treatises. In fact, there is little evidence that Machiavelli even read the
philosophies of Plato or Aristotle or felt that it was necessary to consult their works for an
understanding of ancient political practices. As Friedrich Nietzsche explained, one can
still have a classical perspective and ultimately reject the applicability of the Socratic
tradition to that perspective. In fact, Nietzsche would argue that one cannot truly
understand the ancient mind without rejecting the tenets of the Socratic tradition
altogether. For Nietzsche, Plato was more of a critic of ancient political thought than an
example of it, as he had “deviated so far from all the fundamental instincts of the
Hellenes,” that he can no longer be considered an exemplar of Hellenic practice. 37 This
is why Nietzsche viewed Machiavelli as a kind of modern Thucydides who possessed an
accurate perspective on the classical political tradition. In Nietzsche’s estimation,
Machiavelli possessed an “unconditional will not to deceive” himself “and not to see
36
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reason in reality—not in ‘reason’, still less in ‘morality’,” and this perspective truly
encapsulates “that strong, stern, hard matter-of-factness instinctive to the older
Hellenes.” 38
Unlike Hobbes, Machiavelli believed that the ancients had something to teach us.
This is verified by a claim made in his preface to The Discourses on Livy when he faults
his own time for “not possessing a true understanding of the histories, so that in reading
them, we fail . . . to taste that flavor they intrinsically possess.” 39 In a letter to his friend
Francesco Vettori, Machiavelli viewed himself as an ally and even a successor to the
ancients. He explains how in his study, Machiavelli enters “the ancient courts of ancient
men, where, received by them lovingly, I feed on the food that alone is mine and that I
was born for. There I am not ashamed to speak with them and to ask them the reason for
their actions; and they in their humanity reply to me.” 40 What this letter shows is that
Machiavelli believed that he understood the ancients as they understood themselves, and
not through the lens of the moral philosophers who were more preoccupied with
“republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist.” 41 The
knowledge he uncovered from the ancients revealed the true lessons of ancient political
practice, lessons that have to do with the actions of great men such as Cyrus, Alexander,
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Cincinnatus, and others. The actions of these ancient leaders provide valuable insight
into the questions of effective political rule, and this is how Machiavelli saw himself as a
successor to the ancients even though his philosophy bears little resemblance to Plato’s
dialogues or Aristotle’s treatises. 42
Although his works break from the classical political tradition, Machiavelli
acknowledges that the ancient sources offer valuable lessons, specifically with respect to
leadership. Rather than take his bearings from the ancient philosophers, Machiavelli
formulates his opinion of the ancients from the classical historians: primarily Livy among
the Romans and Xenophon among the Greeks and, to a lesser extent, Tacitus, Polybius,
and Plutarch. These sources provide access to the lives and practices of the great leaders
from antiquity, and Machiavelli urges his readers to continue their study by reading these
classical authors. A good example of this is his advice for the education of princes in
chapter 14 of The Prince. Regarding “the exercise of the mind,” Machiavelli offered the
example of Scipio Africanus, and suggests that princes “should read the histories and
consider in them the actions of excellent men,” for “whoever reads the life of Cyrus
written by Xenophon will then recognize in the life of Scipio how much glory that
imitation brought him, how much in chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio
conformed to what had been written of Cyrus by Xenophon.” 43
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For Machiavelli, the secrets of politics are understood by understanding “the paths
beaten by great men,” 44 and therefore, Machiavelli’s political thought depends upon
understanding concrete examples of leaders in action. When Machiavelli offers a general
rule it is usually after a detailed description of an historical event or personality. For
example, Machiavelli concludes that princes “begin to lose the state the moment they
begin to break the laws and those ways and customs that are ancient” from the example
of Tarquin the Proud’s indifference towards the rape of Lucretia.45 For Machiavelli,
specific examples, not ratiocination, provide the means of understanding general truths.
In contrast, Hobbes’s science does not use historical examples to underpin its
scientific understanding of politics. While he did use historical evidence occasionally to
illustrate his science, 46 he was more inclined to use thought experiments and analogies to
demonstrate his more difficult concepts. An example of this can be seen when Hobbes
compares the relative restriction of liberty to “water shut up in a vessel” in chapter IX of
De Cive. Just as “water shut up in a vessel is therefore not at liberty, because the vessel
hinders it from running out,” so too does “every man hath more or lesse liberty, as he
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hath more or lesse space in which he employes himself.” 47 For Hobbes, political science
is not an exercise in deriving political truths from historical examples. It is, as we have
seen, the rigorous application of a method of reasoning similar to that of a mathematician
methodically establishing a geometric proof. Perhaps if Hobbes believed that political
science was a science of leadership, he would be more inclined to use history to discern
those mechanisms by which exceptional leaders govern. However, Hobbes’s science did
not aim at understanding exceptional cases as much as it was aimed at providing a
generalizable theory of human nature.
This difference in aim between Machiavelli’s thought and Hobbes’s science has
ramifications for how each thinker solves political problems in his respective works.
Although both thinkers agree that the objective of politics is to provide security against
the unpredictability of nature, each thinker has a different view as to how this security is
provided. The differences can be illustrated by examining the method by which a
disparate people become a body politic. For Machiavelli, the creation of a body politic is
accomplished by the founder, a rare individual of considerable talent who can master
fortune even at its worst. In The Prince, founders are described as princes who, “by the
paths of virtue,” introduce “with difficulty … new orders and modes.” 48 This reliance on
the virtue of a single founder for the regime’s lasting stability is not a feature of
principalities only. In The Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli maintains that even in the
case of a republic, the success or failure of the regime is dependent on the virtue of the
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founder as “it is necessary for a single man to be the one who gives it shape, and from
whose mind any such organization derives.” 49 Expansion of a regime through conquest
aside, 50 Machiavelli’s conception of founding relies upon the exceptional skill of an
exceptional individual.
This is not the conception of founding in Hobbes’s science. There is no founder
figure that establishes the regime, 51 but a collection of individuals who “conferre all their
power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men.” 52 There is
comparatively little discussion on whether virtue, skill in governing, skill in lawmaking,
skill in arms, or experience are factors that determine the success or longevity of the
regime. Instead, the factors that determine the success of a regime have to do with the
presence of whatever institutional arrangements are conducive to political stability. It
would seem as if Sheldon Wolin’s observation about Hobbes was correct, that despite the
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awesome power Hobbes allows the sovereign, “no extended discussion is to be found
concerning the education or moral qualities necessary to the exercise of sovereignty.” 53
Wolin also observed that Hobbes did not always believe political theory should be
devoid of any discussion about the sovereign’s personal qualities. In observing Hobbes’s
Epistle Dedicatory for his translation of Thucydides, Wolin saw that Hobbes
“recommended Thucydides ‘as having . . . profitable instructions for noblemen, and such
as may come to have the managing of great and weighty actions.’” 54 It was only later
that “Hobbes changed his mind about the value of history, contrasting the fallibility of
prudence and experience derived from the knowledge of past events with the ‘infallible
rules’ and ‘prospective glasses’ of political philosophy.” 55 Hobbes’s science as stated in
The Elements of Law, De Cive, and Leviathan was for Wolin an attempt to replace the
political heroes found in the histories with a “new paradigm of the hero, incarnated in
Galileo and Kepler” showing “what marvels the human mind might achieve if it dared to
renounce the past and rely on no authority save human reason.” 56 In Hobbes’s science,
statecraft is a job for the scientist. It is not a job for the statesman.
Hobbes’s Epistle Dedicatory from his translation of Thucydides does show us that
he placed a greater emphasis on the education of leaders in his early career than he would
in the middle part of his career. A wealth of new evidence from Hobbes’s early career
only reaffirms this conclusion. While the introduction to Hobbes’s translation of
53

Wolin (1970), p. 28.

54

Ibid., p. 14.

55

Ibid.

56

Ibid., p. 19.

213
Thucydides was discussed in the last chapter, Hobbes wrote additional works during his
service with William Cavendish, first Earl of Newcastle. Three of these works can be
found in Cavendish’s Horae Subsecivae published in 1620. 57 Another work of Hobbes
during this period is a translation of the Altera secretissima instructo (the second secret
instruction) from 1626. 58 What is special about these four texts is that they all contain
some discussion about political skill, a topic that is barely discussed in Hobbes’s
scientific treatises.
Section 3: Hobbes’s Machiavellian Return
Altera secretissima instructo was not composed by Hobbes, but it was translated
by Hobbes into English around 1627. 59 The pamphlet was an example of a body of
popular literature that depicted “the sort of thing that might be discussed in the most
secret deliberations of princes and their counselors.” 60 Like most of the political
pamphlets at the time, the advice given in the pamphlet “borders between fact and fiction,
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between genuine analysis and satirical exaggeration.” 61 In the case of the Altera
secretissima instructo, the text depicts one of the advisors to the Elector Palatine of the
Rhine, Frederick V, who was also married to the sister of Charles I and a member of the
Protestant Union during the Thirty Years’ War. The pamphlet depicts advice that is
similar to the advice given by Machiavelli and other writers from what has been called
the “reason of state” tradition. 62 What is interesting is that this text says nothing about
science as the solution to Frederick V’s political problems, the duty of securing salus
populi, or vainglory as a destructive force. It instead discusses political strategy,
encouraging Frederick V to be ambitious for power and conquest.
The pamphlet starts by analyzing the disposition of all the nations of Europe
towards the Elector Palatine in 1626. It is divided into two parts: what the Elector
Palatine “cannot do” followed by what he “can.” 63 The section on what Frederick V
cannot do primarily consists of an assessment of the various nations of Europe with
respect to domestic politics, military strength, alliances, wars, and disposition towards the
Palatine region. The first nation described is England under Charles I. Hobbes describes
Charles I as “weary of war;” his empty treasury, indemnities towards Norway, and
conflicts within his own kingdom make Charles I unwilling to enter into a military
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alliance with Palatine. 64 After describing the political situation of England and the rest of
Europe, the author concludes that Frederick V’s “hope depends on other mens ayde, in
which there be two thinges doubtfull, their Will and their Power.” 65 Therefore, the
Elector Palatine must rely on his own resources. The author then uses the example of
Caesar, showing how one does not need allies if one possesses “strength and soldiers.” 66
Considering the fact that the Elector Palatine is weak militarily, the author then suggests
deception; for “when ye Lions skin is worne out, put on the Foxes case.” 67 When reading
this advice, one cannot help but be reminded of Machiavelli’s famous statement in The
Prince concerning the lion and the fox, for “since a prince is compelled of necessity to
know well how to use the beast, he should pick the fox and the lion, because the lion does
not defend itself from snares and the fox does not defend itself from wolves.” 68 While
Machiavelli is not mentioned in the work, the Altera secretissima instructio is a
64
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Machiavellian work that applies historical wisdom to the subject of effective leadership.
It shows Hobbes’s link to the ideas and thinkers of the previous reason of state tradition:
a tradition that included Machiavelli and ancient authors such as Tacitus. It is not,
however, the only work by Hobbes that uses historical wisdom in this way.
Three chapters in Cavendish’s Horae Subsecivae are also attributed to Hobbes: A
Discourse on Rome, A Discourse on Laws, and A Discourse upon the Beginning of
Tacitus. His Discourse on Rome is a collection of thoughts from his trip to Rome
alongside Cavendish and offers some reflections on the value of honor and virtue. When
Hobbes sees the natural harshness of the Roman lands, he wonders “how the inhabitants
of so wild a place could ever come to such greatness.” 69 He concludes that the harshness
must have disposed the Roman people towards virtue and self-discipline, and conversely,
“that ease and delicacy of life is the bane of noble actions.” 70 This does not necessarily
mean that human beings do not act at all when conditions are pleasant, but that they tend
to “not apprehend anything farther than the compass of their own affections;” 71 meaning
that they place their private pleasures before the public good.
Harsh conditions provide human beings an incentive to make life better. Arlene
Saxonhouse views this principle found in A Discourse on Rome as the reason why
Hobbes felt it was necessary to describe the state of nature in such harsh terms in his
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more scientific writings. 72 Hobbes, however, seems to be making a kind of argument in
the Discourse on Rome from the argument he is making in Leviathan or elsewhere in his
scientific treatises. His science puts forth a conception of human nature that is radically
individualist. In this view, human beings enter into a covenant for reasons of personal
gain. As Macpherson observed, “Hobbes saw no evidence that any principle of
obligation based on something beyond self-interest was likely to be more widely and
firmly accepted than one based on self-interest.” 73 Whether in response to the fear of
death or the result of rational calculation, human beings in Hobbes’s science enter into
political communities out of self-interested motives. In other words, individuals are
publically inclined only insofar as they receive a private benefit. Therefore, public virtue
in Hobbes’s science—if we are to call it that—is limited to the bare minimum
requirements to maintain security: obedience to the laws, deference to the sovereign’s
judgment, and commodious living. It does not include actions that we traditionally
associate with public virtue such as military service. 74 Citizens in Hobbes’s science are
not expected to carry out public functions; and this is why they authorize a sovereign to
perform the public functions on their behalf.
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In A Discourse on Rome, however, Hobbes clearly distinguishes between private
and public motivations. What made Rome great was not that the people gave themselves
over “to an easeful life.” 75 The poverty of the territory could not allow a man to be
“confined to his own particular interest, and looking no further.” 76 Instead, the
impoverished circumstances created a “will to prevail for the public” so that the Roman
people could “go on in actions of greater consequence and more difficulty.” 77 Hobbes
makes an assertion in A Discourse on Rome that we might describe as communitarian or
republican: that “no man is born only for himself,” and consequently, man cannot expect
to achieve greatness by devoting himself to private affairs alone. 78 The Romans
understood this notion and made an effort to preserve those actions worthy of recognition
in their monuments. Hobbes noticed how the statues “do strangely immortalize” the
fame of those Romans “whose virtue, more than their greatness, made them famous.” 79
This pursuit of immortal glory through monumental architecture was considered by
Hobbes as part of the reason for Rome’s success, for “not knowing any farther
immortality, these were they, and this one consideration produced better effects of virtue
and valor, than Religion, and all other respects do in our days.” 80
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Machiavelli makes similar arguments in Discourses on Livy. He agrees with
Hobbes that if one wants to ensure that the people act virtuously, “it is preferable to select
barren sites, so that men, forced to work industriously and less occupied in idle pursuits,
will live more united, having less reason for disagreements because of the poverty of the
site.” 81 He disagrees with Hobbes that Rome was situated on such an impoverished site.
Instead, Machiavelli traced the origin of the public virtue displayed by Rome to the
“many necessities imposed upon this city by Romulus, Numa, and the others, so that the
fertility of the site, the convenience of the sea, the frequent victories, and the great size of
its empire were unable to corrupt it for centuries, and these laws kept it full of as much
exceptional ability as ever adorned any other city or republic.” 82 For Machiavelli the
strictness of the laws—not the harshness of the geography—explains why the Roman
people often placed the public good ahead of private advantage. Despite this difference,
Machiavelli is in agreement with Hobbes that Rome sought to recognize the public virtue
of her best citizens regardless of wealth or “greatness” in Hobbes’s terms. The only
reason a man like Cincinnatus, a simple farmer, could rise to the level of dictator was that
“poverty did not close the path to any rank or honour whatsoever, and that exceptional
ability was sought after wherever it made its home.” 83 Similarly, the Romans such as
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Cincinnatus did not use their positions for private advantage, for “winning honour from
war was enough for these citizens . . . they left all profit to the public.” 84
This celebration of public glory was considered by both Hobbes and Machiavelli
to be an important aspect of political greatness and stability. However, Hobbes seemed
to abandon this thought during his scientific phase. In Leviathan Hobbes praises those
actions that are conducive to private advantage and condemns those actions that are
conducive to public glory. It is “Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight” which is praised
by Hobbes, for it “disposeth men to obey a common power.” 85 Conversely, the honor
that attends public virtue “enclineth to Contention, Enmity, and War: Because the way of
one Competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell” any
rivals. 86 The cult of glorious actions, praised by Hobbes in his earliest writings, finds
little support in his scientific ones. Two observations need to be made. First, Hobbes’s
science concludes that private individuals should limit themselves to their private
pursuits; for “there are very many, that thinke themselves wiser, and abler to govern the
Publique, better than the rest; and these strive to reforme and innovate, one this way,
another that way; and thereby bring it into Distraction and Civill warre.” 87 Second, any
public honoring or dishonoring is the job of the sovereign: the sovereign is “to appoint
what Order of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what signes of respect, in
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publique or private meetings, they shall give to one another.” 88 In other words, the
people under the sovereign’s jurisdiction play no part in honoring or dishonoring their
neighbors, except as directed by the sovereign.
However, the glorification of private citizens for noble deeds seems to find
renewed support in Hobbes’s dialogues. A Dialogue ends with a discussion of Parliament
from its Saxon origins. The lawyer conveys that it was advantageous for the kings that
they called “a great part of the wisest and discreetest Men of the Realm, and made Laws
by their advice.” 89 The philosopher does not dispute the wisdom of this custom, but only
conveys the problem that “it is a hard matter to know who is the wisest in our times.” 90
The lawyer then describes “that the Townsmen of every Town were the Electors of their
own Burgesses, and Judges of their discretion; and that the Law, whether they be discreet
or not, will suppose them to be discreet till the contrary be apparent.” 91 Thus, we find in
the dialogues one instance where custom allows the people to honor one of their own
using mechanisms outside of the sovereign office.
In Behemoth Hobbes most clearly shows the utility of public honor. As discussed
in chapter IV, he chooses to end Behemoth by praising Lord Monck, not Charles II. This
is presumably because of Monck’s indispensable contribution to peace, a contribution
that was so instrumental that A’s final line is a prayer for Charles II to “have” a general
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like Monck “as often as there shall be need.” 92 Of course, the question needs to be asked:
how can such a general always be available if his deeds are not considered praiseworthy?
The answer is that it is up to Hobbes, his characters A and B, and the citizens who value
the peace to keep the memory of Lord Monck’s example available for future generations.
Using Hobbes’s language from A Discourse on Rome, it is as if Monck’s virtues
“deserved perpetuity in our memory” in the hope that they “breed a kind of emulation to
imitate.” 93 Thus Hobbes sees the value of exceptional public conduct, especially when
there is no sovereign that has the capacity or legitimacy to carry out the functions
associated with public honor.
While A Discourse on Rome explores the concept of public honor, A Discourse on
Law explores the relationship of the sovereign to the laws. Hobbes starts by describing
the laws as “the Princes we ought to serve, the Captains we are to follow, the very rules,
by which all the actions of our life be squared and disposed.” 94 It is important to notice
that Hobbes describes the law in the same terms as he would describe the sovereign in his
scientific works. In A Discourse on Law, Hobbes agrees “with Demonsthenes’s
observation, who supposed Laws to be as the soul of a Commonwealth.” 95 More than
thirty years later, Hobbes would write in the introduction of Leviathan that “the
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Soveraignty is an Artificial Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body.” 96 The
difference is one of prominence. In A Discourse on Law, the law is the highest authority
that everyone in the commonwealth, even the sovereign himself, ought to obey. Hobbes
used Solon’s answer to the question of the best regime to illustrate this point; the best
regime is one “wherein the City obeyed the Magistrate, and the Magistrate the Laws.” 97
In Leviathan, however, Hobbes clearly states that sovereigns cannot be subject to
the laws in the same way as average citizens. If the sovereign were subject to the laws,
then the commonwealth would need another sovereign above him in order to judge
whether the laws were broken. 98 Accordingly, Hobbes wanted the sovereign to be the
ultimate authority in the commonwealth; subjecting the sovereign to civil laws would be
impossible, as this would necessarily divide the sovereign power. Similarly, forcing the
sovereign to uphold past customs or precedents is equally problematic. In Leviathan,
Hobbes states that “the Length of Time shal bring no prejudice” to the sovereign’s
prerogative to uphold or deny precedents as he sees fit. 99 Forcing a sovereign to uphold
the precedents of a past regime is limiting the sovereign power in a way that may lead to
the weakening of the commonwealth. Hobbes seems to indicate that the sovereign cannot
be accused of injustice, because the sovereign cannot be found in violation of law in
either its positive or precedent forms. Perhaps this is the case in terms of Hobbes’s

96

Leviathan, introduction, p. 81.

97

Three Discourses, p. 111.

98

Leviathan, II.29.367.

99

Ibid., II.26.313.

224
scientific understanding of the commonwealth, but it remains to be asked whether the
commonwealth is able to follow Hobbes’s prescriptive philosophy.
As observed in chapter III, the very mechanisms of the English commonwealth
prevented the type of scientific understanding offered by Hobbes from reaching general
acceptance. Given the admission from Behemoth’s A that “the power of the mighty hath
no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people,” the public perception of the
sovereign’s rightful authority is just as important as the actual rightness of the
sovereign’s authority. The importance of public perception to the functioning of the state
is something Machiavelli understood well. In The Prince, Machiavelli shows how “it is
necessary” for a sovereign prince “to be so prudent as to know how to avoid the infamy
of those vices that would take his state from him and to be on guard against those that do
not, if that is possible.” 100 It is tempting to interpret this passage as evidence that a
sovereign prince need not follow the conventional morals of his state. While it is true
that Machiavelli’s prince is in many respects above the law, Machiavelli understands that
it is often to a prince’s advantage to obey his own laws. Using the rape of Lucretia
during the reign of Tarquin the Proud as an example, Machiavelli observed in Discourses
on Livy that princes “begin to lose the state the moment they begin to break the laws and
those ways and customs that are ancient and under which men have lived for a long
time.” 101 It is comforting for the people to know that the law, once established, will be
adhered to by the prince in power; for “when a prince does this and the people realize that
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under no circumstances will he break these laws, they will begin in a short time to live in
security and contentment.” 102 Of course, princes are considered to be above the law, and
in fact need to be above the law in order to govern their states successfully. It is often to
a prince’s advantage to follow the laws as if he were subject to them as much as any other
citizen.
Even the Hobbes who wrote A Discourse on Laws understands that it “be
sometimes necessary” for the sovereign to change the laws “such as are made in times of
war,” but he also admits that “it ought notwithstanding to be done with a great deal of
caution.” 103 What remains consistent throughout all of Hobbes’s writings is the notion
that the sovereign must have the ability to alter or even go against the laws as stated.
What A Discourse on Laws offers, however, is an argument for why it is advantageous
for a sovereign to obey the laws as stated, making changes only when the law is
“incongruous to the present times and government.” 104 Hobbes describes how it is
advantageous where he discusses “the honor of a Kingdom.” 105 He cautions that “if the
Laws be neglected” by the sovereign, “his person is more subject to the attempts of
Traitors, his life to the tongues of malice and detraction, and his reputation to perpetual
infamy.” 106 However, if the sovereign shows himself “to be as the fountain of Justice, so
Justice keeps the fountain free from corruption, infection, or danger, prescribing rules for
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fear it corrupts, ascribing Antidotes for fear of infection, and preserving his person, and
reputation both from sensible, and insensitive danger.” 107 Hobbes says little about the
powers of the sovereign, but rather describes the conduct of the sovereign as instrumental
to his safety. Therefore, at the heart of A Discourse on Law is a discussion of political
skill and, as shown in the previous chapter, this is a discussion Hobbes would continue in
his treatment of English monarchs in his dialogues.
In these early works, however, political skill as a theme is most easily observed in
A Discourse upon the Beginning of Tacitus. As he does in his other works, Hobbes
shows a preference for monarchy, and discusses classical Rome as a kingdom from the
time of Romulus to the time of the emperors. The period of the Roman republic is
portrayed by Hobbes as a kind of extended deviation from Rome’s monarchical
founding—a kind of illness—where the people “grew perplexed at every inconvenience,
and shifted from one form of government to another, and so to another, and then to the
first again; like a man in a fever, that often turns to and fro in his bed, but finds himself
without ease, and sick in every posture.” 108 What is perhaps most interesting, however,
is why Rome became ill in the first place, as Hobbes discusses how monarchs become
tyrants. Referring to the rape of Lucretia, Hobbes describes how “this, together with the
pride, and tyranny of the King, gave color to his expulsion, and to the alteration of
government.” 109 Hobbes then discusses what made the Tarquin regime prone to
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overthrow, as the “Kings abuse their places, tyrannize over their Subjects, and wink at all
outrages, and abuses, committed against them by any either of their children, or
favorites.” 110 Even though “bondage” is not “always joined to Monarchy,” the actions of
the Tarquins caused the citizens to break “forth into attempts for liberty,” as such actions
are “hardly endured by man’s nature, and passion.” 111 Far from being a simple product
of the subjective fancy of each citizen, 112 Hobbes gives specific causes explaining why
sovereigns are perceived as tyrants. In the case of Tarquin the Proud, the preference he
displayed towards his son and the contempt for the rule of law undermined the legitimacy
of the regime. Given Hobbes’s strong condemnation of rebellion throughout his works, it
is surprising how little Hobbes criticizes this decision to overthrow Tarquin. However,
Rome’s mistake was that the citizens confused the failure of a monarch with the failure
of monarchy as a political system, starting a period of “change and variety of
governments” until the rise of Julius Caesar: an event that ushered in “the last change of
the Roman government.” 113
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Hobbes introduces Augustus as a man who “took upon him the Monarchy by
force, and yet he so settled it, as the State could never recover liberty.” 114 Hobbes’s
analysis of Tacitus shows that he was interested in “the means Augustus used in
acquiring and confirming to himself the supreme and Monarchical authority.” 115 In other
words, he was interested in Augustus’ political skill in acquiring his position as emperor.
Like his predecessors Cinna and Sulla, Augustus “attained unto supreme power by
violence and force,” but unlike his predecessors, Augustus used “politic provisions” to
ensure his future rule. 116 Augustus was able to triumph over his political rivals because
of his political skill, not necessarily because of his military skill alone. The first evidence
of Augustus’ skill in action was in naming himself Princeps (first citizen) instead of Rex
(king). This is because Augustus “knew that the multitude was not stirred to sedition so
much, with extraordinary power, as insolent Titles, which might put them to consider of
that power, and the loss of their liberty.” 117
One of the reasons Augustus proved to be a shrewd politician was his
understanding of the symbolic value of titles, a characteristic that Oliver Cromwell also
possessed. Although Cromwell possessed the power that kings normally possess, he did
not take the title of king, but that of Lord Protector. In Behemoth, character A recalls
how in 1656 “an alderman of London” made a motion for Cromwell “to leave the title of

114

Ibid., p. 35.

115

Three Discourses, p. 31.

116

Ibid., p. 35.

117

Ibid., 38.

229
Protector, and take upon him that of King.” 118 B replies that “the motion was made on
purpose to ruin both the Protector himself and his ambitious officers.” However, A
explains that Cromwell gave Parliament “a peremptory refusal” to take the title of king.
When B asks “what made him refuse the title of King?” A responds by stating that “the
army being addicted to their great officers, and amongst those officers many hoping to
succeed” Cromwell, including Major General Lambert, “would have mutinied against
him.” It would seem that Cromwell, like Augustus, was aware of the political
ramifications of title. This is why Cromwell “did never dare to take upon him the title of
King, nor was ever able to settle it upon his children,” 119 as the political circumstances
would not allow it.
Augustus’ rise to power in Rome parallels Oliver Cromwell’s rise to power in
England in another way. Specifically, both Augustus and Cromwell acquired power
slowly and methodically. Augustus first acquired authorization from the Senate to raise
an army as a bulwark against the growing power of Mark Antony. 120 Cromwell
proceeded in a similar fashion by first taking control of the army, “to be
Generalissimo,” 121 and only after the force of arms was ceded to him would he proceed
in grasping absolute power away from Parliament. These examples show the general
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observation Behemoth’s A makes regarding the military: that while “it is the desire of
most men to bear rule . . . few of them know what title one has to it more than another,
besides the right of the sword.” 122 B also understands that a sovereign body that cedes
control of the army to an usurper in effect cedes control over the commonwealth: “for
they that keep an army, and cannot master it, must be subject to it as much as he that
keeps a lion in his house.” 123 Where the force of arms goes, sovereignty follows. This is
a principle that Machiavelli understood well; for “it is not reasonable that whoever is
armed obey willingly whoever is unarmed, and that someone unarmed be secure among
armed servants.” 124
Hobbes’s Leviathan has a different conception of the relationship between force
of arms and sovereignty. This is most clearly seen in Leviathan’s description of
commanders in chapter 30. While Hobbes warns that a military commander can be “a
dangerous thing to Soveraign Power,” the right to possess the title of sovereign “is so
popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more, for his own part, to turn the hearts of
his Subjects to him.” 125 In Leviathan, therefore, sovereignty does not come from
possessing force of arms, but rather, force of arms comes from the title of sovereign.
Sovereignty bestows legitimacy upon the ruler that an ambitious general will never
possess through force of arms alone. The evidence Hobbes uses for this assertion is that
“those, who by violence have at any time suppressed the Power of their lawfull
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Soveraign, before they could settle themselves in his place, have always put to the trouble
of contriving their Titles, to save the People from the shame of receiving them.” 126
Usurpers, therefore, contrive titles to provide themselves with some measure of
legitimacy for their illegitimate acts. Though mentioning neither Augustus nor Cromwell
by name, one might classify both Augustus and Cromwell as generals who tried to make
their illegitimate claims to power more legitimate through the establishment of new titles.
Neither character in Behemoth criticized Augustus or Cromwell for their choices of title.
If anything, this seems to show that Hobbes understood why each of them chose the titles
he did.
Hobbes conceived of the relationship between arms and title differently
throughout his career. He first looked at Augustus’ use of the title Princeps as a shrewd
strategic move, alongside his use of the army to re-establish monarchy. In his scientific
phase, Hobbes believed that sovereignty was determined by consent, and that it was
consent that gave the sovereign strength of arms. 127 In Behemoth, however, Hobbes
seems to turn back to force of arms as the essential characteristic that establishes
sovereignty, and Cromwell’s choice of the title Lord Protector as a shrewd choice to
consolidate his power over an already fractured commonwealth. Given the similarities
between the two, why was Augustus’ monarchical system able to last, while Cromwell’s
protectorate ended shortly after his death?
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Although A Discourse upon the Beginning of Tacitus explains Augustus’ rise to
power, Hobbes devotes a great portion of his discourse to explaining the care Augustus
gave to the issue of who would succeed him after his death. Hobbes writes that “when a
Prince draws near to his end the people’s minds are all set upon new hopes, and discourse
of nothing that is present, but only what is in expectancy.” 128 In states that vest a vast
amount of power and discretion in one man, the future success or failure of the state
relies on succession issues far more than in a system that spreads the power and
discretion among several individuals. Whether by accident or design, 129 Augustus had
the discretion to choose the best successor and, from Hobbes’s account, used this
discretion well. Among the possible candidates were Postumus Agrippa and Tiberius
Claudius. Both were related to Augustus by marriage. Agrippa lacked “age and
experience,” which for Hobbes “are necessary for the government of a great Empire.” 130
The lack of age and experience were not Agrippa’s most detrimental characteristics. The
“fierceness of his disposition,” coupled with the censure given to him by the Senate
(resulting in his banishment), meant that there was a very real fear that Agrippa would
“make his revenge according to his own cruel inclination, and done contrary to the
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custom of human nature.” 131 One is reminded of Machiavelli’s advice in Discourses on
Livy to “carefully consider whether or not to place anyone in any important
administrative post who has been offended in some noteworthy way by others.”132
Although Machiavelli wrote this advice in the context of appointments in republics, the
advice seems equally applicable to the circumstances surrounding succession in an
empire. Using the example of Consul Claudius Nero during the Second Punic War,
Machiavelli observed that the Consul had no reservation to use his public power to
“avenge himself upon the city and those citizens who had so ungratefully and
shamelessly insulted him.” 133 This is similar to Hobbes’s understanding of the problems
associated with the granting of public power to one who is scorned; for the people “can
expect nothing but revenge” when the scorned individual is granted the power of the
state. 134
Hobbes then turns to the other possible candidate for succession: Tiberius.
Although Tiberius was experienced, the fear was that he would “hold the reins of
government too hard, especially over a people so lately weaned from liberty.” 135 This
speculation was based upon Tiberius’ “pride and cruelty,” the former due to “his
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ancestors and education,” and the latter because of his own “demonstration.” 136 Also,
Tiberius’ mother and two sons were considered “no small grievance to the
Commonwealth,” and could potentially “draw the Commonwealth into faction and
sedition” after Tiberius’ death. 137 Therefore, both potential successors had problems that
might undermine the ability of either one to govern successfully. Hobbes ends the
Discourse upon the Beginning of Tacitus before Augustus decides on Tiberius as his
successor, but this omission does not lessen the argument that Hobbes presents, namely,
that the transfer of power between a sovereign and a successor is not to be taken lightly.
Both personal characteristics and public perception are vitally important to consider, as
both can have an impact on the ability of the successor to fulfill the requirements of the
office.
While Hobbes portrayed Augustus as mindful of the gravity surrounding the issue
of succession, his portrayal of Oliver Cromwell’s handling of the succession issue in
England is more critical. Major General John Lambert was “a man second to none but
Oliver Cromwell in the favor of the army” and in fact had a “promise from the Protector”
to succeed him. 138 Despite Lambert’s claim and legitimacy within the army, Cromwell
“designed for his successor his eldest son Richard.” 139 The army’s acceptance of Richard
Cromwell was at best “inconstant” for he was “irresolute, and without any military
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glory.” 140 Richard Cromwell’s brief seven month reign as Protector was marked by
conspiracies from both the officers of the army and Parliament until he was forced to
resign his title in April of 1659. 141
The choice of successor is the one power of sovereignty that repeatedly
preoccupies Hobbes throughout his career. Succession is a theme that Hobbes discusses
in his earliest works, his Behemoth, and also in his Leviathan. In chapter 19, Hobbes lists
several reasons why monarchy is superior to other forms of government, but in terms of
succession, monarchy is at a distinct disadvantage. In democratic or aristocratic
governments, the death of one of the members does not impede the function of the
government, for popular assembles can still conduct the commonwealth’s business with
fewer members and elected bodies can call elections to fill any vacant seats. In
monarchy, however, the death of the monarch seriously impedes the ability of the
government to carry out its functions. Any sovereign instituted in the interim will simply
not have the legitimacy necessary to be a proper sovereign, and therefore, it is no surprise
that much of Leviathan’s chapter 19 is devoted to issues surrounding monarchical
succession. Hobbes identifies the central crux of the succession problem: that “it is not
manifest who is to appoint the Successor; nor many times, who it is whom he hath
appointed.” 142 Because of the vacuum created after the death of a monarch, it is difficult
to ascertain who or what should determine who the next monarch should be. Hobbes
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would prefer that the sovereign choose his successor personally while the sovereign is
still alive to do so. 143 What must be kept in mind, however, is that Hobbes provides no
list of qualities that must be considered when choosing a successor. While giving the
sovereign both the duty and the power to appoint a successor, Hobbes’s science gives
very little guidance as to whom to appoint, why the appointment should be made, and
what criteria are important in determining who should be the successor.
One can conclude that succession—among the most important decisions a
sovereign will make—is also the area where a sovereign’s political skill is most needed.
What makes this conclusion likely is that the chapter on succession is one of the few
places where Hobbes discusses political skill in Leviathan. 144 He responds to the
possibility that the sovereign may “give his Right of governing to a stranger” and that this
stranger would “turn to the oppression of his Subjects.” Instead of equating oppressive
government with foreign rule, Hobbes asserts that the “great inconvenience” of
oppressive government “proceedeth not necessarily from the subjection to a strangers
government, but from the unskillfulnesse of the Governours, ignorant of the true rules of
politics.” 145 While Hobbes mentions political skill, he equates it to the understanding of
“the true rules of politics,” which might be interpreted as an understanding of Hobbes’s
143
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political science. However, Hobbes also goes beyond his political science by drawing
upon two examples of political skill in action. The first example is the Roman practice of
“giving sometimes to whole Nations, and sometimes to Principall men of every Nation
they conquered, not onely the Privileges, but also the Name of Romans” taking “many of
them into the Senate, and Offices of charge, even in the Roman City.” 146 The other
example is James I’s “union of his two Realms of England and Scotland. Which if he
could have obtained, had in all likelihood prevented the Civill warres, which make both
those Kingdomes” at the time of Hobbes’s writing “miserable.” 147
These two examples are uncharacteristic of Hobbes’s science for a few reasons.
First, he is drawing from history rather than deducing from principles. In other words,
Hobbes’s verbal clarity was not enough to counter the argument that a foreign sovereign
would be oppressive. Instead, Hobbes used historical case studies to demonstrate
examples of skillful appointment. These examples are important for another reason:
political skill is also mindful of appearances. Both of these examples are cases where the
sovereign’s intent was to make the government “digestible” by appointing those outside
the national body (as in Rome), or dissolving the distinctions that separate two or more
nationalities (as in James I’s attempt at unification). And yet, there is no real mandate—
outside of this passage—that the sovereign in Hobbes’s science is under any obligation to
make the regime “digestible” to the people. In other words, one of the marks of good
sovereignty is to be aware of public perceptions, a far more Machiavellian bit of advice
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than is typical for Hobbes’s science. Perhaps the most instructive lesson we can receive
from Leviathan’s discussion of political skill is its brevity in comparison to the discussion
in Hobbes’s other works. Compared to Hobbes’s works before The Elements of Law and
after Leviathan, any discussion of political skill is difficult to find. But it is not so
atypical of Hobbes when we consider that his earlier writings (like the selections from the
Horae Subsecivae) and his later writings (like Behemoth) examine political skill in a
much more direct way. Not surprisingly, Hobbes’s advice in these works also bears a
striking resemblance to the advice given by Machiavelli: that historical examples are
valuable, that a sovereign should be mindful of appearances, and that the political skill of
the leadership—far more than political institutions—will be instrumental in determining a
regime’s success.
Rather than take a completely new approach to politics, it would seem that
Hobbes is reintroducing himself to concepts and methods he set aside after his translation
of Thucydides. While there is no mention of Machiavelli in Hobbes’s work, his earliest
works have a distinctively Machiavellian flavor, a flavor that we recognize again in his
later works. Between these two phases in Hobbes’s career, we have his science: an
approach that possesses some similarity to Machiavelli’s political thought, but without
much discussion about the role of the sovereign’s personal qualities or the sovereign’s
political skill. Given the importance of these elements in the English Civil War, it is not
surprising that Hobbes would return to political skill as a theme, reorienting his
philosophy as useful for more than how to set up a government, but also, how to govern.

CHAPTER VII
HOBBES’S LEGACY AND LESSON
The previous chapter showed how Hobbes’s approach in the dialogues
was not without precedent. Machiavelli emphasized the notion that the success or failure
of a regime depends upon the political skill of the sovereign. This is also a quality of
Hobbes’s earliest works, but it is a quality that is relatively absent from his political
science treatises. Hobbes seems to reintroduce the concept of political skill in his
dialogues. Hobbes’s earliest works shared similarities with the reason of state tradition
typically associated with Machiavelli and Tacitus. But Hobbes moved away from that
tradition with the publication of his The Elements of Law, the first of his scientific works.
As chapters III and IV show, however, this scientific tradition might have proved
insufficient in itself to provide a complete or accurate solution to the problems of politics.
What was missing was a discussion of the importance of personality, leadership, or
political skill on the well-being of the commonwealth. This was, as the previous chapter
showed, a major feature of Hobbes’s work before The Elements of Law as well as a major
feature of his dialogues. Therefore, it is not incorrect to make the assertion that Hobbes
comes full circle: he ascribes a strong role for political skill early in his career, later
eschewing political skill for a more generalizable and precise science of justice and
institutions, only to reintroduce political skill as an important concept in his dialogues.
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It remains to be asked what this progression of Hobbes’s thought might tell us
about Hobbes, and furthermore, what Hobbes’s journey might tell us about the way we
approach social science today. In order to answer these questions, it is useful to see
exactly why Hobbes’s scientific approach was so important to the development of the
social sciences to the present day. Two features of Hobbes’s approach have been
instrumental in the development of modern social science: his systematic approach to
uncover the effectual truth of politics, and his optimism about the ability of science to
solve perennial political problems. Though not all social scientists possess these two
Hobbesian tendencies, many social scientists do, including some of the most influential
social scientists in the history of social thought.
Section 1: Hobbes’s Legacy, Appeal, and Idealism
Although this study explores deviations from Hobbes’s science as outlined in his
famous treatises, Hobbes will probably always be remembered for his unique approach to
studying political questions. The very fact that Hobbes was the first to approach politics
systematically makes him important to the history of political thought. What makes
Hobbes’s Leviathan so compelling is the sheer logic and clarity of its argument. As a
work of political philosophy, Leviathan is uncannily precise, which is something Hobbes
thought necessary in order for the treatise to serve its intended function: to solve the
problem of civil unrest.
The persuasive power of science and the ability of science to create a consensus
of opinion were attitudes that were appealing in the later part of the 19th and early 20th
centuries. Although he was a critic of Hobbes, John Dewey nevertheless respected
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Hobbes for his courage to break away from the established conventions of his time. In
“The Motivation of Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” Dewey described the historical and
common law examples used by Hobbes in A Dialogue. 1 He recognized that Hobbes was
up to something quite different from previous conceptions of politics. The audience for
Hobbes’s philosophy was all persons, regardless of religious denomination or cultural
peculiarity. While Hobbes’s evidence was anecdotal rather than empirical, Dewey was
impressed at the analytical framework Hobbes used to understand anecdotal evidence
such as laws and history. Hobbes’s defense of absolute monarchy seemed backward, if
not untenable, for Dewey to accept. Nevertheless, Dewey admired Hobbes’s method of
examining humanistic phenomena such as morals and politics as scientific phenomena.
Dewey appreciated Hobbes’s thought, a thought shared with Jeremy Bentham, that
“moral science was one with political science, and was not a theoretical luxury, but a
social necessity. . . . Progress beyond them comes not from a hostile attitude to these
conceptions, but from improved knowledge of human nature.” 2 As science would
discover the underlying relationships within politics, human beings would gradually drop
the authoritative opinions they had previously accepted. As an agent of change, political
1
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2

Ibid., p. 40.

242
science held the promise of being not only a descriptive science, but also a prescriptive
science, gradually undermining the historical distinctions that are merely arbitrary in the
final analysis. The optimistic notion that social science had the capacity not only to
understand, but transform social institutions was a popular idea, and John Dewey’s
writings on the theory of social intelligence build upon the Hobbesian conception that
science had the capacity to transform public opinion.
Dewey believed that the object of science in the United States was not just the
study of democracy; science was democracy in a very real sense. While Dewey never
admitted that Hobbes influenced his concept of social intelligence, Dewey’s concept of
social intelligence was Hobbesian in the sense that science was a language that creates
consensus among citizens. The two thinkers differ with respect to which political form
the scientific consensus would support. While Leviathan made the case that the scientific
consensus would support absolute government, Dewey believed that the scientific
consensus would support democracy and limited government. In The Public and its
Problems, Dewey stresses the importance of dissemination and education in the growth
of knowledge. 3 When discussing a conversation he had with a friend, Dewey claimed
that scientific knowledge can only be truly instrumental in creating change if it is shared
3

“My old friend was aware that a thing is fully known only when it is published, shared, socially
accessible. Record and communication are indispensable to knowledge. Knowledge cooped up in a private
consciousness is a myth, and knowledge of social phenomena is peculiarly dependent upon dissemination,
for only by distribution can such knowledge be either obtained or tested. A fact of community life which is
not spread abroad so as to be a common possession is a contradiction in terms. Dissemination is something
other than scattering at large. Seeds are sown, not by virtue of being thrown out at random, but by being so
distributed as to take root and have a chance at growth. Communication of the results of social inquiry is
the same thing as the formation of public opinion. This makes one of the first ideas framed in the growth
of political democracy as it will be one of the last to be fulfilled. For public opinion is judgment which is
formed and entertained by those who constitute the public and is about public affairs. Each of the two
phases imposes for its realization conditions hard to meet.” Taken from Dewey’s The Public and its
Problems, 1927 (Denver: Alan Swallow Press), pp. 176-177.
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with and promulgated to a general audience. Through the promulgation of knowledge,
scientific reasoning creates harmony between human beings. In this way, Dewey saw
education and science as leading toward political democracy. Scientific reasoning gives
individuals within a society a common language and knowledge that promotes consensus
about the right course of action. Like both Hobbes and Steffens, Dewey realized how
vulnerable an uneducated public could be when faced with propaganda from ambitious,
self-interested elites. Dewey warned that “as long as interests of pecuniary profit are
powerful, and a public has not located and identified itself, those who have this interest
will have an unresisted motive for tampering with the springs of political action in all that
affects them.” 4 The central problem of the public, as Dewey understood it, was that the
public needed “the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and
persuasion. . . . upon freeing and perfecting the processes of inquiry and of the
dissemination of their conclusions. . . . It is not necessary that the many should have the
knowledge and the skill to carry on the needed investigations; what is required is that
they have the ability to judge of the bearing of the knowledge supplied by others upon
common concerns.” 5 Dewey’s faith in the power of an enlightened citizenry was similar
to Hobbes’s in Leviathan insofar as both believed that science provided solutions for
political unrest and general misery.
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While Leviathan contains many passages that show how difficult it is for human
beings to reach a consensus about anything, 6 Leviathan also contains a conception of
human nature that can transcend this limitation. In a statement that appears almost
Kantian, Hobbes described human beings as “makers, and orderers” of reality, separate
from their capacity as mere “matter.” 7 Convinced that human beings could and would
support a way out of the “irregular justling and hewing one another” that described
politics as Hobbes had come to know it, Leviathan served as a blueprint of how a
commonwealth and all within it should function.
Ferdinand Tönnies was also impressed with Hobbes’s approach to political
analysis. What made Hobbes’s approach unique for Tönnies was Hobbes’s assertion that
the political commonwealth was artificial. Unlike the ancients, Hobbes believed that the
commonwealth could not be described as a natural or sentimental association. Rather,
the commonwealth was an association that was engineered, resting upon a consensus of
human reason. 8 While the matter or material of commonwealth was human beings, the
same human beings who were governed by the commonwealth also governed it in return
insofar as they made and sustained the political relationship through consent. Tönnies’s
praise of Hobbes was so complete that he once described Hobbes’s philosophy as “the
6
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most elaborate and most consistent system of the doctrine commonly known as natural
law (Naturrecht), including, as it always did, a theory of the state.” 9
What impressed Tönnies the most about Hobbes was his analytical and precise
approach to social phenomena. What surprised Tönnies was not Hobbes’s influence in
social science, but rather, that Hobbes did not have a greater influence in the history of
ideas. Hobbes’s “rationalistic and individualistic philosophy of law” was overshadowed
by historical jurisprudence and more organic theories of the state, 10 but these later
developments in the study of politics did not fully appreciate the differences between the
state and other forms of social association.
Hobbes’s conception of the state as an artificial construction would be reflected in
Tönnies’s own work on forms of social organization. Famous for his distinction between
the Gemeinschaft and the Gesellschaft, Tönnies would reiterate Hobbes’s definition of
the commonwealth as an artificial construction, or as Tönnies described it, an “imaginary
and mechanical structure” which “is the concept of Gesellschaft.” 11 While other forms of
social organization such as the family or community were natural or sentimental,
institutions of the Gesellschaft type were divorced from man’s natural sentiments as a
conglomeration of impersonal associations. 12 Unlike Aristotle, Tönnies—like Hobbes
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before him—argued that man is political by convention rather than by nature. Human
beings serving in their capacity as makers of the political order have the power to create
whatever political arrangement seems advantageous.
Of course, what is advantageous for some might not be so for others, or even for
the majority. Tönnies, like Dewey and Hobbes, believed that the public was especially
vulnerable to propaganda and other tools of the politically ambitious. While the
commonwealth was able to reach its highest potential as a rational agent when all the
members of a community functioned together, one individual or group could tend to
dominate over all others. 13 A powerful political minority was capable of influencing a
majority when it had the power of the press, and by extension, the power over public
opinion. 14 While Tönnies did not propose a solution to this problem, he did discuss the
concept of interdependence, and considered how individuals might come to an
understanding of reciprocal rights and duties either through “predominantly emotional or

characterized by the social will as concord, folkways, mores, and religion; the Gesellschaft by the social
will as convention, legislation, and public opinion,” (ibid., p. 231).
13

“The will of a commonwealth is usually represented in its assembly either by one man (the prince),
several (the nobles or aldermen), or many (the masses, the people). . . . In the end, the masses become the
intellectual center, the brains of the social system; as such this center can function much more perfectly
than its predecessors in that role [monarchy and aristocracy], for, although confronted with more difficult
problems through the close contacts of its members (or elements), its faculties faculties are heightened by
constant practice and experience. It is, therefore, much more likely to produce the highest and noblest
intelligence in the political field. But the commonwealth derives its full dignity only from the consensus
and co-operation of those three organs [the prince, the aristocrats, and the masses], even though, in reality,
one may become predominant while the others wither away” (ibid., p. 213).
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“Thus, the press is the real instrument (“organ”) of public opinion, weapon and tool in the hands of those
who know how to use it and have to use it; it possesses universal power as the dreaded critic of events and
changes in social conditions. It is comparable and, in some respects, superior to the material power which
the states possess through their armies, their treasuries, and their bureaucratic civil service” (ibid., p. 221).
Cf. A’s assertion in Behemoth, “the power of the mighty hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of
the people,” (Behemoth, p. 95).
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predominantly intellectual” means. 15 This conception of how individuals become
motivated toward interdependence with one another is similar to how Leviathan
described the motivations which compel individuals to enter into civil society. The fear
of violent death can be a motive, but as A states in Behemoth, general enlightenment, or
sufficient understanding of “the rules of just and unjust” accomplishes the same end. 16
Unlike Dewey, Tönnies was less concerned with democracy as an abstract
concept, but was greatly concerned with the special nature of political institutions. As
constructs of the human mind, political relationships differed from other relationships
between human beings. Nevertheless, both Dewey and Tönnies were familiar with
Hobbes’s work, and both seemed to use Hobbes’s science as a model for the method and
aims of social science. The goal of social science was to make politics understandable,
and by making politics understandable, science could help change the political system for
the benefit of all who lived under it. 17 What made Leviathan an idealistic work is its
recognition of the power of human reason to rectify the problems of politics. For
Hobbes, science was not just a diversion for the curious; it was also a vehicle for solving
practical problems. This is a theme that would be resurrected by social scientists in the
19th and 20th centuries. The primary focus of this emerging social science was to ensure
that the public was educated, since bad administration tended to thrive when the public
15

Community and Society (1957), p. 242.
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Behemoth, p. 39.
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“The end or scope of philosophy is, that we may make use to our benefit of effects formerly seen; or that,
by application of bodies to one another, we may produce the like effects of those we conceive in our mind,
as far forth as matter, strength, and industry, will permit, for the commodity of human life” (De Corpore, p.
7).
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was not. Like Lincoln Steffens’s observation that the problems of urban politics can be
solved by studying the “unstudied art of municipal government,” 18 many social scientists
of the early part of the twentieth century believed that the solution to political problems
depended on creating a better citizen through education. Through education, science
could create harmony among reasonable individuals supporting reasonable
administration. An educated public was one that could resist propaganda and the
avaricious tendencies of the ambitious, which was quite similar to A’s belief in Behemoth
that citizens should learn the “rules of just and unjust.” 19 In both Hobbes’s science and
the emerging social science of the twentieth century, good government was seen as a
function of the citizens’ due diligence more than it was seen as a function of the political
skill of the leadership.
Despite Hobbes’s preference for absolute government, there was something rather
democratic in his scientific analysis of the commonwealth. Hobbes understood that the
common people were political actors in their own right who played an active role in the
affairs of the state. Because citizens create discord as well as peace, Leviathan was an
attempt to provide a clear and convincing case for citizens to want to support the
governing authority. Leviathan did not represent the sovereign as a shrewd politician or
an ambitious master. Rather, the sovereign was portrayed as a prudent administrator and
a representative of the people. Hobbes reasoned that when individuals agree to the same
standard of what a sovereign should be, they become in essence one person as manifest in

18

See above in chapter. I, pp. 13-15.
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Behemoth, p. 39.
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the individual chosen to represent them. 20 The irony of Leviathan is that it portrays
absolute sovereignty as a form of democracy, an irony not lost on Hanna Pitkin in her
work on representation. She observes that Leviathan does not distinguish popularly
elected government from any other form, as “every government is a representative
government” insofar as the sovereign authority acts as a representative of the people. 21
What is missing in Leviathan’s concept of representation is the notion that the sovereign
is ever accountable to the people after the initial covenant that installs the sovereign. 22
The only option Leviathan leaves open for sovereign accountability is civil war which,
for Hobbes, was an untenable alternative.
Yet the problem of viewing the sovereign as an unaccountable representative is
only a problem when we examine Leviathan through pessimistic eyes. As readers of
Hobbes we must remember that when he was composing his political science treatises,
Hobbes was an optimist. He, like most scientific optimists, believed that if the people
were sufficiently educated to discern good government from bad government, they would
never willingly choose the bad. This may have been Hobbes’s hope as much as it was
Lincoln Steffens’s hope when writing about the perils facing Seth Low. Theoretically
speaking, skillful and ambitious politicians would gain no traction if popular opinion
20

“A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented; so
that it be done with the consent of every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the
Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One” (Leviathan, I.16.220).
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See Pitkin’s Representation (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), p. 8.

“Some writers [Carl Friedrich, Otto von Geierke, John of Salisbury, Charles A Beard, and John Lewis]
will argue that Hobbes has missed the very essence of representation: than above all a representative is
someone who will be held responsible to those for whom he acts, who must account to them for his actions.
What defines representation is not an act of authorization that initiates it, but an act of holding-to-account
that terminates it” (ibid., p. 9).
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valued the competent leaders they had more than the rhetorically skillful leaders they
could have. In practice, though, good administration is as much the victim of politics as
the goal of politics. Charles I may have been a capable administrator, but this alone
could do nothing to save his administration from collapse.
This problem with Leviathan reflected a tendency in social science to presume its
own utility, a presumption of utility that, as we have seen in chapter III, depends on
optimal political and societal circumstances to be effective. However, Behemoth was not
the last work, and Hobbes was not the last thinker, to expose this presumption of utility.
In the first half of the twentieth century, a group of theologians, historians and legal
experts challenged the idealistic tendencies of social science. These authors became
known as the realists, and their critique exposes a tension in Hobbes’s Leviathan that
Hobbes himself would recognize in his later works.
Section 2: The Historical Critique of Leviathan’s Science
While Hobbes was optimistic that science could be useful when he wrote his
political science treatises, this optimism faded after the Restoration. Theoretically,
Hobbes’s science may have been “evident to the meanest capacity” and perhaps even
“easie to be observed,” 23 but his science depended on optimal political and social
circumstances to become the framework on which the commonwealth could be erected.
England at the time was in no position to adopt Hobbes’s science, and his science was
only persuasive to the select few who could respect its purpose. For better or worse,
England was subject to the old way of politics: a kind of statecraft that depended on the
23
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prudence of leaders, the wit of orators, and the memory of the citizens to maintain order
and ensure the common good. Fortunately for England, this combination proved to be
enough to bring about the Restoration, proving that the peace can be found through
means other than science: a fact that Hobbes could not help but acknowledge in the
actions of Lord Monck and the English people. While not specifically discounting his
observations into human nature and good government, Hobbes’s later texts were
tempered with a sobering truth: that science alone can do little without the aid of strong,
capable politicians who are masters of the statesman’s art. Consequently, it is no surprise
that Hobbes uses his later works to emphasize the actions of those whom he considers to
be good statesmen: William I, Henry VII, Henry VIII, Elizabeth I, Lord Monck,
Charlemagne, and the like. By so doing, Hobbes shifts the responsibility for governing
the regime from the scientist back to the statesman. The knowledge that is emphasized
resembles the art of the tennis player more than the abstract reasoning of the
mathematician.
Hobbes’s journey from scientific idealist to historical realist is important because
it mirrors a similar journey in the discipline of political science. Perhaps no other
movement within the history of ideas would embrace Hobbes’s observations more fully,
yet reject Hobbes’s science more completely, than the realist movement of the early
twentieth century. The early founders of the realist movement in political science agreed
with Hobbes as they “put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and
restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death.” 24 In this respect,
24

Leviathan, I.11.161.

252
Hobbes was recognized by many realists as an early proponent of realism. 25 However,
the aim of Hobbes’s science and the realist’s perspective were theoretically opposed.
Unlike Hobbes, realists tended to reject the notion shared by Hobbes and Dewey that
science and education provided practical solutions to moral problems. Much of the
realist criticism of social science was in response to the failure of enlightened policy to
mitigate the uncertainty of the era between World War I and World War II; but realists
such as Reinhold Niebuhr, E.H. Carr, and Hans Morgenthau did not formulate their
critiques of scientific idealism solely in reference to the events of their time. Realists
were students of history, and noticed common tendencies in human institutions that
seemed to resist the ability of social science to foster change.
Reinhold Niebuhr was one of the first realist scholars to attack the kind of
scientific idealism that made Hobbes so appealing to scientific idealists. While Niebuhr
would not disagree that Hobbes’s observations of human nature have some merit, he
would also point out how Hobbes’s scientific project was deeply flawed. 26 Like Hobbes,
Niebuhr observed the inordinate selfishness of human beings, as “man’s lusts are fed by
25
26

See above in chapter III, p. 83, note 1.

Despite being one of Hobbes’s harshest critics, Niebuhr was an avid reader of Hobbes, and the works
referenced throughout Niebuhr’s Nature and Destiny of Man include Hobbes’s Elements of Law, Elements
of Philosophy (De Corpore), Leviathan and Behemoth. Niebuhr’s analysis of man’s natural condition was
similar to Hobbes’s view insofar as “the ego” of man “does not feel secure and therefore grasps for more
power in order to make itself secure” (p. 189). Due to Niebuhr’s Christian perspective, however, he
believed that free will gave humankind a far greater capacity to place the ego in check than Hobbes’s
science assumed. Rather than acknowledge man’s free will to live morally, Hobbes turns to the state “to
avoid anarchy by the creation of an absolute government, to the authority of which all social decisions are
submitted” (p. 100). Therefore, Niebuhr concluded that Hobbes’s science underestimated the human
capacity for self-control and overestimated the capacity of political systems to address specific deficiencies
in human nature. It is in this way that Niebuhr criticizes not only Hobbes, but also, scientific idealism in
general, as “man actually has a greater degree of freedom in his essential structure and less freedom in
history than modern culture assumes” (p. 101). See The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. 1 (Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964).
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his imagination, and he will not be satisfied until the universal objectives which the
imagination envisages are attained.” 27 This inordinate selfishness is the reason why
society resembles “a perpetual state of war” because “lacking moral and rational
resources to organize its [society’s] life, without resort to coercion . . . men remain the
victims of the individuals, classes and nations by whose force a momentary coerced unity
is achieved, and further conflicts are certainly created.” 28 Like Hobbes in Leviathan,
Niebuhr was aware that the problems in politics can be directly attributed to the
inordinate love of glory that characterizes the ambitious few. 29 However, Niebuhr was
much more pessimistic than Hobbes about the capacity of science or education to do
much to solve the commonwealth’s moral dilemmas.
In his introduction to Moral Man and Immoral Society, Niebuhr points out that
“the most persistent error of modern educators and moralists is the assumption that our
social difficulties are due to the failure of the social sciences to keep pace with the
physical sciences which have created our technological civilization. . . . This assumption
is that, with a little more time, a little more adequate moral and social pedagogy and a
generally higher development of human intelligence, our social problems will approach

27

See Niebuhr’s Moral Man and Immoral Society (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000), p. 44.
Cf. Leviathan, I.8.137: “The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane, clean, obscene,
grave, and light, without shame or blame; which verball discourse cannot do, father than the judgement
shall approve of the Time, Place, and Persons.”
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Niebuhr (2001), pp. 19-20.

Perhaps the best statement of how the love of glory corrupts the commonwealth can be found in
Gabriella Slomp’s Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory where she states, “Of all human
passions Hobbes highlighted one that in his view was of paramount political importance—the human desire
for ‘glory,’ which in today’s language translates not simply as the desire of prestige, but also the desire to
acquire power over others” (Slomp, 2000, p. 33).
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solution.” 30 One senses that Behemoth’s A and the general aims of Leviathan as outlined
in the preceding section share the optimistic assumption Niebuhr attributes to social
science. As we have seen, A wonders “why may not men be taught their duty” and
Leviathan seems to be a work that is devoted to teaching citizens their duty. The problem
with this solution, like all scientific solutions, is that “reason is always, to some degree,
the servant of interest in a social situation,” and “social injustice cannot be resolved by
moral and rational suasion alone, as the educator and social scientist usually believes.
Conflict is inevitable, and in this conflict power must be challenged by power.” 31 In
other words, Niebuhr argues that no matter how reasonable a scientific solution may
seem change can only occur within the political system through the use of coercion. The
reasonableness of an administration in no way influences its longevity, because
administrations do not sustain themselves through their reasonableness alone. The
strength of an individual’s partisan affiliation can and often does trump the individual’s
loyalty to the state, for a science of politics that presumes that the collective body politic
will be rational fails to account for the stubbornness of human factions to presume their
own prerogatives in defiance of what is rational. In Niebuhr’s realism, the persuasive
power of science can do little to convince factions to abrogate their desire for dominance,
for reason oftentimes served as a pretext and moral justification for partisan conflict.

30

Niebuhr (2001), p. xxvi.
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History, Niebuhr claimed, showed the futility of social science to create the sort of
theories that were applicable to politics. 32
To be fair, Leviathan recognized that the commonwealth was only as stable as the
willingness of individuals to abrogate their partisan loyalty in favor of loyalty to the state.
Hobbes admitted that “nothing can be immortall, which mortals make; yet, if men had the
use of reason they pretend to, their Common-wealths might be secured, at least, from
perishing by internall diseases.” 33 Of course, the security of the commonwealth is
predicated on a very tenuous if, for it may very well be the case that human beings simply
persist in their irrationality. In this light, Leviathan seems to be a hope rather than a
serious plan for change. The way Hobbes counteracted the power that factions had over
the public was simply to describe such loyalties as absurd, an example being the
comparison of the Papacy to the “Kingdome of Fairies.” 34 What Niebuhr argues is that
merely pointing out the absurdities that cause problems in politics does nothing to
eliminate the absurdities from public life. The power that the Pope, the Presbyterian
congregations, the aristocracy, or any insulated community exercises over public life is
32

“What is lacking among all these moralists, whether religious or rational, is an understanding of the
brutal character of human collectives, and the power of self-interest and collective egoism in all intergroup
relations. Failure to recognize the stubborn resistance of group egoism to all moral and inclusive social
objectives inevitably involves them in unrealistic and confused political thought. They regard social
conflict either as an impossible method of achieving morally approved ends or as a momentary expedient
which a more perfect education or a purer religion will make unnecessary. They do not see that the
limitations of the human imagination, the easy subservience of reason to prejudice and passion, and the
consequent persistence of irrational egoism, particularly in group behavior, make social conflict an
inevitability in human history, probably to its very end” (ibid., p. xxx).
33
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Leviathan, II.29.363.

“Fairies have no existence, but in the Fancies of ignorant people, rising from the Traditions of old Wives,
or old Poets: so the Spirituall Power of the Pope (without the bounds of his own Civill Dominion)
consisteth onely in the Fear that Seduced people stand in, of their Excommunication; upon hearing of false
Miracles, false Traditions, and false Interpretations of the Scripture,” (ibid., IV.47.714).
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not contingent on whether it makes sense to science. As we have seen in chapter III, the
group only needs to make sense to its members. Members of a group are naturally
hesitant to embrace any philosophical critique that is prejudicial to their deeply held
beliefs. In a humorous aside Niebuhr ridicules the notion that social science can topple
unjust regimes as “most social scientists are such unqualified rationalists that they seem
to imagine that men of power will immediately check their exactions and pretensions in
society, as soon as they have been appraised by the social scientists that their actions and
attitudes are anti-social.” 35 This description would seem to fit the Hobbes of Leviathan
perfectly, for he presumed a persuasive power in science that required an enlightened
public that he himself could not guarantee. If Leviathan was intended for general public
consumption it would seem that the public was ill prepared to digest it.
E.H. Carr, a reader of both Hobbes and Niebuhr, critiqued social science in a
different way. He examined the difference between scientific idealism and historical
realism as rooted in the difference between the intellectual and the statesman. Carr
observed that:
It is in the nature of things that the intellectual should find himself in the
camp which seeks to make practice conform to theory; for intellectuals are
particularly reluctant to recognize their thought as conditioned by forces
external to themselves, and like to think of themselves as leaders whose
theories provide the motive force for so-called men of action. Moreover,
the whole intellectual outlook of the last two hundred years has been
strongly coloured by the mathematical and natural sciences. To establish a
general principle, and to test the particular in the light of that principle, has
been assumed by most intellectuals to be the necessary foundation and
starting-point of any science. In this respect, utopianism with its
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insistence on general principles may be said to represent the characteristic
intellectual approach to politics. 36
What is important to understand here is that Carr’s general criticism can also be applied
to Hobbes’s political science, for it too was “coloured by the mathematical and natural
sciences.” The reason why Hobbes’s Leviathan is more utopian than realistic is found in
the very qualities that made the work attractive to Dewey and Tönnies: its rigorous
theoretical approach, the certainty with which it presented itself, and the optimistic belief
in the ability of science to transform the regime. As a mathematician and humanist,
Hobbes was an academic more than he was a man of action. Given his background,
Hobbes was able to write the sort of treatise that would appeal to academicians.
Political philosophers, however, do not always come from the academy; some of
the most important voices in political thought come from backgrounds in public service.
Carr recognized that the “bureaucrat purports to handle each particular problem ‘on its
merits’” or “to eschew the formulation of principles and to be guided on the right course
by some intuitive process born of long experience and not of conscious reasoning.” 37
This is the political thought we find in Machiavelli, a thinker who demonstrates Carr’s
assertion that “practice, not theory, bureaucratic training, not intellectual brilliance, is the
school of political wisdom.” 38 This practical wisdom of politics “is bound up with the

36

See Carr’s Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919-1939, second edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1946), p. 14.

37

Ibid., p. 16.

38
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one lives to how one should live that he who lets go of what is done for what should be done learns his ruin
rather than his preservation” (p. 61). Notice also that Machiavelli recommends in chapter 14 that “a prince
should read histories,” as opposed to philosophy, “and consider in them the actions of excellent men,
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existing order, the maintenance of tradition, and the acceptance of precedent as the ‘safe’
criterion of action.” 39 Turning back to Lincoln Steffens, this is the wisdom that made
organizations such as Tammany Hall so formidable. When asked why reform
administrations filled with educated men had difficulty sustaining themselves, Tammany
insider George Washington Plunkitt answered:
The fact is that a reformer can’t last in politics. He can make a show in it
for a while, but he always comes down like a rocket. Politics is as much a
regular business as the grocery or the dry-goods or the drug business.
You’ve got to be trained up for it or you’re sure to fall. . . . It’s just the
same with a reformer. He hasn’t been brought up in the difficult business
of politics and he makes a mess of it every time. 40
It would seem from this passage that realistic politics is not an academic endeavor. It is,
as Plunkitt so bluntly put it, “difficult business” and requires a set of skills that has more
in common with the concreteness of history than it does with the abstract clarity of
geometry. When we examine how Hobbes portrays sovereignty in Leviathan, we see it
as a list of powers and duties necessary for the purposes of the commonwealth. Viewed
in this way, the sovereign is no more than the people’s clerk, albeit one with high status
and meaning in the commonwealth. 41 Leviathan’s strength is that it reduces the art of

should see how they conducted themselves in wars, should examine the causes of their victories and losses,
so as to be able to avoid the latter and imitate the former” (p. 60). Compare this with Leviathan’s
description of vainglory in chapter 6, “which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in our
selves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the Histories, or Fictions
of Gallant Persons; and is corrected often times by Age, and Employment” (Leviathan, I.6.125).
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Those who are familiar with Richard Neustadt’s work on the American presidency will recognize the
argument here, for “’powers’ are no guarantee of power; clerkship is no guarantee of leadership. The
President of the United States has an extraordinary range of formal powers, of authority in statute law and
in the Constitution.” And yet “despite his ‘powers’ he does not obtain results by giving orders—or not, at
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governing to a science that may be quickly and readily understood by practically anyone
with the patience and inclination to digest it. However, this may also be Leviathan’s
greatest weakness, because sovereignty is only as capable as the person who possesses it.
In this sense, what differentiates an effective sovereign executive from an ineffective one
depends upon the sovereign’s personal and charismatic qualities. Hobbes’s scientific
method was appealing to social scientists such as Dewey and Tönnies, who believed that
a systematic approach was necessary to understand the underlying dynamics of political
consent. However, politics and political persuasion were still very much human
endeavors that were subject to the inherent strengths and weaknesses of human beings as
political actors. This is not a theme that resonates strongly in Leviathan, but a closer
inspection of the work reveals that Hobbes was also writing for another audience, one
that was far more politically astute and able to implement the lessons in Leviathan.
Section 3: The Applicability of Hobbes’s Science
A close inspection of Leviathan reveals that Hobbes was already moving in the
direction of giving advice to statesmen before his dialogues were written. Chapter 31
reveals that the intended audience of Leviathan not only includes those who serve and are
instructed by the academy, but also includes existing sovereigns of states or even
potential sovereigns of states. We find that Hobbes understood that if the
recommendation so carefully described in Leviathan had any hope of implementation, it

any rate, merely by giving orders. He also has extraordinary status, ex officio, according to the customs of
our government and politics. Here is testimony that despite his status he does not get action without
argument. Presidential power is the power to persuade.” See Richard Neustadt’s Presidential Power and
the Modern Presidents, 1990 Edition (New York, NY: Free Press, 1990), pp. 10-11.
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would have to come from an already established sovereign. Moreover, the sovereign had
to be of the type that is independent or mindful enough to read and consider the work
alone without the aid of advisors, whether loyal or not. This presupposes that the
sovereign possesses a modicum of time, leisure, and inclination for study. Besides these
personal qualities, Hobbes understood that the sovereign who was to promulgate and
implement his Leviathan needed to have the ability to “exercise . . . entire sovereignty” 42
to implement his policy for the subjects under this rule. This seems to imply that it was
necessary for the sovereign to possess this power before Leviathan could successfully be
promulgated to the people as Hobbes seemed convinced that his philosophy would come
under attack. 43 Viewed in this way, Leviathan is not so much an argument to adopt the
absolute sovereign representative, but rather presupposes that the absolute sovereign is
already in place. Given that Hobbes wrote Leviathan specifically because he believed
that philosophy needed to be “put into order,” Hobbes further required that the sovereign
in question would be unusually open-minded. In short, just as Plato required a Dion of
Syracuse, or Machiavelli required a Lorenzo de’Medici, so too did Hobbes require a
sovereign with certain specific qualities to bring the commonwealth into order.
Yet this presents a problem for Hobbes. On the one hand, he suggests in
Leviathan’s chapter 31 that only a sovereign with sufficient power can hope to implement
his vision of the properly constructed commonwealth. On the other hand, Hobbes
42
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“There ought certainly to be great care taken, to have it [civil and moral doctrine] pure, both from the
Venime of Heathen Politicians, and from the Incantation of Deceiving Spirits. And by that means the most
men, knowing their Duties, will be less subject to serve the Ambition of a few discontented persons”
(Leviathan, Review and Conclusion, p. 728).
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suggests in Leviathan’s chapter 29 that only a properly constructed commonwealth can
give the sovereign the power needed to secure salus populi. True to his model of the
commonwealth as an artificial person, Hobbes identifies the “infirmities” of the
commonwealth in terms of “imperfect institution” and “seditious doctrine” corresponding
to “defectious procreation” and “poyson” in the human body. 44 The infirmities caused by
imperfect institution are reduced to one: “want of absolute power.” 45 In other words,
commonwealths that provide only limited power to the sovereign authority necessarily
limit the ability of the sovereign to protect the people from threats.
Hobbes packages his explanation of imperfect institution in the form of advice to
a governing sovereign. He observes that “when Kings deny themselves some such
necessary Power, it is not always (though sometimes) out of ignorance of what is
necessary to the office they undertake; but many times out of a hope to recover the same
again at their pleasure.” 46 One is reminded of those sovereigns discussed in Hobbes’s
dialogues, like Henry VII, Henry VIII, and Elizabeth I, who governed with Parliament
when it was convenient. Here, however, Hobbes states that sovereigns who would limit
the power of the office by choice “reason not well; because such as will hold them to
their promises, shall be maintained against them by forraign Common-wealths; who in
order to the good of their own Subjects let slip few occasions to weaken the estate of their
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Neighbours.” 47 Sovereigns should never give up their prerogatives, for if circumstances
require sovereigns to take their prerogatives back, it “hath the resemblance of an unjust
act; which disposeth great numbers of men (when occasion is presented) to rebell.” 48
This advice is also important because Hobbes uses history to justify this advice. He uses
the examples of Henry II, William I, William II, the Roman republic, and the Athenian
democracy under Solon as evidence that sovereigns sometimes have difficulty
reacquiring prerogatives that were given up.
In this respect, the explanation resembles the reason of state arguments from
Hobbes’s earlier works and the dialogues he would produce after the Restoration. All of
the elements associated with Hobbes’s dialogues are here in his explanation of imperfect
institution. To start, Hobbes framed the problem of imperfect institution in terms of the
sovereign’s actions and not as a constitutional problem or a problem of institutional
structure. Hobbes emphasizes the role that public perception plays in the stability of the
commonwealth and gives the sovereign practical advice on how public perception can be
influenced. He also uses history to show why it is important for sovereigns to follow his
advice, relying on historical examples to prove his case rather than proving it himself
through the use of abstract analogies.
This advice seems to be maintained by Hobbes in his later writings as well.
Hobbes’s science claimed that Charles I had unlimited prerogative power as sovereign by
right of the office. This included the right to acquire funds for the defense of the
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commonwealth, something that Behemoth’s A explains when discussing the ship money
controversy. 49 Yet when asserting this right, Charles I’s sovereign prerogative was
blocked by Parliament. The conventional understanding of why Parliament blocked
Charles I’s acquisition of ship money is that Parliament was emboldened by the success it
had in freeing a “few preachers and writers” who were imprisoned for sedition. 50 It then
proceeded against Charles I’s prerogative to levy ship money, rallying “against it as an
oppression” against the Petition of Right signed almost a decade earlier by Charles I
himself as well as other more ancient precedents that preceded him. 51 Although Hobbes
does not mention Charles I in his examples of sovereigns who are unable to gain back
prerogatives that are given away, the inability of Charles I to procure ship money could
be linked to Charles I’s signing of the Petition of Right in 1628. Thus Leviathan
foreshadows the approach Hobbes takes in his dialogues, as Hobbes starts to approach the
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When the people give the sovereign “the burthen of defending the whole kingdom, and governing it,
upon any person whatsoever, there is very little equity he should depend on others for the means of
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task of leadership as a matter of the sovereign’s actions rather than as a matter solely
related to the institutional structure of the commonwealth.
However, Hobbes’s Leviathan seems to be less focused on offering the sovereign
practical advice than it is on the broad mandates or duties of sovereignty. The absolute
sovereign that Hobbes envisions in Leviathan cannot be just any sovereign, but one who
places just rule ahead of personal gain. In order to ensure the safety of the people, the
sovereign had to be equitable toward his subjects, and equity requires that “justice be
equally administered to all degrees of people.” 52 Behemoth’s A believed that Charles I’s
administration met this standard, but this was not enough to secure his reign. Like the
citizens of New York City at the time of Steffens, Charles I’s subjects had no
appreciation for good administration. After A describes the seven groups which seduced
the English people to civil war, B makes the observation that, “in such a constitution . . .
the King is already ousted of his government, so as they needed not arms for it. For I
cannot imagine how the King may come by any means to resist them.” 53 Despite having
nearly unlimited power and the innate sense of equity to use that power fairly, Charles I
was unable to secure peace within the commonwealth.
While Hobbes indicates in Leviathan that it is the sovereign’s responsibility never
to waive or forego the prerogatives of the office, what is a sovereign to do if the office
itself does not grant the prerogatives that Hobbes’s science deems necessary? While the
advice Hobbes gives to sovereigns in chapter 28 of Leviathan is similar to the advice
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implied in his dialogues, what is lacking in Hobbes’s science in Leviathan is a realistic
assessment of the limitations of what a sovereign can do in a given historical
circumstance. Conversely, there is no recognition in Leviathan that a sovereign’s
political skill can overcome the limitations that the political environment presents. While
it is certainly Hobbes’s hope that science, those “rules of just and unjust sufficiently
demonstrated, and from principles evident to the meanest capacity,” 54 will prevent civil
war and protect good sovereigns, Hobbes in Behemoth recognized that no regime in
history—not even his own regime—was able to overcome civil unrest through general
scientific enlightenment. This becomes apparent when we recognize that B’s role in
Behemoth is instrumental to the central theme. If “people always have been, and always
will be, ignorant of their duty to the public,” 55 politics will require a sovereign than can
survive in such a hostile environment. The fact that Hobbes emphasizes the importance
of both “politik capacity” and “natural capacity” in A Dialogue only underscores the
point that the success or failure of a sovereign’s governance can only be partly explained
by the constitutional powers of the office. When assessing Charles I—or any sovereign
for that matter—personal skill becomes equally important. That is why the collapse of
Charles I’s regime can be only partly explained by the conventional understanding that
“the people were corrupted generally, and disobedient persons esteemed the best
patriots.” 56 While this may have been true, it does not explain how sovereigns such as
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William I, Henry VII, Henry VIII, and Elizabeth I could have long and prestigious reigns.
They, like Charles I, had to contend with religious upheaval, cultural upheaval, wars,
customary expectations, and unpopular taxation. Yet these sovereigns, far from losing
their heads, were historically revered for their ability to govern the English
commonwealth. Hobbes’s closer examination of these sovereigns in his dialogues
suggests that he is attempting something different in his dialogues than in his treatises,
but what exactly is he trying to convey, and why is it important?
Section 4: Conclusion
Hobbes’s science is similar to A’s view of the events between 1640 and 1660 in
Behemoth: “as from the Devil’s Mountain,” an analogy that includes both distance and
perspective. Hobbes’s science has some distance from its subjects. It does not explain
political turmoil or stability by describing particular places, particular personalities, or
particular times. In other words, Hobbes’s science does not generally include firsthand
accounts from real events as a way of explaining politics. Instead, the scientist takes a
perspective that is detached from the reality under investigation, using reified models to
explain the phenomena under investigation. Although Hobbes admits his Leviathan
draws inspiration from the English Civil War, 57 the work is considerably broader in its
appeal and applicability. This is where Hobbes’s perspective plays a key role. Just as A
claimed to be able to see “all kinds of injustice, and all kinds of folly” from his
perspective atop the Devil’s Mountain, Hobbes also claimed that the conclusions of his
science were not limited to any particular time or historical circumstance. His science
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offers a simplified framework that is akin to mathematical rules which “discharges our
mentall reckoning, of time and place; and delivers us from all labour’s of the mind,
saving the first; and makes that which was found true here, and now, to be true in all
times and places.” 58
Continuing the analogy of the Devil’s Mountain, one might imagine two
spectators of human activity in a city corresponding to the two ways human beings gain
knowledge of human activity. One observer is on the street and in the crowd, observing
directly all the flavor and nuances of the subjects under investigation. The observer’s
senses are filled with a richness of detail about individual human beings, and especially
when any particular human being is unique, special, or draws attention to himself. One
can certainly gain a great wealth of information about human beings by observing in this
fashion, but the scope and certainty of the observer’s knowledge will be limited in a
number of crucial ways. The observer’s information will be limited to the street he
observes, which may not necessarily be applicable to other streets in the city that are not
under observation. Moreover, the observer is not only a passive spectator, but is also a
part of the crowd. As such, the observer will be subject to all of the same conditions the
crowd is subjected to. The observer’s attention will be drawn to the same phenomena
that draw the crowd, and there is a chance that the observations gained will not be
indicative of the underlying truth of what is actually occurring. This is akin to the
previous method of political philosophy that the divinity schools in Hobbes’s time
practiced, and the method Hobbes criticized.
58

Ibid., I.4.104.

268
Let us then imagine another observer, but instead of observing a city from street
level, this observer gazes from a vantage point that can observe the entire city at once.
His vantage point is no longer limited to one street alone but includes all of the streets at
the same time. Moreover, the observer is no longer part of the crowd and is therefore
able to see the city without actually becoming a part of the city. From such a vantage
point, the observer is able to see the general patterns as everyone goes about his business
on the streets below. While this observer from this vantage point cannot make out the
details of the people that he observes, he is also not deceived by those details as the
crowds are. If we imagine science as Hobbes does, the political scientist is one who is
like this second observer: a discerner of universal knowledge about human beings and the
political institutions they create using a high vantage point. However, instead of a
physical vantage point, the political scientist uses a conceptual vantage point, one that
uses a theoretical framework and a precise method to discern general laws concerning
human nature and government. This does not require knowledge of particular human
beings or particular governments, for studying particulars is akin to using the vantage
point of the first observer; the knowledge of particular past events or people can yield
little in terms of general laws and immutable truth, though it can have the illusion of law
or truth. Hobbes’s science, however, indicates that this kind of knowledge yields
anything but certainty. 59 Knowledge gained from ratiocination, or through systematic
method, possesses a certainty that common memory, experience, or prudence can never
possess. It is the conceptual vantage point, or using Behemoth’s A’s words, the Devil’s
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Mountain, that provides him with a much better perspective from which he may derive
universal truth.
Like many social scientists that would succeed him, Hobbes hoped that his
method could yield a kind of universal understanding of politics and justice available to
everyone. This does not imply, however, that Hobbes’s vision was resistant to criticism.
Just as the idealism of social scientists would come under attack from the realists in the
twentieth century, Hobbes’s idealism came under attack when the leading scholars of his
age criticized the validity of his science. Turning back to the introduction of this study,
three criticisms were leveled against Hobbes’s science in his time, criticisms reiterated by
scholars closer to our own time when they reflect on Hobbes’s science.
The first of these criticisms was shared by both Clarendon from Hobbes’s time
and Jane Mansbridge from our own. Both concluded that Hobbes’s science has a narrow
view of human nature. For them, Hobbes’s science determined that human beings are not
only motivated primarily by self-interest, but a particularly narrow form of self-interest
that failed to take into account the ability of human beings to act in concord with one
another. While Hobbes’s dialogues do not dispute the claim that human beings are
motivated by self-interest, they also show that the motivations that underpin human
behavior are more nuanced than those described in Hobbes’s science. A reader of
Hobbes’s dialogues will certainly find a plethora of examples that show mankind’s
selfish nature. One will also find several passages that show mankind’s hope for a better,
more moral and fulfilling life. To achieve this life, human beings are more apt to follow
“their immediate leaders; which are either the preachers, or the most potent of the
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gentlemen that dwell amongst them” than they are to follow their own interests. 60 The
dialogues show that human beings are, in truth, far more naturally governable than
Mansbridge and Clarendon assume. Human beings naturally gravitate toward those
leaders who can promise them felicity even if those leaders promise impossibilities such
as “security against all the World.” 61 The dialogues show that human beings can make
good decisions such as the choice to restore the crown to the Stuarts. However, the
dialogues also show that human beings often place their hopes for a better future in the
hands of those who “seem wise,” but use their wisdom only to “abuse the Common
People to their own ends.” 62 Far from being creatures that suffer on account of their
natural selfishness, Hobbes’s human beings seem unaware of what their self-interest
requires, gravitating towards any personality that may offer them deliverance from their
woes.
This depiction of human beings is not absent from Hobbes’s science, nor is it
absent from the interpretations of Hobbes’s dialogues by scholars such as Robert
Kraynak. 63 Behemoth and A Dialogue show how human beings are often misled. They
make decisions that seem amicable to their interests only to discover that the only
interests that are served are the ambitions of a select few. This widespread naïveté
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constituted a problem in politics and, as Kraynak rightly observed, this was a problem
that Hobbes’s political science was designed to counteract. 64
It is not, however, the solution that was adopted by the English people during the
Restoration. On the one hand, Hobbes’s history of the English Civil War shows why
political science is useful. On the other, it shows how peace can be achieved when
political science plays no part in achieving it. The same tendency that causes human
beings to follow bad leaders is also the means by which human beings can choose good
leaders: sovereigns who have both natural ability and the good sense to govern well.
Human beings follow leaders on the basis of whether their interests will be served, and
they determine whether their interests are served by referring to their own experiences
under good and bad leaders. While not perfect, this common sense reckoning is the best
reckoning that human beings possess when science is unavailable. Science alone can do
nothing when it is never allowed to influence a general audience. Memory, however, is
available to everyone. Using the example of the street observer, the person who uses
memory to discern the truth will not have the privileged perspective available to the
observer that takes a vantage point outside of the crowd. The street observer is part of the
crowd and can be misled or deceived as everyone else. Unable to utilize a higher vantage
point that observes the whole city, the street observer is limited in his perception. Unless
an event is large or vivid enough to capture the attention of every person on every street,
each observer on street level will have a very limited and perhaps unreliable conception
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of the city as a whole. A’s observation that the instigators of the Civil War “had learned
nothing” 65 seems to support the notion that whatever led the English people to restore the
monarchy had little to do with the adoption of better, more enlightened, principles.
Rather, the Restoration was brought about because the instigators of the rebellion “knew
they had acted vilely and sottishly,” 66 implying that the factions involved in the rebellion
learned something; but how did they learn this—and more importantly—from where?
The only explanation seems to be that the memory of the events between the late
1630’s and early 1660’s taught the English people that it was in its interest to restore the
monarchy. While Hobbes prefers knowledge gained by ratiocination to knowledge
gained from experience, the English Civil War was not just any experience. For Hobbes,
it was a series of events that affected nearly every aspect of English life and included
nearly every person in the English commonwealth. The fact that Behemoth ends with the
vast majority of the people reaching the same conclusion about the necessity of bringing
Charles II to the throne only reaffirms that a suitably vivid, large, or important event can
serve as a teacher. This would certainly explain why Hobbes would write in Behemoth’s
Epistle Dedicatory that “there can be nothing more instructive towards loyalty and justice
than will be the memory, while it lasts” of the English Civil War. 67 Determining how
one’s self-interest is best served can be a complicated matter to discern. Memory,
experience, and prudence are often insufficient in themselves to provide clarity in terms
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of understanding how one’s interest is served. Yet it seems that an experience as large
and encompassing as civil war can serve as a catalyst for reflection on how one’s selfinterest is best served. This is something of a departure from the teaching found in
Hobbes’s scientific treatises where memories and experiences are typically denigrated as
sources of correct knowledge. Behemoth is a case study in how the English people were
able to discover peace despite the fact that science had little or no impact in fostering the
peace.
This is not the only way in which Hobbes’s dialogues offer a more comprehensive
view of politics than the one found in his scientific treatises alone. Clarendon made
another criticism of Hobbes’s science in the seventeenth century, a criticism that
persisted into the twentieth century through the writings of Hannah Arendt and Albert
Hirschman. Specifically, Hobbes’s science seems to devalue the capacity of human
beings to practice virtue, heroism, and other actions that one might call noble. Hobbes’s
science as outlined in his treatises attributes such high actions as a manifestation of what
he calls “vain-glory” which “conisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in our
selves, which we know are not.” 68 Instead, Hobbes’s science tends to praise the low or
base motives of human beings such as the “desire of ease, and sensuall Delight,” for these
are identified as those motives that “disposeth men to obey a common Power.” 69
Hobbes did not always believe that these lower motivations such as the desire for
sensual delight are always good, nor did he always believe that those higher or more
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noble motivations such as virtue or heroism are necessarily destructive. Behemoth’s A
issues strong condemnation to those partisans who “would have taken any side for pay or
plunder.” 70 Perhaps the best example of a group of people that has a strong desire for
ease and sensual delight would be the city of London, which “has a great belly, but no
palate nor taste of right and wrong.” 71 It would seem that the “belly,” symbolizing the
desires of the people, can cause more discord than peace unless it is tempered by
civilizing influences. Hobbes’s hope was that science could temper these desires, or at
least direct them towards the understanding that they can be best served by obedience to a
common power. London would be the first city to support Lord Monck’s faction,
eventually restoring the monarchy, but the influence of science as Hobbes understood it
played little or no role in persuading London to support Lord Monck’s faction. One
might be inclined to claim, as Hobbes seemed to claim, that the city of London was one
of those groups that had learned nothing and was just as much governed by its belly after
the Restoration as it was before.
Yet what could account for the change that brought about the Restoration?
Besides the notion that the memories and experiences of the people might have been
instrumental in causing a change of disposition, the English Civil War revealed the
character and skill of a wide variety of political actors. Some of these actors, such as
Lord Monck, were able to operate in a political environment that was hardly ideal by the
standards of Hobbes’s science. Mixed government, stubborn customs, persistent
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precedents, and a want of absolute prerogative were political realities that faced not only
the key figures of the English Civil War, but also those monarchs in English history that
preceded the war. It may have been Hobbes’s hope that the English constitutional
structure could mimic the model outlined in his Leviathan and elsewhere in his scientific
works. The fact of the matter was, however, that the powers and prerogatives of the
sovereign could in no way substitute for the sovereign’s skill. Unfortunately, there is
little discussion in Hobbes’s scientific treatises on the subject of political skill, those
skills that separate effective sovereigns from ineffective ones. The closest Hobbes comes
to a discussion of political skill is a rather broad mandate that the sovereign should be
skillful enough to ensure that the duty of securing salus populi is fulfilled and a rather
stern suggestion that a sovereign should not willingly give up those powers vested in the
office. However, none of this explains exactly how a sovereign is to fulfill the mandate
of procuring salus populi, nor does this explain how a sovereign is to conduct his affairs
if a necessary constitutional power is formally lacking or taken away by forces beyond
his control. The reality of sovereignty in practice is far more nuanced than the rational,
yet simplistic, ideal institution of sovereign as described in Hobbes’s science.
Hobbes never claimed that the institution of sovereign could not be improved.
One can assume that he believed the institution of sovereignty could very much be
improved, but the striking feature of his post-Restoration dialogues is how much he
emphasized leadership as opposed to institutions. His dialogues contain evidence of
personal qualities that made particular sovereigns excel at the role. Sovereigns that are
criticized in Hobbes’s scientific treatises are praised in Hobbes’s dialogues; William the
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Conqueror, Henry VII, and Elizabeth I receive a far better assessment from Hobbes in the
dialogues than they do in his science. It is how each of these sovereigns uses the power
of the office, rather than how each increased the authority of the office, that distinguishes
these sovereigns from others. For example, Henry VIII’s shrewd political maneuvering
after his separation from the Catholic Church was, for Hobbes, more important than the
establishment of the Anglican Church. Henry VII was praised for his ability to acquire
funds in spite of the fact that he had to levy these funds through Parliament. This is why
Hobbes described Henry VII and Henry VIII in terms of the “two great virtues” 72 as both
sovereigns displayed uncanny skill that came from their own personalities rather than
from the office they filled.
This praise of skill is not limited to sovereigns only, but also extends to Lord
Monck and his “greatest stratagem that is extant in history.” 73 While he possessed no
formal title of sovereignty other than the right of the sword, Lord Monck began and
oversaw a chain of events that would eventually restore both the monarchy and peace to a
war-weary England. While Hobbes’s characters described Monck’s actions in glorious
terms, it would be a mistake to claim that Monck’s actions were vainglorious.
Behemoth’s A hopes that the king shall “have as often as there shall be need” of a general
like Monck, 74 suggesting that Monck’s example is worthy of emulation, not
condemnation. Public virtue, therefore, is not a characteristic that should concern
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sovereigns only, but should also concern the people under the sovereign’s rule. Far from
being a passive figure desiring safety and comfort, Lord Monck is praised for taking an
active role in providing order, leadership, and stability when the sovereign is unable to
provide these things. This idea of public virtue was an idea that Hobbes held early in his
career, and he reintroduced it in his dialogues. Taken as a whole, Hobbes’s writings
seem to show that human beings are capable of acting on motives that one might call
publically spirited or noble. Far from being destructive, such high motives are crucial to
the establishment and maintenance of peace and order. This is not a concept that is easy
to glean from Hobbes’s science solely, but is readily apparent when Hobbes’s dialogues
and pre-scientific writings are considered alongside Hobbes’s science.
Considering only Hobbes’s science, one is led to believe that politics does not
require political skill as such, but a knowledge of “certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique
and Geometry.” 75 In other words, Hobbes promoted the idea that the problems of civil
society could be solved through the correct application of scientifically derived solutions.
This belief that science could overcome, and perhaps even replace, the statesman’s art
(referred to as mere “tennis-play” by Hobbes) was one of the reasons Hobbes was
perennially criticized from the time of Bishop Bramhall to more recent times. For
Bramhall, Hobbes’s scientific doctrine failed to capture the essence of politics as a
complex and dynamic enterprise based upon the needs of the moment. Instead, Hobbes’s
science described politics as a rather simple and static exercise based upon general rules,
which in Bramhall’s view, “signifie not much in policy” because “the quintessence of
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policy doth consist in the dexterous and skillful application of those rules to the subject
matter.” 76 There is little direct evidence that Hobbes actually took Bramhall’s criticism
seriously. However, Hobbes does seem to focus his attention on the dynamic nature of
leadership more thoroughly in his post-Restoration dialogues than he did in his preRestoration scientific treatises. This is most apparent when we examine B’s contribution
to Hobbes’s overall message in Behemoth alongside A’s contribution.
Besides offering historical examples of skilled politicians, Hobbes offers practical
advice to sovereigns through his characters. Examples occur throughout the dialogue,
such as “they that keep an army, and cannot master it, must be subject to it as much as he
that keeps a lion in his house” and “those princes that with preferment are forced to buy
the obedience of their subjects, are already, or must be soon after, in a very weak
condition.” 77 Such statements give the sovereign practical advice to be applied in the
actual course of governing, which is somewhat different from the advice Hobbes presents
in his science concerning the general powers and mandates the sovereign should possess.
While Leviathan includes arguments for why sovereigns should have a monopoly on the
use of force, it says relatively little about the sovereign’s responsibility to master the use
of force. While Leviathan gives the sovereign the power to honor and dishonor, it says
relatively little about the consequences of preferment in terms of its ramifications on the
sovereign’s ability to lead. Hobbes’s science relies on the correct establishment and
order of institutions to create political stability. Hobbes’s dialogues, however, explain
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how the skill of sovereigns—more than the office of sovereign—sustains peace. While it
is true that Hobbes’s science views leadership as the application of scientifically derived
solutions to political problems, Hobbes’s dialogues describe how sovereigns respond to a
dynamic political environment by adopting strategies that allow them a great amount of
flexibility, sometimes following Hobbes’s set rules, and at other times breaking them.
The sovereign is bound to ensure salus populi for all citizens under the sovereign’s care.
However, sovereigns are allowed to be cruel, as King Ergamenes was cruel, when such
cruelty is necessary. While Hobbes argues against mixed government in his science,
mixed government need not be so problematic if the sovereign is skillful and wise enough
to know when it is advantageous to defer to a parliament and when it is necessary to act
outside of a parliament. Perhaps Charles I did not have this skill, but other sovereigns
described in Hobbes’s dialogues did have it. Hobbes’s explanation that a sovereign “of
ripe years and sound mind” will benefit from a strong Parliament only affirms that
skillful sovereigns will be able to survive and even thrive in a contested political arena.
Closer to our own time, Kraynak also criticized Hobbes’s belief in the power of
science. Instead of criticizing Hobbes’s science from a practical perspective as Bramhall
did, Kraynak criticizes Hobbes’s scientific works because they have the potential to be
just as dogmatic and uncompromising as the unscientific doctrines they are meant to
replace. Kraynak views Hobbes’s scientific works as “authoritative dictionaries of
political and philosophical terms—dictionaries in which Hobbes makes himself the new
authority and says, in effect ‘trust me.’” 78 Far from being trusted, however, Hobbes’s
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science was thoroughly condemned by most of his peers by the time he started to write
his dialogues. Hobbes may have hoped that his science could offer a way out of the
“Kingdom of Darkness” described in part IV of his Leviathan, and nothing in the
dialogues suggest that his science was not still useful in many respects, especially with
regard to understanding human nature and the proper ordering of institutions.
However, Hobbes seems to be much less optimistic in his dialogues than he is in
his scientific treatises that science can offer a practical solution to the problems of the
commonwealth, at least in the short term. Behemoth’s character A discusses the
possibility that science can provide the intellectual foundation that is necessary to ensure
loyalty to the sovereign. But, given the nature of both human beings and pedagogical
institutions, it is highly unlikely that science can ever be promulgated as it needs to be in
order for it to fulfill its intended purpose. While A maintains that university reform can
and will solve the problem of sedition, the university reform instituted by the Long
Parliament as described in dialogue three did nothing to save the people and Parliament
from the ambitions of Oliver Cromwell. Such a failure shows a weakness of science: it
can only be effective if political circumstances allow it to be. Fortunately, however,
science may not be necessary to ensure peace. One should not let the morose tone of
Behemoth’s narrative overshadow the fact that it has a happy ending. Despite the fact
that the English people never did embrace Hobbes’s science, they nevertheless managed
to restore the monarchy in spite of their ignorance. Their triumph can only be attributed
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to a long exposure to uncertainty and bad rule, coupled with what B called “the greatest
stratagem that is extant in history,” or General Monck’s coup d’état. 79
While Bishop Bramhall and Kraynak may approach their respective critiques
from different directions, both critics acknowledge that Hobbes’s science is too rigid and
inflexible to be truly useful. Bramhall’s concern was that Hobbes failed to capture
politics as a practical enterprise. Kraynak’s concern was that Hobbes’s enlightenment
science was so detached from the reality it sought to explain, it seemed to legitimize “the
ideological utopianism of the revolutionary intelligentsia” more than it seemed to
legitimize stable—but anecdotal—explanations of effective politics. 80 In the dialogues,
however, Hobbes seemed to eschew extended discussions on theoretical politics in favor
of discussing politics in practice.
Given the real possibility that Hobbes became pessimistic that science could
transform politics for the better, it is plausible that he turned his attention towards
understanding leadership. If B’s assertion that “all the states of Christendom will be
subject to these fits of rebellion, as long as the world lasteth” 81 is true, then the
commonwealth requires leaders that are able to survive and govern through such periods.
Truly capable leaders can function well even in circumstances that curtail or weaken their
constitutional authority, while the reverse is not true. This can explain why Hobbes was
much more sympathetic to the role of a strong Parliament in A Dialogue than he was in

79

Behemoth, p. 204.

80

Kraynak (1990), p. 207.

81

Behemoth, p. 71.

282
his scientific treatises. Strong leaders, like the historical monarchs that preceded Charles
I, are able to assert their prerogatives even when their authority is constitutionally
limited. They do this by using a combination of political capacity and natural capacity.
However, merely increasing the political capacity of a sovereign in no way will make
sovereigns more skillful. Charles I is a good example of a monarch who had a large
amount of political capacity, but was nevertheless outmaneuvered by those who were
more crafty than he. While Hobbes could not overtly criticize Charles I in Behemoth, the
criticism is implied in both the veneration his characters give to the historical sovereigns
and the various flaws of Charles I the characters delicately reveal throughout the
narrative.
While Hobbes’s scientific treatises contain arguments for absolute sovereignty,
they do not include much guidance as to who is best suited to be sovereign or how the
person who is made sovereign should fulfill the role. The dialogues attempt to fill in
what was missing in Hobbes’s science, albeit in a way that Hobbes’s science could not
fully endorse. History, prudence, and memory are all considered inferior sources of
knowledge according to Hobbes’s science, but these anecdotal sources of wisdom all play
important roles in Hobbes’s dialogues. One must have knowledge of history in order to
discover examples of effective leadership in practice. What one discovers is that the
prudence of leaders is what distinguishes effective leaders from ineffective ones. The
memory of times of bad leadership, like the time of the English Civil War, can often be
the best way for a body politic to practice loyalty and justice towards good leaders when
they appear. Therefore, it is no surprise that Hobbes writes to Lord Arlington, “there can
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be nothing more instructive towards loyalty and justice than the memory, while it lasts, of
that war,” 82 and why Hobbes chose to write about the English Civil War after the
Restoration.
In conclusion, it is tempting to view Thomas Hobbes as a rigid thinker who was
fully committed to his scientific project: to bring order to the study of political
philosophy through the establishment of a rigorous method of inquiry. The impact of his
approach is evidence of the seriousness and care with which he produced his work, as De
Cive, Leviathan, and De Corpore have influenced and continue to influence scholars to
the present day. However, we should not let the influence of Thomas Hobbes’s famous
works overshadow the fact that he was also a doubting Thomas: one who was self-critical
and always open to better explanations of the world around him, especially with respect
to human beings and the political forces that govern them. This should not be seen as a
weakness, but a strength of Hobbes as a political philosopher of the first rank. Doubt
does not imply denial, and the basic mission of Hobbes’s project remains the same
throughout his career. Simply put, how can human beings bring order out of chaos,
justice out of injustice, and stability out of instability? Hobbes’s science includes an
institutional solution, one that calls upon the human capacity to be makers and shapers of
institutions. Hobbes in his dialogues likewise calls upon human beings to be makers of
their own political order, but he does so by analyzing the personalized solutions that
various leaders and peoples create for themselves. An analysis of the English Civil War
or the common law may not offer generalizable solutions to the problems of order and
82
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peace. It does, however, realistically portray the conditions in which human beings find
themselves. The characters in Hobbes’s dialogues debate the relevance of theory to
practice, revealing that politics itself is often a debate between theory and practice.
Hobbes reaffirms that science can produce the most rational solution to our political ills
through his dialogues, but he also recognizes the limitations of matching theory to
practice. Recognizing this limitation, he rediscovered the important role human beings
play in bringing about their own political destiny, bringing life to the institutions Hobbes
so carefully considered in his treatises. Therefore, one may view the dialogues as a
completion of Hobbes’s philosophical project, but not because they describe the problem
that Hobbes’s science must solve. Rather, Hobbes’s dialogues describe the problem of
Hobbes’s science as well as the solution to that problem: that the science of politics does
not replace the art of rule, it requires the art of rule.
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